RENE CABARLES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

Cabarles versus Maceda

The Case

This is an original action for certiorari brought by Rene Cabarles against Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda and the People of the Philippines. Cabarles was the accused in a murder case pending before the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City. A day before the scheduled promulgation of judgment, the judge on his own initiative issued an order cancelling the promulgation and reopening the case to receive the testimony of two prosecution witnesses who had never testified during trial. Cabarles asked the Supreme Court to annul that order as tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The case matters because it fixes the exact procedural boundaries of the remedy of reopening under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, and because it reminds every examiner and practitioner that the Bill of Rights protects the accused even against a court's desire to give the prosecution a second chance.

Procedural History

Cabarles was charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 275, presided over by Judge Maceda. He pleaded not guilty and trial proceeded. After both sides rested, Cabarles filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of court, which the trial court denied. A day before the scheduled promulgation of judgment, Judge Maceda issued an order on his own initiative cancelling the promulgation and reopening the case for the reception of evidence from two prosecution witnesses. Cabarles moved for reconsideration, which was denied. He then filed a petition for certiorari directly with the Supreme Court, invoking its original jurisdiction under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court continued with the reopened proceedings while the petition was pending, and later deferred the promulgation and ordered the case archived pending the Supreme Court's resolution. The Supreme Court took cognizance of the petition as an exception to the hierarchy of courts.

Facts

On June 18, 1999, Cabarles was charged with murder for the stabbing of Antonio Callosa on April 25, 1999 in Las Piñas City. The information alleged treachery and evident premeditation. Cabarles pleaded not guilty. The trial court set several dates for the prosecution's evidence, but through no fault of its own the prosecution was unable to present evidence on the first four hearing dates. Trial on the merits began only on May 23, 2001, when the testimony of Carlos Callosa was dispensed with by stipulation. On June 20, 2001, the testimony of Police Inspector Prudencio Parejos was likewise dispensed with by stipulation. The prosecution then announced it would rest if no witness appeared at the next hearing.

On June 27, 2001, no witness appeared. The records showed that subpoenas had been issued to Imelda Pedrosa, the alleged eyewitness, and to Dr. Romeo Salen, but some subpoenas had no proof of service and those to the doctor were returned with the notation that the addressee had moved. No subpoena at all was issued for the June 27, 2001 hearing. Over Cabarles's objection, Judge Maceda gave the prosecution a last chance but warned that the prosecution was not relieved of its duty to make a formal offer of evidence. On August 1, 2001, still no witness appeared, so the prosecution rested and formally offered its evidence. The defense then presented Cabarles himself and one Luisito Javier.

A day before the scheduled promulgation of judgment on April 2, 2003, Judge Maceda issued the questioned order reopening the case. He reasoned that a mix-up in the subpoena dates and the hearing dates had deprived the prosecution of its day in court, and he set the reception of the testimony of Pedrosa and Dr. Salen. He issued this order without notice and without hearing. Cabarles's motion for reconsideration was denied. Pedrosa eventually testified and was cross-examined, and the testimony of Dr. Salen was dispensed with by stipulation on the facts in the death certificate.

Issues

• Whether or not Judge Maceda acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing on his own initiative the order reopening the case before judgment was rendered, to receive the testimonies of two prosecution witnesses after both parties had rested.
• Whether or not the reopening of the case violated Cabarles's right to due process and to a speedy disposition of his case.

Applicable Provisions

Section 24, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Section 24. Reopening. At any time before finality of the judgment of conviction, the judge may, motu proprio or upon motion, with hearing in either case, reopen the proceedings to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The proceedings shall be terminated within thirty days from the order granting it.

This is the provision under which the challenged order was issued, and its requirement of a hearing is the very requirement the trial court failed to observe.

Section 3, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in its relevant portion:

Section 3. Exclusions. The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence: x x x (b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of an essential witness.

The Solicitor General invoked this provision to argue that the delay caused by the absent prosecution witnesses should not be counted against the State for purposes of the right to speedy trial.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled that the petition is meritorious. A motion to reopen was not in the old rules but was a recognized procedural recourse deriving validity from long established usage, and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure merely formalized it. The Court laid down the requirements for reopening: first, the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction; second, the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; third, the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted; fourth, the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and fifth, the presentation of additional evidence must be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of the order. The Court held that while Judge Maceda was allowed to reopen the case before judgment was rendered, he issued the order without notice and hearing and without giving either party the chance to be heard. That failure constitutes grave abuse of discretion and violates the due process clause of the Constitution, which requires notice and opportunity to be heard. The Court added that Cabarles did not waive his objection by cross-examining Pedrosa, because a waiver must be certain and unequivocal, and he had already filed the petition before that cross-examination.

The Court also rejected the trial court's premise that the prosecution had been deprived of its day in court. The prosecution had four hearing dates, namely May 23, June 20 and 27, and August 1, 2001, and the presence of prosecution witnesses is the responsibility of the public prosecutor. The Court quoted with approval its pronouncement in People versus Monje:

A proposal has been expressed for the remand of this case to the trial court for further proceedings, apparently to enable the prosecution to prove again what it failed to prove in the first instance. We cannot agree because it will set a dangerous precedent. Aside from its being unprocedural, it would open the floodgates to endless litigations because whenever an accused is on the brink of acquittal after trial, and realizing its inadequacy, the prosecution would insist to be allowed to augment its evidence which should have been presented much earlier.

On the second issue, the Court held that the discussion of the right to speedy disposition was mooted by the nullification of the order, but it reiterated that the concept of speedy disposition is relative and flexible. The right is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured, or when without cause a long period is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. The Court also stressed that direct recourse to it violates the policy of strict observance of the hierarchy of courts, since petitions for extraordinary writs against a regional trial court should be filed with the Court of Appeals, but it took cognizance of the case as an exception because the information had been filed in June 1999 and almost eight years later no judgment had yet been rendered.

Doctrine

A motion to reopen under Section 24, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure may be filed by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion, before the finality of a judgment of conviction, but only after a hearing is conducted, to avoid a miscarriage of justice, and the proceedings must be terminated within thirty days from the order granting it. The hearing requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional in effect, and an order reopening a case without notice and hearing is void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The reopening is meant to prevent a miscarriage of justice, not to give the prosecution a second opportunity to repair the gaps in its evidence after it has rested. The presence of prosecution witnesses at trial is the responsibility of the public prosecutor. A waiver of an objection to such an order must be certain and unequivocal.

Disposition

The petition was granted. The order of April 1, 2003 was annulled and set aside, all evidence received and offered as a result of that order was stricken off the record, and the records were remanded immediately to the trial court for appropriate action without further delay, with no pronouncement as to costs.

Remember This

The single line to memorize is that reopening under Section 24, Rule 119 requires a hearing, and an order issued without one is grave abuse of discretion. Examiners use this case to test the requirements for reopening a criminal case and the limits of the trial court's discretion when the prosecution has already rested.