HUGO APUNDAR, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. DALMACIO ANDRIN AND FLAVIANA PILAPIL, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

This action of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer was originally instituted in the court of the justice of the
peace of San Remigio, Cebu, by the plaintiff, Hugo Apundar, to recover
from the defendants, Dalmacio Andrin and Flaviana Pilapil, the
possession of a parcel of land located in said municipality, having an
extension requiring 3 gantas of maize for seeding purposes, and with
boundaries as described.

The plaintiff alleges in substance that for a long period of time
prior to February 15 of the year 1915 he had exercised peaceful and
undisputed possession over the parcel of land in question and that upon
that date the defendants entered upon the same with force and
intimidation, excluding the plaintiff therefrom and uprooting the
tobacco plants which the plaintiff had set out over an area of
one-third thereof, to his damage in the amount of P250. Wherefore, he
prays to be restored to possession and that the defendants be required
to pay damages and costs. In the Court of First Instance, to which the
case came upon appeal, judgment was rendered absolving the defendants
from the complaint, and the plaintiff appealed.

No question is made as to the location and identity of the land
which is the subject of the complaint; nor is it disputed that, on or
about the date stated, the defendants entered upon the land, though
without violence or intimidation, and have subsequently cultivated it,
thereby excluding the plaintiff therefrom. The sole disputed point has
reference to the prior possession which the plaintiff claims to have
been exercising over the property at the time he was put out.

Upon this point the plaintiff says, and the testimony submitted in
his behalf tends to show, that the land had been given to him in 1889
by a kinsman, Numeriano Andrin, who still owns and occupies a parcel
immediately adjacent to that in question and lying on the south, or
southwest, side thereof; and the plaintiff asserts that he had remained
in continuous and uninterrupted possession from that date, in the
character of owner, until he was dispossessed by the defendants.

The defendants, on the contrary, assert that the plaintiff never
had anything to do with the land until the year 1911, when the
defendant Flaviana Pilapil, widow of Mercido Andrin, and mother of the
defendant Dalmacio Andrin, permitted the plaintiff to enter upon and
work the land as a cropper on shares; that he remained there in said
capacity of cropper and punctually divided the crops harvested
therefrom until in the year 1915, when he refused to make further
division of the crops, claiming to be himself the owner of the land,
whereupon the defendants resumed the occupation and cultivation of the
land.

In support of this view of the facts the defendants introduced in
evidence the document Exhibit B, showing that in the year 1895, the
defendants’ predecessor in interest, one Bonifacio Magdadaro, procured
a possessory information to be duly drawn up and inscribed, covering a
parcel of land in the same barrio of an area of 12 gantas, of which
parcel that now in question forms the extreme southern portion. They
also showed that the said Bonifacio Magdadaro remained in possession of
the land included in said possessory information until the year 1902,
when he sold it to Mercido Andrin for the sum of P200 (Exhibit C). From
said date Mercido Andrin remained in possession until his death,
leaving the same in the possession of his widow, Flaviana Pilapil, and
his son Dalmacio Andrin, the defendants in this case.

The documents above-mentioned clearly show the falsity of the
plaintiff’s pretense to have been in possession of the questioned
parcel in the character of owner since 1889, when he is supposed to
have obtained the same by donation from Numeriano Andrin; and
particularly the possessory information, extended in the year 1895,
shows that the plaintiff Hugo Apundar could not then have been in
possession of the questioned parcel in the character of owner, since
said document calls for Numeriano Andrin as the adjacent proprietor on
the south; and of course if the latter had six years previously given
the questioned land to Hugo Apundar, the document would have called for
Hugo Apundar as the adjacent proprietor on that side, instead of
Numeriano Andrin. It is not pretended that the alleged gift of the
property by Numeriano Andrin in 1889 to Hugo Apundar was evidenced by
any writing; and the correct inference to be. drawn from the evidence
in our opinion is that the alleged gift is entirely a creature of the
imagination. This is corroborated by the testimony of the defendant
Dalmacio Andrin—which has remained undenied by witnesses for the
plaintiff—tending to show that this action of unlawful detainer was
promoted by Numeriano Andrin largely out of ill-will to the defendants
and with a view to depriving them of this land. The proof in our
opinion clearly shows that the parcel in question never pertained to
Numeriano Andrin to give to anybody; that it was included in the
possessory information obtained by Bonifacio Magdadaro in 1895; that
the entire parcel covered by the possessory information passed in 1902
from Bonifacio Magdadaro to Mercido Andrin, who occupied it with his
family until his death; that thereafter the entire tract, including the
questioned parcel, passed into the possession of the defendants, widow
and son of Mercido Andrin; that said defendants in 1911 permitted the
plaintiff, Hugo Apundar, to enter upon and cultivate the land as a
cropper on shares; and finally that in 1915 the plaintiff refused to
divide the produce of the land with the defendants, claiming to be
owner; whereupon the defendants entered upon and resumed the
cultivation of the land, excluding the plaintiff therefrom.

