MAGDALENA ESTATE, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. HERMOGENES CALUAG, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL (BRANCH IV, QUEZON CITY) AND GONZALO P. NAVA, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision of the Court
of Appeals in Case CA-G. R. No. 24212 denying an original petition for a
writ of mandamus.

In Civil Case No. Q-2061 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City, an action for specific performance entitled Nava vs. Magdalena
Estate, Inc., the respondent Judge rendered judgment on June 11, 1957,
the dispositive portion of which read:

“(a) Declaring the cancellation of the contract by the defendant to be unauthorized and without any legal force and effect;

“(b)
Ordering the defendant, within thirty (30) days from notice hereof, to
give to the plaintiff the title to Lot 2-b-5 of Part-33887 subject to a
first mortgage in favor of the defendant to secure payment on the
unpaid balance of the price of the land;

“(c) In the event that the defendant could not comply with the obligation mentioned in (b), and in lieu thereof

(1) Declaring the contract rescinded;

(2) Ordering the defendant to return to the plaintiff the sum of
P16.820.00, with legal interest thereon from the time that the
different payments were made; and

(3) Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of
P25.000.00, with legal interest thereon from August 22, 1956, by way of
actual and compensatory damages; and

“(d) Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff
the sum of P250.000.00 by way of attorney’s fee’s, and the costs of the
suit.”

The defendant, herein petitioner, received its copy of the said
decision on June 21, 1057. On July 9, 1957, it filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and Clarification of the same. The request for
clarification referred solely to paragraphs (a) and (b) of the
dispositive portion, which the defendant represented were vague and
ambiguous.

On January 10, 1958, the lower court resolved to deny the motion for
reconsideration. In the same order of denial, however, it clarified
only paragraph (b) of the dispositive portion adverted to in the
prayer. As modified paragraph (b) reads as follows:

“(b) Declaring: the plaintiff to be entitled to pay
for the land on cash basis within a period of ninety (90) days from the
time that the defendant shall deliver to him the title to Lot 2-b-5 of
Psd-33887, subject to a first mortgage in favor of the defendant to
secure payment of the unpaid balance of the price of the land, which
delivery of title must be accomplished within thirty (30) days from
notice hereof.”

A copy of this last order was served on the petitioner on February
12, 1958. Six days Inter, or on February 18, 1958, it filed its native
of appeal and appeal bond, the notice declaring that the appeal was
“from the judgment promulgated and entered by this Honorable Court in
the above-entitled case, dated January 10, 1958 and received by the
herein defendant on February 12, 1958 * * *.” On March 5, 1958, the
defendant, heroin petitioner, filed its Record on Appeal.

On
March 15 1958, respondent Gonzalo P. Nava filed a motion to Dismiss the
Appeal. On July 3, 1958, the lower court granted the motion on the
ground invoked by movant, namely, that the Rucord on Appeal was filed
out of time. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the said order
was unavailing.

The petitioner then went to the Court of
Appeals on a petition for mandamus to compel the lower court to admit
his appeal. After proper consideration, the appellate court dismissed
the petition for lack of merit. It also denied a motion for
reconsideration filed therefor. Hence, this appeal.

The
petitioner insists that its Records on Appeal was filed well within the
reglementary period since ita appeal was not from the judgment
promulgated on June 11, 1957 but from the order of January 10, 1958.
Both the lower court and the Court of Appeals, however, ruled that the
disputed pleading was filed beyond the prescriptive period since the
computation of the same should start from the original judgment dated
June 11, 1957 and not from the order of January 10, 1958 as contended
by the petitioner.

Before Us now, therefore, the issue is one
and simple. When did the period for filing the Record on Appeal start
to commence? Under the facts of this case, however, the issue can be
resolved only after this particular query is answered: Did the order of
January 10, 1958 substantially modify the first decision of the lower
court?

