SAMSON B. BEDRUZ, GREGORIO M. MONREAL, AND EMMA C. LUNA, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, RESPONDENT.

Bedruz versus Sandiganbayan

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by Samson Bedruz, Gregorio Monreal, and Emma Luna — the Officer-in-Charge of the City Engineer's Office, the City Assessor, and the City Administrator of Tagaytay City — against the Sandiganbayan. They were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act Number 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and the Sandiganbayan ordered their suspension from office pending trial. They ask the Supreme Court to annul that suspension order. The case matters because it fixes the contours of the preventive suspension that the anti-graft law makes mandatory, and tells us exactly what the required pre-suspension hearing is — and is not.

Procedural History

The Spouses Liongson filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman. After preliminary investigation, the Graft Investigation Officer recommended prosecution of the three petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act Number 3019, and the Ombudsman approved. An Information was filed before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioners moved for reinvestigation, which the Sandiganbayan granted; the Ombudsman maintained its finding of probable cause. The petitioners were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The Special Prosecutor then filed a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite. The Sandiganbayan granted it in a Resolution dated February 24, 2003, ordering their suspension for ninety days, and denied reconsideration on November 21, 2003. The petitioners went to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Facts

The Liongson spouses owned three parcels of land in Tagaytay City. In November 1998 they applied with the City Engineer's Office for a building permit, which was never acted upon. In July 1999, a group from that office, said to be headed by the petitioners, fenced portions of the property with woven bamboo slats, without their knowledge and consent, practically shutting off the points of ingress and egress and fencing the stairway to their house and the only water faucet on the property. The Liongsons claimed this was done to favor the Suarez spouses, who were asserting an interest in the land.

The petitioners denied the imputations. They averred that the Suarez spouses, through their attorney-in-fact Edgardo Peña, applied for a fencing permit, presented their title and tax declaration, and complied with all requirements; hence the permit was granted. The actual fencing, they said, was done by private individuals engaged by Peña, and their only participation was the processing and signing of the permit in their official capacity.

In their Reply, the Liongsons stressed that the Suarezes' fencing permit was processed in about a month, while their own building permit application remained unacted upon despite payment of fees. After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman found probable cause against the three petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act Number 3019 and dismissed the complaint against the others. The Information alleged that the petitioners, acting with manifest partiality and evident bad faith, processed, signed, and approved the fencing permit application despite blatant defects in the documents submitted, thereby giving unwarranted benefits to the Suarezes and causing damage to the Liongsons.

Issues

• Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to suspend the petitioners pendente lite without setting the motion anew for a pre-suspension hearing.
• Whether or not the pre-suspension hearing required before a suspension order may issue was satisfied by the petitioners' opportunity to oppose the motion and to challenge the validity of the Information.
• Whether or not the petitioners' challenge that the acts charged do not constitute a violation of the anti-graft law may be resolved at the pre-suspension stage.

Applicable Provisions

Section 13 of Republic Act Number 3019 provides:

Section 13. Suspension and Loss of Benefits. — Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.

This is the source of the mandatory suspension the Sandiganbayan ordered, and its validity turns on the pendency of a valid Information.

Section 3(e) of the same law, the offense charged, provides:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

The Court uses this to test the Information: whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the offense.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petitioners failed to establish grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion means capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or exercise in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to an invasion of positive duty — mere abuse of discretion is not enough. The Sandiganbayan's resolution was in accord with law and case law.

On the second issue, the Court held that no new hearing was required. The pre-suspension hearing is not governed by hard and fast rules; what is indispensable is that the accused be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings against him. Here the motion was set for hearing, counsel appeared and asked for time to oppose, the parties agreed to submit the motion for resolution upon the filing of the opposition, and the petitioners in fact filed their opposition. The Court quoted its guideline from Luciano versus Mariano:

No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings against him, e.g., that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.

On the third issue, the Court held that a challenge that the acts charged do not constitute a violation of the anti-graft law should be limited to an inquiry whether the facts alleged in the Information, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the offense. The law does not require that the guilt of the accused be established in a pre-suspension proceeding; the strength of the evidence, the gravity of the offense, and whether his continuance in office could influence witnesses are not for that stage. Those matters are threshed out at trial on the merits.

Doctrine

Under Section 13 of Republic Act Number 3019, the suspension of a public officer charged under a valid Information is mandatory; the court has no discretion to withhold it once the Information is valid. Before issuing the order, a pre-suspension hearing must be held, but no specific rules govern it — it is enough that the accused is given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings, as by opposing the motion, moving to quash, or raising the invalidity of the Information. That hearing is confined to the validity of the Information: the test is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the offense. It is not a trial of guilt, and the court does not weigh the strength of the evidence or the gravity of the offense. Certiorari lies only for grave abuse of discretion, not mere error of judgment.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed, and the Sandiganbayan's resolutions of February 24, 2003 and November 21, 2003 were affirmed; the petitioners' ninety-day suspension stood.

Remember This

Memorize the line: suspension under Section 13 is mandatory upon a valid Information, and the pre-suspension hearing requires only a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the Information — not a trial on the merits. Examiners use this case to test the mandatory nature of preventive suspension and the limited scope of the pre-suspension hearing.