The conclusions of the trial judge upon the controverted questions
of fact are accordant with the contention of the defendants, and in
harmony with our own view of the case, though he loosely describes the
relation between the parties, by virtue of the cropping agreement, as
that of landlord and tenant—an inexactitude of expression into which it
was easy to fall in view of the proof before the court.

No assignment has been interposed in this court by the attorneys
for the appellant directed to the conclusions of fact of the trial
judge; and no effort has been made in the appellant’s brief to
demonstrate error therein. On the contrary, the contention of the
attorneys for the appellant is that, accepting the facts as found, the
trial judge erred in applying the law to the case. In this connection
said attorneys assume that the relation between the parties was that of
landlord and tenant, as supposed by the trial judge, and not that of
owner and mere cropper. We are of the opinion that in whichever aspect
the relation be viewed the supposed error was not committed.

In the first place, if it be assumed that the agreement under which
the plaintiff entered upon the land in 1911 was merely that of a
letting of the land to labor on shares, the plaintiff as cropper
clearly did not acquire possession in any sense as against the owner. A
cropper is simply a laborer who is entitled to a certain portion of the
crop for his work. The rights incident to such a contract are
assimilated in the Civil Code as those of partnership (art. 1579), and
the most that could be conceded to the cropper would be to say that he
becomes a cotenant with the owner of the land with respect to the
fruits of the soil. with the right to occupy the land for purposes of
tillage. The owner remains at complete liberty to enter upon his own
land at any time, though of course if he puts the cropper off without
sufficient justification in law he is civilly liable in damages, and
may be compelled in a civil action to comply in good faith with the
terms of his contract.

Upon this point the American authorities are exceedingly clear, and
entirely in harmony with the proposition that a cropper acquires no
estate or possessory interest whatever in the land which he tills. He
is as much a servant as if his wages were fixed and payable in money.
(8 R. C. L., 373-375.) “A cropper’s contract gives the cropper no legal
possession of the premises further than as an employee; the legal
possession is in the employer.” (17 C. J., 382.)

For default of prior possession, therefore, the plaintiff in this
action must fail—assuming, as before stated, that his status was that
of an ordinary cropper on shares.

In the second place, assuming that a true relation of landlord and
tenant had been created between the defendants on the one part and the
plaintiff on the other, as the trial judge appears to have supposed, it
is equally clear that the plaintiff cannot maintain this action. To
establish this it is sufficient to point out that, after having entered
into possession in 1911 under the agreement already mentioned, the
plaintiff in 1915 denied the title of the defendants and began to
assert ownership in himself. This operated as a renunciation of his
rights under his contract and as a forfeiture of the lease, with the
result that the owner became entitled to reenter peacefully, as he did,
and resume possession.

In Medel vs. Militante (41 Phil., 526), we held that when
the tenant denies his landlord’s title this gives rise to a right of
action on the part of the landlord to recover immediate possession of
the demised premises; and it follows as a necessary corollary from this
proposition that if the landlord acquires possession peacefully, as in
this case, by the mere act of reentry, the tenant cannot maintain an
action to put the landlord out. The existence of an affirmative right
of action on the part of the landlord to oust the tenant is fatal to
the maintenance of any action by the tenant. Otherwise, the absurd
result would follow that a tenant ousted under the circumstances here
revealed would be restored to possession only himself to be immediately
put out in a possessory action instituted by the landlord. To prevent
circuity of action, therefore, we must recognize the affirmative right
of action on the part of the landlord as a complete and efficacious
defense to the maintenance of an action by the tenant. Circuitus est evitandus; et boni judices est lites dirimere, ne lis ex lite oriatur.

Another consideration based upon an idea familiar to jurisprudence
is equally decisive. This is found in one of the implications of the
familiar maxim Ubi jus ibi remeduun; the converse of which is of course equally true, namely, Nullun jus nullun remedium.
Applying this idea to the case before us, it is manifest that inasmuch
as the plaintiff’s right of possession has been destroyed, the remedy
is also necessarily taken away. Even under the language of the statute
itself (sec. 80, Code Civ. Proc), the action of unlawful detainer does
not lie unless the property is unlawfully withheld from the plaintiff,
which imports an actual present right of possession in him.

Our conclusion is that in whatever light the relation of the
parties to this action under the agreement of 1911 be viewed—whether as
that of owner and cropper, or landlord and tenant—the present action
cannot be maintained. There was no error, therefore, in the action of
the trial judge in absolving the defendants; and the judgment must be
affirmed. It is so ordered, with costs against the appellant.

Johnson, Araullo, Avancena, and Villamor, JJ., concur.