MANUEL BORJA, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. HON. FLORENCIO MORENO, AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, AND BENJAMIN YONZON, RESPONDENTS AND APPELLA…

This is an appeal by respondents Secretary of Public Works and
Communications and Benjamin Yonzon from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga dated November 9, 1959 in Civil Case No.
1508 of said Court, which was initiated by a petition of herein
appellee, Manuel Borja, for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with
preliminary injunction.

Borja is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of some 104
hectares in barrio Consuelo, municipality of Macabebe, province of
Pampanga, This land, utilized as a fishpond, was acquired by him from
Ayala and Company in 1937. On August 15, 1958 an administrative
complaint was filed with the office of respondent Secretary by Benigno
Musni and others, including then Senator de la Rosa, against a number
of landowners, among them petitioner Borja, for abatement of nuisance
and demolition of illegally constructed dams, dikes or any other works
in the. public navigable rivers in Macabebe, pursuant to the provisions
of Republic Act No. 2056. In the particular case of Borja, he was
alleged to have closed the stream called Matlaue, supposedly public,
which runs through his land.

Benjamin Yonzon, an attorney in the Department of Public Works and
Communications, was designated by the Secretary to investigate the
charges in the complaint. A copy of the decision, purportedly signed by
the Under-secretary, M. B. Bautista, and dated April 3, 1959, was
served upon counsel for Borja on June 12, 1959, ordering the latter as
follows: to “remove the dams and/or dikes illegally constructed across
the channel of the southern portion of Batacan-Matlaue including that
dam and/or dike found across the channel bordering the properties owned
by respondent and Maxima Vda. de Bias, and restore the bed to its
original condition within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of
this decision, otherwise, the removal thereof shall be effected by this
office or its duly authorized representative at the expense of the
respondent within ten (10) days after the expiration of the thirty-day
(30) period, without prejudice to whatever judicial action that may be
instituted against them pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2056.”

The foregoing decision of respondent Secretary was assailed by petitioner Borja in the latter’s petition before the court a quo
on several grounds: that it was based on erroneous findings of fact;
that it was contrary to law; that the investigation constituted a
usurpation of judicial power and hence beyond the jurisdiction of
respondent Secretary; that the delegation to Benjamin Yonzon of the
authority to investigate was illegal and therefore null and void; and
that the investigation was conducted with grave abuse of discretion and
in violation of due process. Respondents raised a number of defenses in
their answer to the petition, and after trial the court rendered the
judgment now subject to the present appeal, granting the writs prayed
for by petitioner; declaring null and void and of no legal effect all
proceedings had by respondents in the administrative investigation,
including the decision entered on April 3, 1959; restraining and
prohibiting respondent Secretary from enforcing said decision, and
declaring the injunction previously issued to be permanent.

The issues raised by appellants in this appeal are formulated in the errors assigned in their brief, as follows:

I

“The lower Court erred in holding in effect that
Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional in that it constitutes an
undue delegation of judicial power to an administrative official.

II

The lower Court erred in holding that there was no duty on the part of petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies.

III

The lower Court erred in not finding the decision of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications supported by evidence.

IV

The lower Court erred in holding that the Matlaue river is a private stream.

V

The lower Court erred in finding that respondent Benjamin Yonzon gravely used his discretion and acted capriciously.”

The provisions of Republic Act No. 2056 referred to by appellants in
their first assignment of en or are Sections 1 and 2. Section 1
provides that the construction or building of dams, dikes or any other
works which encroaches into any public navigable river, stream, coastal
waters and any other navigable public waters or waterways as well as
the construction or building of dams, dikes or any other works in areas
declared as communal fishing grounds shall be ordered removed as public
nuisances or as prohibited construction, but authorizes the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications to allow the construction of any
such works when public interest or safety so requires, or when it is
absolutely necessary for the protection of private property. Section 2
provides for due notice and hearing to establish the facts mentioned in
Section 1, after which the Secretary, upon an affirmative finding as to
their existence, is authorized to order the removal of the works
declared as nuisances or prohibited constructions, giving the party
concerned a period of not more than 30 days to do so, failing which
such removal should be carried out by the Secretary within 10 days
after the expiration of the period originally allowed. The same section
adds that the investigation to be conducted by the Secretary must be
terminated and decided by him within a period not exceeding 90 days
from the time a complaint in writing is filled with him by any
interested party apprising him of the existence of the illegal works or
constructions. Failure on his part, with- out justifiable reason, to
terminate or decide a case or to effect the removal of the works or
constructions within the time limit is considered an offense, for which
the corresponding penalty is prescribed.

