MANOLO P. SAMSON, PETITIONER, VS. HON. VICTORIANO B. CABANOS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 71, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPI…

Samson versus Cabanos

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari brought by Manolo P. Samson against the Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 71, and the People of the Philippines. Samson had been charged with unfair competition under the Intellectual Property Code for selling goods bearing marks closely identical to the internationally famous Caterpillar marks. He moved to quash the information, insisting that the offense carries a penalty of imprisonment of only two to five years, and that under the law expanding the jurisdiction of the metropolitan trial courts, the case belongs there and not in the Regional Trial Court. The case matters because it settles which court has jurisdiction over criminal violations of intellectual property rights, and because it applies the doctrine of the law of the case.

Procedural History

Samson was charged with unfair competition before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 71. He filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. Presiding Judge Felix S. Caballes denied the motion for lack of merit in an order dated January 22, 2003. Samson filed a motion for reconsideration, which Acting Presiding Judge Victoriano B. Cabanos likewise denied in an order dated November 17, 2003. Samson then filed the present petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court on a pure question of law. The Court issued a temporary restraining order on February 18, 2004, enjoining the respondent judge from further proceeding with the criminal case until the petition was resolved.

Facts

In the first week of November 1999, in Cainta, Rizal, Samson, as owner and proprietor of ITTI Shoes Corporation, was alleged to have willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously distributed, sold, or offered for sale Caterpillar products such as footwear, garments, clothing, bags, accessories, and paraphernalia. These goods were alleged to be closely identical to or colorable imitations of the authentic Caterpillar products. He was also alleged to have used trademarks, symbols, or designs that would cause confusion, mistake, or deception on the part of the buying public, to the damage and prejudice of Caterpillar, Incorporated, the prior adopter, user, and owner of the internationally famous marks.

An information for unfair competition was filed against Samson before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, accusing him of violating Section 168.3, paragraph a, in relation to Sections 123.1, paragraph e, 131.3, and 170 of Republic Act Number 8293, the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines.

Samson moved to quash the information, arguing that Section 170 of the Intellectual Property Code penalizes the offense with imprisonment of two to five years and a fine of fifty thousand pesos to two hundred thousand pesos, and that Republic Act Number 7691, amending the Judiciary Reorganization Act, vested the metropolitan trial courts with exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years, irrespective of the amount of the fine. He added that the old Trademark Law, Republic Act Number 166, which conferred jurisdiction on the courts of first instance, now the regional trial courts, over complaints for unfair competition, had been repealed by the Intellectual Property Code. The trial court denied his motion and his motion for reconsideration, prompting this petition.

Issues

• Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the offense of unfair competition charged in the information, where the penalty ranges from two years to five years, in light of the law vesting exclusive original jurisdiction on the metropolitan trial courts over offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years irrespective of the amount of the fine.
• Whether or not Republic Act Number 166, the Trademark Law, was expressly repealed by the Intellectual Property Code.
• Whether or not the ruling in the earlier case between the same parties, Samson versus Daway, constitutes the law of the case that disposes of the present petition.

Applicable Provisions

Section 170 of Republic Act Number 8293 provides:

SEC. 170. Penalties. — Independent of the civil and administrative sanctions imposed by law, a criminal penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years to five (5) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) shall be imposed on any person who is found guilty of committing any of the acts mentioned in Section 155 [Infringement], Section 168 [Unfair Competition] and Section 169.1 [False Designation of Origin and False Description or Representation].

This provision fixes the penalty for unfair competition, which the petitioner used to argue that the offense falls within the jurisdiction of the metropolitan trial courts.

Section 163 of the same Code provides:

SEC. 163. Jurisdiction of Court. — All actions under Sections 150, 155, 164 and 166 to 169 shall be brought before the proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws.

This provision is the bridge to the old Trademark Law, because it refers to the proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws.

Section 27 of Republic Act Number 166, the Trademark Law, provides:

SEC. 27. Jurisdiction of Court of First Instance. — All actions under this Chapter [V — Infringement] and Chapters VI [Unfair Competition] and VII [False Designation of Origin and False Description or Representation], hereof shall be brought before the Court of First Instance.

This is the existing law referred to by Section 163, and it lodges jurisdiction over unfair competition with the courts of first instance, now the regional trial courts.

Section 239 of Republic Act Number 8293 provides:

SEC. 239. Repeals. — 239.1. All Acts and parts of Acts inconsistent herewith, more particularly Republic Act No. 165, as amended; Republic Act No. 166, as amended; and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code; Presidential Decree No. 49, including Presidential Decree No. 285, as amended, are hereby repealed.

This repealing clause is the textual anchor of the Court's holding that the Trademark Law was not repealed in its entirety.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that jurisdiction over the criminal case for unfair competition is properly lodged with the Regional Trial Court, even if the penalty is imprisonment of less than six years. The Court reasoned that the settled rule in statutory construction is that in case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail. Jurisdiction conferred by a special law on the regional trial courts must prevail over that granted by a general law to the municipal trial courts. The Intellectual Property Code and the Trademark Law are special laws conferring jurisdiction over violations of intellectual property rights on the Regional Trial Court, and they prevail over the general law expanding the jurisdiction of the metropolitan trial courts. The Court also noted that it had designated certain regional trial courts as intellectual property courts, and later consolidated jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Code cases in specific regional trial courts designated as special commercial courts.

On the second issue, the Court held that Republic Act Number 166 was not expressly repealed by the Intellectual Property Code. The repealing clause did not repeal the Trademark Law in its entirety, otherwise it would not have used the phrases parts of Acts and inconsistent herewith. The use of those phrases means that the repeal pertains only to provisions repugnant to or not susceptible of harmonization with the Intellectual Property Code. Section 27 of the Trademark Law is consistent and in harmony with Section 163 of the Intellectual Property Code. Had the Code intended to vest jurisdiction over violations of intellectual property rights with the metropolitan trial courts, it would have expressly stated so under Section 163.

On the third issue, the Court held that its earlier ruling in Samson versus Daway, which involved exactly the same facts and issue except that the information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, is the law of the case. The Court explained that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. The Court also clarified that the passing remark in Mirpuri versus Court of Appeals on the repeal of the Trademark Law was merely a backgrounder and cannot be construed as a jurisdictional pronouncement.

Doctrine

Jurisdiction over criminal actions for unfair competition under the Intellectual Property Code is lodged with the Regional Trial Court, not the metropolitan trial court, even though the penalty is imprisonment of two to five years and a fine of fifty thousand pesos to two hundred thousand pesos. The Intellectual Property Code and the Trademark Law are special laws, and as special laws they prevail over the general law expanding the jurisdiction of the metropolitan trial courts. Section 27 of the Trademark Law was not repealed by the Intellectual Property Code, because the repealing clause in Section 239 reaches only acts and parts of acts inconsistent with the Code, and Section 27 is in harmony with Section 163. Finally, the law of the case binds the parties: a rule once irrevocably established between the same parties continues to govern so long as the facts remain the same.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed and the temporary restraining order issued by the Court on February 18, 2004 was lifted, leaving the Regional Trial Court's denial of the motion to quash standing.

Remember This

Memorize this line: intellectual property crimes, including unfair competition, belong to the Regional Trial Court, because the special law prevails over the general law on jurisdiction. Examiners use this case to test the general law versus special law rule in jurisdiction and the law of the case doctrine.