THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. MARTINA RIVERA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

When Leona Laciste endeavored to set fire to
the house of Martina Rivera in which the two small children of the
latter were sleeping, the two women grappled and Leona Laciste was
boloed to death by Martina Rivera. As a result, a criminal prosecution
for murder was instituted in the Court of First Instance of La Union
against Martina Rivera and after due trial she was found guilty of the
lesser crime of homicide and was sentenced to eight years and one day
of prision mayor, with the accessory penalties provided by
article 61 of the Penal Code, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in
the sum of P500, and to pay the costs.

Two questions are raised by the appeal. The one more
fundamental in nature revolves about the point of whether or not the
defendant should be exempted from all responsibility because of having
acted in defense of her person, her rights, and her descendants. The
second question is incidental in nature and relates to the finding of
the court that the qualifying circumstance of cruelty, because of
having deliberately and inhumanly increased the sufferings of the
offended party, was present.

Article 8 of the Penal Code exempts any one from criminal liability
who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the
following circumstances concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable
necessity for the means employed to prevent or repel it; (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Anyone who acts in defense of the person of his descendant is similarly
exempted. In our view of the case, the first and last requisites
above-mentioned concur, but the second is lacking.

A man’s house is his castle. When a person is attacked in his own
house, he has a right to protect it, and those within it, from the
intrusion or attack. He may repel force by force in defense of person,
habitation, or property, against one who manifestly intends or
endeavors by violence or surprise to commit a felony, such as arson,
upon either. In such case one is not obliged to retreat, but may pursue
his adversary until he has secured himself from danger. (People vs.
Lewis [1897], 117 Cal., 186, citing East’s Pleas of the Crown, p. 271,
and Foster’s Crown Cases, chapter 3, p. 273, where the rule is well
stated.)

In this instance, the accused acted in defense of her person, her
home, and her children. The crime of arson was about to be committed,
and there was present the element of danger to the occupants of the
habitation. But there was not present any reasonable necessity for
killing the assailant. The accused proceeded beyond the limits of
immunity when, after the assailant was out of the house, and prostrate
on the ground, she persisted in wounding her no less than fourteen
times. The case is, consequently, covered by article 86 of the Penal
Code.

The lower court committed an error in taking into consideration the
qualifying circumstance of cruelty. The number of wounds on the body of
a deceased are not conclusive evidence of the presence of this
circumstance. (U. S. vs. Palermo [1915], 31 Phil., 425;
decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of December 9, 1889.) On the
contrary, the evidence discloses more nearly the mitigating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation.

It is our unmistakable duty to find the defendant guilty of
homicide. It is, however, just as certainly our duty to view with
leniency the action of the defendant in view of the provocative nature
of the aggression. The provisions of article 86 of the Penal Code
permit of the exercise of considerable discretion by the courts.

Judgment is affirmed, with the modification that in place of eight years and one day of prision mayor, the defendant and appellant shall be sentenced to three years of prision correccional, and shall, in addition, pay the costs of this instance. So ordered.

Mapa, C. J., Araudio, Street, and Villamor, JJ., concur.