With respect to the first error assigned by appellants, it is not
true that the trial court ruled the foregoing provisions
unconstitutional. On the contrary, it declined to pass upon the
constitutional question on the ground that those provisions do not
apply to the facts of the instant case. As far as may be gathered from
the court’s opinion, the particular fact which removes this case from
the purview of Republic Act No. 2056 and which it considered duly
established by the evidence is that the Matlaue stream which runs
through the land of petitioner-appellee is not a public navigable river
but his private property. The implication is that the authority of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications to proceed under the
provisions of said statute covers only cases where there is no dispute
as to the public navigable character of the river or water-way alleged
to be illegally obstructed, but that when this is precisely a basic
fact in contention the matter should be left to the courts for
determination.

To the writer of this opinion the view thus taken by the court a quo
and now urged upon us by petitioner-appellee has cogent reasons behind
it. There is a certain danger in leaving the adjudication of a claim of
private ownership of property, vis-a-vis the Government, in the hands
of an executive official. This danger is demonstrated by the very
argument of appellants under their third and fourth assignments of
error. They point to the evidence submitted at the administrative
investigation and, invoking the “substantial evidence” rule, assail the
lower court’s conclusion that the Matlaue stream is privately owned.
The said rule, indeed, which has been applied in a number of cases in
this jurisdiction, is that if there is substantial evidence to support
the findings of an administrative official in matters within his
competence, that is, “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion” (Ang Tibay vs.
CIR, 69 Phil. 635, 642), the courts are bound to look no further, not
even to consider contrary evidence of a preponderant nature. If the
decision of the administrative official carries with it, as the premise
upon which it rests, a finding that certain property claimed by a
private party to be his is in fact part of the public domain, it does
not seem fair to take that finding as conclusive upon the courts just
because it is supported by substantial evidence, although there may be
evidence to the contrary which, if properly considered and evaluated,
would lead them to a different conclusion.

The other members of this Court, however, hold that the authority of
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications to inquire into and
decide the question-of the public or private character of a river or
stream is incidental to the power conferred upon him by the statute to
conduct the necessary investigation and to order the removal of any
works which constitute obstructions therein. This authority recognized,
the next question posed by appellants is with respect to the
correctness of the trial court’s finding that the Matlaue stream is
privately owned by petitioner-appellee. Under the “substantial
evidence” rule (laying aside for the moment the question of whether or
not such evidence may properly be considered at all, in view of the
manner in which the administrative investigation was conducted) we find
appellants’ third and fourth assignments of error to be well-taken:
there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion of respondent
Secretary that the Matlaue stream is a public navigable river. This
evidence consists of the testimony of two witnesses, one a farmer and
the other a fisherman, and of the result of the ocular inspection
conducted by the investigator, appellant Yonzon, as embodied in the
report subsequently submitted by him and depicted in a sketch prepared
by the assistant engineer of the Pampanga River control project.

Nevertheless, we do not feel justified in affirming, for purposes of
adjudication, the aforesaid conclusion of respondent Secretary, and
reversing that of the trial court, for the investigation wherein the
evidence was received was conducted with manifest disregard of the
requirements of due process. And it is solely on this ground that the
members of this Court are agreed that this decision should be
predicated.

The administrative complaint was filed with respondent Secretary on
August 15, 1958. On October 22, 1958 Yonzon issued a subpoena to Borja
ordering him to appear at the hearing of the case on October 24, 1958.
That was the first time Borja had notice of the complaint. Acting on
his request that the hearing be postponed for at least two weeks,
Yonzon deferred it, but only up to October 27, 1958.

When that day arrived Attorney Vicente V. Mendoza, a member of the
law firm Carlos, Laurea & Associates, in representation of
appellee, attended the investigation at Macabebe, Pampanga, but for the
sole purpose of delivering to Yonzon appellee’s motion to quash and
dismiss on the grounds that complainants Musni, et al. did not have the
capacity to file the complaint and that Republic Act 2056 would be
unconstitutional if it should be given retroactive effect. Without
acting on the motion Yonzon proceeded with the examination of the two
witnesses for the complainants. Attorney Mendoza repeatedly manifested
that he was not prepared for the hearing and was not in a position to
cross-examine complainants’ witnesses because the law firm of which he
was a member had not had time to confer with appellee on account of the
limited time given by Yonzon. Attorney Mendoza, however, sought to
reserve his right to cross-examine, but Yonzon ruled that his failure
to cross-examine was in effect a waiver of the right.

On October 28, 1958 appellant Yonzon, upon a mere oral notice,
conducted an ocular inspection of the questioned stream without giving
appellee Borja sufficient time to prepare therefor. Furthermore, Yonzon
did not limit himself to inspecting the premises but proceeded to
conduct a hearing by questioning the witnesses who had testified the
day before.

