SPS. BUENAVENTURA JAYME AND ROSARIO JAYME, PETITIONERS, VS. RODRIGO APOSTOL, FIDEL LOZANO, ERNESTO SIMBULAN, MAYOR FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, MUNICIPALITY OF KORONADAL (NOW CITY OF KOR…

Jayme versus Apostol

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by spouses Buenaventura and Rosario Jayme, the parents of a minor pedestrian killed when a municipal pick-up truck struck him on a national highway. They sued the driver, the registered owner, the possessor of the vehicle, the municipal mayor who was riding in it, the Municipality of Koronadal, and the insurer, asking that all of them be held solidarily liable in damages. The case matters because it draws the outer boundary of vicarious liability — the doctrine by which one person answers for the negligent acts of another — and it teaches, in one clean set of facts, who may and who may not be made to pay for a death caused on the road.

Procedural History

The parents filed a complaint for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Polomolok, Cotabato. The trial court rendered judgment in their favor. It absolved the Municipality of Koronadal on the ground that it is an agency of the State performing governmental functions, and it absolved the possessor of the vehicle for not being its owner. It dismissed the complaint against the insurer for lack of a cause of action. But it held the driver, the registered owner, and Mayor Fernando Miguel jointly and severally liable for actual damages with legal interest, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, the amount for the death of the child, litigation expenses, and costs.

Mayor Miguel appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed and set aside the trial court's decision insofar as he was concerned and dismissed the complaint against him, holding that he was not the employer of the driver and was a mere passenger at the time of the accident. The parents then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari, assigning errors to the Court of Appeals.

Facts

On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato, was on board an Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee of the Municipality of Koronadal. The truck was registered in the name of Rodrigo Apostol but was then in the possession of Ernesto Simbulan, from whom Lozano had borrowed it to bring the mayor to the airport at General Santos City to catch his flight to Manila.

Along the national highway in Poblacion, Polomolok, the truck struck Marvin Jayme, a minor who was crossing the road. The force of the collision threw the boy some fifty meters from the point of impact — a clear indication, the Court said, that the vehicle was moving at a very high speed. Marvin sustained severe head injuries, was treated first at a local hospital, then airlifted to a medical center in Davao City, and died six days after the accident.

His parents sued. The respondents each denied liability: the registered owner and the possessor claimed the driver took the truck without their consent; the mayor and the driver blamed the boy's sudden sprint across the highway, and the mayor denied being on board when the truck hit him. The municipality adopted the answer of the mayor and the driver, and the insurer insisted that any claim against it had already prescribed.

Issues

• Whether or not Mayor Miguel may be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of the driver assigned to him, which resulted in the death of a minor pedestrian.
• Whether or not an employer-employee relationship between the mayor and the driver was established by preponderant evidence, so as to make the doctrine of vicarious liability applicable to him.
• Whether or not the mayor's supposed authority to give directions to the driver, by itself, made him the employer of the driver or otherwise liable for the latter's negligence.

Applicable Provisions

Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

This is the provision on which the parents' theory of imputed liability against the mayor rests, and its employer paragraphs are the ones the Court measures him against.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the doctrine of vicarious liability finds no application in this case. To sustain a claim against an employer for the acts of an employee, three requisites must be established: that the employee was chosen by the employer personally or through another; that the service is to be rendered in accordance with orders the employer has authority to give at all times; and that the illicit act of the employee was committed on the occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him. It must further be shown that the injurious act was committed at the time the employee was performing his functions.

On the second issue, the Court stressed that the employer-employee relationship cannot be assumed; the plaintiff must prove it by preponderant evidence, and the defendant is under no obligation to prove a negative averment. Applying the four-fold test — the power of selection, the payment of wages, the right to control the method of the work, and the right of suspension or dismissal — the Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the lawful employer of the driver was the Municipality of Koronadal. That the driver had been assigned to the mayor at the time of the accident was of no moment, for an employment relationship still exists even if the employee is loaned to another, because control over him subsists.

On the third issue, the Court held that even assuming the mayor had authority to give instructions or directions to the driver, he still could not be held liable. The mere giving of directions to a driver does not establish that the passenger has control over the vehicle, nor does it make him the employer of the driver. The Court quoted its own earlier ruling in a security-guard case:

The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to the security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client responsible as an employer of the security guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts and omissions. Those instructions or directions are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into with the security agency.

The Court added that no negligence may be imputed to a fellow employee although he may have the right to control the manner of the vehicle's operation; the negligence of a subordinate is imputed not to a superior employee but only to the master or principal. A public official, likewise, is not liable for the wrongful acts of his subordinates on a vicarious basis, absent cooperation in, direction of, or encouragement of the act. The mayor was neither the employer nor the registered owner, and no causal relationship linked him to the driver or the vehicle. He was a mere passenger, and a passenger's failure to warn the driver or serve as lookout does not make him liable, for the driver's duty is not one that may be delegated. The Court closed by restating that liability attaches to the negligent driver, the driver's direct employer, and the registered owner of the vehicle.

Doctrine

Vicarious liability under Article 2180 requires a proven employer-employee relationship, established by preponderant evidence through the four-fold test of selection, wages, control of the method of work, and power of dismissal. The relationship is not presumed, and a defendant need not prove its absence. A person who merely gives directions to a driver, or who is a fellow employee with some right of control, is not thereby made an employer and does not answer for the driver's negligence; imputed liability runs to the master or principal, not to a superior employee. A passenger who neither cooperates in, directs, nor encourages the negligent act is not liable for it, and the driver's duty to drive safely cannot be delegated to him. Finally, for a vehicular death, liability attaches only to the negligent driver, the driver's direct employer, and the registered owner of the vehicle.

Disposition

The petition was denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed; Mayor Miguel was absolved, and the complaint against him was dismissed.

Remember This

Memorize the line: only the negligent driver, the driver's employer, and the registered owner of the vehicle are liable for a death caused by negligent operation of a vehicle. Examiners use this case to test the four-fold test of employment, the rule that giving directions to a driver does not create vicarious liability, and the registered-owner rule in motor vehicle cases.