The Court of Appeals answer this in the negative and explains thus:

“It
is to be borne in mind and there in only one judgment (Annex A,
petition) rendered in this case, dated June 11, 1957, a copy of which
was served on the petitioner on June 21, 1957, and said judgment was
clarified in the order of January 10, 1958, which was served on the
petitioner on February 12, 1958. The clarification did not have the
effect of changing the date of the judgment nor the date notice thereof
was served upon the petitioner. The appeal, therefore, is necessarily
from this judgment, notwithstanding petitioner’s statement to the
contrary in its notice of appeal.”

“From the date of notice
of the judgment was received, to wit, June 21, 1957, to the date of the
filing of the motion for reconsideration and clarification, which is
July 9, 1957. seventeen (17) days elapsed, leaving thirteen (13) days
available for the perfection of the appeal. The petitioner received on
February 12, 1958 notice of the order of January 10, 1958 clarifying
the portion of the judgment and denying the motion for reconsideration
and from February 12, 1958, the remaining thirteen (13) days commenced
to run and ended on February 25, 1958, so that the thirty-day period
expired on this date, because the filing on February 18. 1958 of the
notice of appeal and appeal bond did not suspend the running of the
remaining period of thirteen days. Therefore, when the Record on Appeal
was filed on March 5, 1058, the filing was made eight days after the
expiration of the thirty-day period. The foregoing computation clearly
shows that the order disallowing the appeal and disapproving the Record
on Appeal is correct and fully in accordance with law.”

We
cannot accept the validity of the foregoing conclusion for the reason
that it results from the erroneous premise that there was only one
judgment. When the lower court “clarified” the dispositive portion of
the original decision, it actually amended the original decision, and,
to all intents and purposes, promulgated a new one from which the time
to appeal must be reckoned. In other words, the order of January 10,
1958 ostensibly “clarifying’ the sense and substance of the dispositive
portion of the decision of June 11, 1957 did not really merely “make
clear” or “clarified” the same, but, as it was, the said order
altogether changed the decree contained in the dispositive portion of
the said decision of June 11, 1957.

Thus, in the decision of
June 1.1, 1957, the Magdalena Estate was merely directed to deliver the
title to the plaintiff, respondent Gonzalo Nava, within thirty days
from notice, whereas in the order of January 10, 1958, this
substantially material portion was added: “Declaring the plaintiff to
be entitled to pay for the land on cash basis within a period of ninety
days from the time that the defendant shall deliver to him the title to
Lot 2-b-5 of Psd-33887, subject to a first mortgage etc., etc.,”
(Italics supplied). The addition amounted to a material alteration of
the first judgment, the alteration being of such substance and
proportion aa to give rise to an entirely new one. It should be noted
that whereas the original decision merely commanded the company to
transfer ownership of the land to the buyer, the subsequent order, in
addition, directed the buyer to pay the seller the price within 90 days
of the delivery. In other words, while the direction of the court in
the order of January 10, 1958 was addressed to both parties, its
direction in the decision of June 11, 1957 referred to but one party.

Our
attention is called to the fact, however, that on pages 10-11 of the
lower court’s decision of June 11, 1957, mention was already made of
respondent Nava’s obligation “to pay for the land on cash basis” when
the said court declared:

“It is quite obvious
from the context of Exhibit ‘D’ in relation to the contents of Exhibit
‘E-1’ that the defendant has agreed to allow the plaintiff the
privilege of paying for the lot on cash basis within ninety days from
the date that the title to the said lot shall be issued to the
plaintiff * * *.”

It is of no moment that the
above was contained in text of the original decision. The quoted
finding of the lower court cannot supply deficiencies in the
dispositive portion. It is a mere opinion of the court and the rule is
settled that where there is a conflict between the dispositive part and
the opinion, the former must prevail over the latter on the theory that
the dispositive portion is the final order white the opinion is merely
a statement ordering nothing. (2 Moran 194, 1963 ed.)

In view
of the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby reversed and set
aside. As it is our holding that the subsequent order of January 10,
1958 substantially changed the original decision, the 30-day period for
filing the Record on Appeal’ should be counted from the receipt of the
said order. So ordered. Costs against the respondent.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Paredes, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.