ESTEBAN CABUHAT, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND AS GUARDIAN OF THE MINORS ROSARIO AND MELENCIO CABUHAT, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. CASIANO ANSAY AND PEDRO REODICA, AS DEPUTY SHERIFF OF…

In the year 1917, Casiano Ansay, one of
the defendants herein, obtained a judgment for a sum of money in the
court of the justice of the peace of the municipality of Cavinti,
Province of Laguna, against Esteban Cabuhat, the plaintiff. The
judgment mentioned remained unsatisfied, and Casiano Ansay accordingly
caused an execution to be levied upon a house and lot in the poblacion of
Cavinti, occupied by Esteban Cabuhat as a residence. In due time a sale
was effected, notwithstanding the claim of Esteban Cabuhat that the
property in question was exempt as a homestead under subsection 1 of
section 452 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The purchaser at this sale
was the execution creditor himself, Casiano Ansay, who, upon the
expiration of the period allowed by law for the redemption of the
property by the debtor, manifested his intention to oust the latter and
take possession as owner. Esteban Cabuhat thereupon instituted the
present action, on behalf of himself and as guardian of his two minor
children, Rosario and Melencio Cabuhat, to enjoin the purchaser,
Casiano Ansay, and Pedro Reodica, as deputy sheriff of Laguna, from
disturbing the plaintiff, alleging that the property in question is
exempt as aforesaid. After hearing the cause, the trial judge held that
the plaintiff’s claim of exemption could not be sustained. He
accordingly absolved the defendants, dissolved the preliminary
injunction, and ordered the plaintiff to surrender possession to the
defendant, Casiano Ansay. From this judgment the plaintiff appealed.

At the trial the plaintiff testified that the house and lot now
claimed by him as exempt were acquired by him by purchase during the
life of his wife, Lorenza Ansay, now deceased, and that she left
surviving her the two children, Rosario and Melencio Cabuhat, named as
plaintiffs by representation in the complaint. There is no proof
directly conflicting with this statement, and it must in our opinion be
accepted as true. It follows that the house and lot in question is
ganancial property, acquired during the married life of the two
spouses, Esteban Cabuhat and Lorenza Ansay. The two minor children
have, therefore, an undivided one-half interest in said property by
inheritance from their deceased mother. The trial judge held that
Esteban Cabuhat is the exclusive owner, basing this conclusion on the
admitted fact that, in the proceedings where Esteban Cabuhat had
applied for appointment to the guardianship over his two children, he
had stated under oath that said children had no property other than a
piece of rural land, whereas the property in question is urban. The
fact that such statement was thus made by Esteban Cabuhat is not in our
opinion sufficient to refute his more exact and specific statement as a
witness in court to the effect that the property in question had been
acquired by purchase while his deceased wife was yet alive.

In section 463 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that
at a sale of property under execution, the purchaser acquires all the
right, title, and interest of the execution debtor in such property,
subject of course to the right of redemption provided by law. This
means that the interest acquired by the purchaser is limited to that
which was possessed by the debtor; and it is self-evident that such
purchaser acquires no interest whatever that is vested in any other
person than the debtor. For instance, if there are more than one person
owning property in common and an execution against one only is levied
thereon, the sale effected by the sheriff under such execution operates
exclusively upon the interest of the execution debtor, without being in
any wise prejudicial to the interest of the other owners. The result in
such case merely is that one new owner in common is substituted for the
owner whose interest is alienated by process of law.

In the case before us it does not appear that the debt which
Casiano Ansay had recovered in the court of the justice of the peace of
Cavinti against Esteban Cabuhat had been contracted by the latter under
conditions that would make it a binding obligation upon the conjugal
property. The inference must rather be, and the presumption is, that
said debt had been contracted by Esteban Cabuhat after the death of his
wife and that therefore it was his own individual obligation.

From what has been said it is clear that the execution sued out by
Casiano Ansay on the judgment recovered against Esteban Cabuhat, as
aforesaid, could not reach any other interest in the property levied
upon than the proper personal interest of the debtor; and it could in
no wise prejudice the interest of the two minor children, Rosario and
Melencio Cabuhat, therein. Upon this the question arises whether the
individual interest of Esteban Cabuhat in the property mentioned is of
sufficient value to be taken upon execution or is exempt, as being of
less value than P150.

