LYNX INDUSTRIES CONTRACTOR, INC., ROGER GERNALE, CORAZON GERNALE, GAY GERNALE AND LORENZO CAAMPUED, PETITIONERS, VS. EUSTERIO T. TALA, LEONITO VIAGEDOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS…

Lynx Industries Contractor versus Tala

The Case

This is a petition for review brought by Lynx Industries Contractor, Incorporated and its individual officers against two of its former employees, Eusterio Tala and Leonito Viagedor. The employees had won a judgment for illegal dismissal and monetary claims before a labor arbiter, and the company, having lost its chance to appeal, sought to reopen the case through a petition for relief from judgment. The case matters because it fixes the two reglementary periods for that remedy and settles that notice to counsel is notice to the client — a party cannot escape a final judgment by blaming the negligence of its own lawyer.

Procedural History

The two employees filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal and monetary claims with the National Labor Relations Commission. The labor arbiter rendered a decision holding the company and the individual petitioners jointly and severally liable for backwages, separation pay, service incentive leave pay, and attorney's fees. No appeal was taken, and a writ of execution issued on the ground that the decision had become final and executory.

The petitioners then filed a petition for relief from judgment with the National Labor Relations Commission, which dismissed it as filed one day late. The Commission denied reconsideration. The petitioners elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Commission and likewise denied reconsideration. The petitioners then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review.

Facts

Eusterio Tala was employed by Lynx Industries Contractor, Incorporated from February 1982 until January 2001, his last position being general foreman. Leonito Viagedor was employed from 1976 until December 2000, rising to Assistant Vice-President for Operations. On November 16, 2000, Tala received a memorandum informing him that the company would cease operations effective that day due to heavy losses and non-existing projects, though he was assured of his salary until December 15, 2000. No such memorandum was served on Viagedor; he simply stopped receiving his salaries, and only upon inquiry did he learn that the company had ceased operations.

The two employees filed their complaints for illegal dismissal and monetary claims in January and February 2001. The labor arbiter ruled in their favor, awarding backwages, separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, service incentive leave pay, and attorney's fees, and holding the company and the individual petitioners jointly and severally liable. The decision became final and executory for want of an appeal, and a writ of execution issued.

The petitioners then filed a petition for relief from judgment, blaming their former counsel's indifference and neglect for their failure to appeal on time. Their former counsel had received a copy of the labor arbiter's decision on May 9, 2002, but the petition was filed on July 9, 2002 — sixty-one days later, one day beyond the sixty-day period.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the dismissal of the petition for relief from judgment on the ground that it was filed one day late.
• Whether or not the negligence of the petitioners' former counsel entitles them to relief from judgment.
• Whether or not the petition for relief substantially complied with the requirements of the Rules.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Section 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.

This provision fixes the two periods whose strict compliance the Court enforces against the petitioners.

Section 1, Rule 38 of the same Rules provides:

Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.

This provision limits the remedy to negligence that is excusable and imputable to the party, not to counsel.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Court of Appeals did not err. A petition for relief from judgment must strictly comply with two reglementary periods: the petition must be filed within sixty days from knowledge of the judgment, and not more than six months from its entry. The Court stressed that strict compliance is required because the remedy is a final act of liberality on the part of the State, which cannot be allowed to erode the principle that a judgment must at some definite time attain finality. Since counsel received the decision on May 9, 2002, the petition should have been filed on or before July 8, 2002; filed on July 9, 2002, it was one day late.

On the second issue, the Court held that the negligence of counsel binds the client. The reglementary period is reckoned from the time the party's counsel receives notice of the decision, for notice to counsel is notice to the party. While a counsel's failure to notify his client of an adverse judgment may be inexcusable negligence, it is not a ground for relief from judgment. The negligence, to be a ground, must be excusable and generally imputable to the party; if it is imputable to counsel, it binds the client. The aggrieved litigant should instead seek administrative sanctions against the erring counsel, not the reversal of the ruling.

On the third issue, the Court held that the petitioners failed to substantiate their allegation of gross negligence, and their petition lacked the requisite affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon and the facts constituting their good and substantial cause of action. The Court added that while rules of procedure are not cast in stone, strict compliance is indispensable for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial business, and the petitioners had been accorded an opportunity to present their evidence, so they could not feign lack of due process.

Doctrine

A petition for relief from judgment must strictly comply with two reglementary periods: it must be filed within sixty days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, and not more than six months after the judgment was entered. Notice to counsel is notice to the party for purposes of computing the sixty-day period. The negligence of counsel binds the client; it is not a ground for relief from judgment unless it is excusable and imputable to the party. The remedy is a final act of liberality on the part of the State and cannot be allowed to erode the finality of judgments.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals, with costs against the petitioners.

Remember This

Memorize this line: notice to counsel is notice to the client, and the negligence of counsel binds the client. Examiners use this case to test the two reglementary periods for a petition for relief from judgment and the rule that a party cannot reopen a final judgment by blaming its own lawyer.