On the next hearing date, October 30, 1958, Attorney Clemente
Madarang, Jr., of the law firm representing appellee, was present. He
asked for reconsideration of Yonzon’s ruling that Attorney Mendoza’s
request for reservation to cross-examine amounted to a waiver of the
right to do so. Yonzon refused to reconsider. When Attorney Madarang
reiterated his request, Yonson relented and agreed to allow him to
cross-examine the witnesses who had previously testified, but without
waiting for the transcription of the stenographic notes of the hearing
previously had. Attorney Madarang agreed to cross-examine even if only
on the notes taken by Attorney Mendoza. But when he was about to do so
Yonzon again changed his mind and refused to let him cross-examine. On
that same day, Attorney Madarang sought to take the stand as witness
for appellee in order to identify certain documents which he had
secured for the latter, but Yonzon prevented him from doing so. In
addition, during that same hearing Yonzon called to the witness stand a
certain engineer Manangan of the Pampanga River Control Project,
allegedly as witness for the Government, which was not a party to the
case. And then Yonzon denied to Attorney Madarang the right to object
to any question propounded to Manangan, even if the same were
prejudicial to appellee’s interest.

On November 17, 1958 appellant Yonzon, at the request of appellee,
issued a subpoena to Eliseo Panopio to attend the hearing the next day.
When Yonzon delivered the subpoena he found out that Panopio was in the
province. In spite of Attorney Madarang’s insistence that Panopio’s
testimony would not be limited to identifying the tatter’s report
(Exhibit S) Yonzon refused to grant continuance, reasoning out that
Panopio’s testimony would only corroborate that of Valderrama, who had
identified certain documents which were in the custody of his office.
The Panopio report, it may be mentioned, was prepared by him in 1931
when, as a surveyor of the Bureau of Public Works, he investigated the
different streams and rivers situated in Macabebe, Pampanga, and found
that Matlaue in particular had been artificially dug, and subsequently
increased in width, length and depth by the owner at the time, from
whom Borja acquired the land in 1937.

On November 18, 1958, Yonzon terminated the hearing without giving
counsel for Borja opportunity to present other witnesses and in spite
of vigorous objections on his part.

Appellant Yonzon clearly abused his discretion in riding roughshod
over appellee’s right to a fair hearing. His acts of (1) proceeding
with the hearing without first acting on appellee’s motion to dismiss;
(2) ruling that appellee’s attempt to reserve his right to
cross-examine was a waiver of said right; (3) conducting an ocular
inspection motu proprio and interrogating witnesses during
the same; (4) not allowing Attorney Mndarang to cross-examine the
complainants’ witnesses during the hearing of October 30, 1958; (5)
calling to the witness stand a person who was not a witness for either
the complainants or the respondents, and asking him questions to which
he refused to entertain any objection from counsel; (6) arbitrarily
refusing appellee opportunity to present Eliseo Panopio on the ground
that his testimony was merely corroborative, although as it later
turned out in court Panopio’s testimony was important to appellee’s
defense; and (7) terminating the hearing without giving appellee full
opportunity to present his other witnesses—all these are indicative of
the capricious and arbitrary manner in which the administrative
investigation was conducted.

By way of justification Yonzon repeatedly invoked the ninety-day
period proscribed by R.A. 2056 within which an administrative case for
abatement of nuisance thereunder must be terminated. Noteworthy,
however, is the fact that while the complaint for abatement was filed
on August 16, 1958, it was only on October 22, 1958—more than two
months later—that appellant officials informed appellee thereof and,
strangely enough, by means of a subpoena. The latter did not have
sufficient time to prepare his defense when appellant Yonzon started
rushing the proceedings, evidently to make up for lost time.

As it was, even with all that undue haste, the last day of the
hearing was still beyond the deadline sought to be met. The decision
was dated April 3, 1959, eight months after the complaint was filed;
and copy was served on appellee’s counsel only on June 12, 1959.

The manner the investigation was conducted was a virtual denial of
due process. This is one of the exceptions to the rule requiring
exhaustion of administrative remedies—in this case by appeal to the
President, it’ otherwise it was necessary at all—before resort to the
courts may be had.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed in ho far as it sets aside
the administrative investigation conducted by respondents-appellants
and the decision therein against petitioner-appellee, but not in so far
as said judgment declares the Matlaue stream or river the private
property of said petitioner-appellee, the question of ownership thereof
being left for determination in such other proceeding, administrative
or judicial, as respondents-appellants may deem proper to initiate. No
pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Paredes and Regala, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J. B. L., concurs on the ground of virtual denial of due process.