By subsection 1 of section 452 of the Code of Civil Procedure the
debtor’s homestead, in which he resides, and land necessarily used in
connection therewith, both not exceeding in value P150, are declared to
be exempt. The house and lot now in question appear to have always been
assessed for the purposes of taxation at the value of P100; but it is
admitted in the agreed statement of facts that the market value of said
property at the time it was exposed to sale was in excess of P150. In
the opinion of the trial judge, it is said that the valuation of P600
placed upon the property by the deputy sheriff named as defendant in
the case is not excessive; and this may be a fair estimate of its
market value under ordinary conditions. In this connection we note that
the proof does not show the amount for which the property was actually
bid in by the execution creditor at the sheriff’s sale, though that
fact is of the utmost importance for the solution of this controversy.
It is suggested in the brief of the appellant that the word value, as
used in subsection 1 of section 452 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
must be taken to refer to the assessed value; and it is insisted that
the property in question must of necessity be considered exempt because
it is assessed upon the tax list at less than P150. This contention,
however, is not well founded. When reference is had to “value,” in the
statute cited, it must be understood that the law-making body meant the
amount which the property might reasonably be expected to bring if sold
under the conditions prevailing at the time; and in a case where the
property has actually been exposed to public sale, the price which it
then brought is of necessity conclusive between the parties to the
execution as to its value.

The conclusion to which we are thus led is that, supposing the
individual interest of Esteban Cabuhat in the property in question to
be of a value in excess of P150, said interest is liable to be taken in
execution, so far as it is in excess of said value. (13 R. C. L., 617;
21 Cyc, 491; Vanstory vs. Thornton, 34 Am. St. Rep., 483, 505; White vs. Spencer, 129 Am. St. Rep., 547, 560; Lean vs.
Givens, 106 Am. St. Rep., 79.) This means in the concrete case that, if
the property in question brought at the execution sale more than P150,
the purchaser at that sale acquired the interest of Esteban Cabuhat
therein, subject to the obligation to pay to said Cabuhat the sum of
P150, this being the amount exempt to him by law. But it does not
follow that the purchaser at the execution sale would be entitled, by
virtue merely of such purchase, to dispossess the other coowners, to
wit, two minor children who are plaintiffs in this case; and partition
proceedings would in any event be necessary in order to enable the
purchaser to realize his share of the property.

In conclusion, our views on the various questions raised by this appeal may be summarized in the following propositions :

1. An execution sale affects exclusively the right of the
   judgment debtor in the property which is the subject of sale; and the
   purchaser at the sale acquires no other interest whatever than that of
   the judgment debtor. It results that where the debtor is one of several
   coowners, the execution sale transfers his interest only, leaving the
   interest of the other coowners intact.

2. The homestead exemption recognized in subsection 1 of section 452 of
   the Code of Civil Procedure can be invoked by a debtor although he is
   only one of the several coowners, provided he actually resides in the
   house in which the homestead right is asserted. A fortiori, a
   widower, who is the head of a family consisting of himself and two
   children by a deceased wife, is entitled to the homestead exemption in
   the house and lot where he maintains their home, although the children
   themselves are part owners of the same property by inheritance from
   their deceased mother.

3. If the particular
   interest of the debtor in property so owned is of a value not in excess
   of P150, the same is exempt to him; but if his interest is worth more
   than that amount said interest is subject to sale upon execution.

4. If in such case the interest of the debtor, upon being exposed to sale,
   realizes an amount in excess of P150, the purchaser acquires said
   interest, upon actual payment into the hands of the debtor of said
   exempt amount, namely, P150, of which the debtor cannot be deprived.

5. If, however, the interest of the debtor, upon being exposed to sale as
   aforesaid, fetches less than the amount of P160, the property is exempt
   and the sale fails of effect, supposing that a claim of exemption is
   duly interposed.

6. In no event is the
   purchaser of the interest of one of several coowners entitled, by
   reason of such purchase merely to object the other coowners from the
   property; and in the absence of agreement among the parties in
   interest, partition proceedings would be necessary to enable the
   purchaser to realize his interest.

7. Injunction is a proper remedy to prevent a purchaser at an execution
   sale from molesting those coowners whose rights have not been affected
   by the sale, as it is also a proper remedy to prevent the purchaser
   from molesting the debtor, provided that the interest of the latter is
   in fact exempt and the claim of exemption was duly interposed.

From the foregoing it is evident that the judgment appealed from is
erroneous; and inashmuch as it is impossible for us to solve the case
in ignorance of the amount which the property brought at the sheriff’s
sale, the case must be remanded for further proceedings in conformity
with this opinion. The preliminary injunction previously in force, but
which was dissolved but the trial judge at the hearing, is hereby
reinstated, and the same will remain in force until the final
disposition of the case. No special pronouncement as to costs will be
made. So ordered.

Johnson, Araullo, Avancena, and Villamor, JJ., concur.