PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. CRISOGONO BOTONA, APPELLANT.

People versus Botona

The Case

This is the appeal of Crisogono Botona from his conviction for murder. The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, prosecuted him for shooting Pepito Sulapas twice in the head on a rainy evening at a wharf in Surigao City. The case matters to a reviewee for two reasons. First, it is a clean illustration of treachery, or alevosia, as a qualifying circumstance that raises a killing from homicide to murder. Second, and just as important, it is a lesson in the correct imposition of penalties: the trial court imposed an indeterminate prison term for a crime whose penalty, at the time of its commission, was indivisible. The Supreme Court corrected that error and fixed the penalty at reclusion perpetua.

Procedural History

An Information for murder was filed against the appellant before the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 29, and docketed as a criminal case for murder. The Information alleged treachery as a qualifying circumstance and nighttime as an aggravating circumstance. Assisted by counsel, the appellant pleaded not guilty during his arraignment.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment on May 2, 1995, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. It sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of eighteen years, eight months and one day to twenty years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, ordered him to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of 50,000 pesos, to pay actual damages of 8,000 pesos, and to pay the costs. The trial court gave full credence to the prosecution's principal witness, Valerio Tesado, and rejected the appellant's alibi.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision with modification. Because the Court of Appeals imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the appeal was certified to the Supreme Court, and it is that appeal which the Supreme Court resolved in this decision.

Facts

On the evening of April 13, 1989, at about seven o'clock, Valerio Tesado was at Pantalan Dos on Borromeo Street, Surigao City, waiting for Pepito Sulapas, a fish trader he had dealt with before. While Tesado waited, the appellant arrived and asked him when Sulapas would arrive. The appellant then left.

When Sulapas arrived, Tesado began selecting fish from him. It started to rain, so the two of them took shelter in a nearby pigpen. After about five to ten minutes, the appellant came near them. From a distance of about one and a half meters, he shot Sulapas with a pistol. The first shot struck Sulapas on the left side of the head and he fell. A second shot was fired but did not explode. Out of fear, Tesado ran away, and when he returned, Sulapas was still where he had fallen and the appellant was gone.

The next day, a physician conducted an autopsy and reported that Sulapas had suffered two gunshot wounds on the left side of his head, both fatal. The defense, for its part, presented witnesses who claimed that a different person shot the victim, and the appellant claimed alibi, saying he was still in Agusan del Sur at the time and arrived in Surigao City only at past eight o'clock that evening. The trial court rejected this defense and believed Tesado.

Issues

• Whether or not the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that treachery attended the killing, so as to qualify the crime as murder rather than homicide.
• Whether or not the trial court imposed the correct penalty for murder, considering the penalty prescribed by law at the time the crime was committed.
• Whether or not the heirs of the victim are entitled to moral and exemplary damages in addition to the awards made by the trial court.

Applicable Provisions

Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code, as quoted in the decision, provides:

Article 14. Aggravating circumstances. – The following are aggravating circumstances: … 16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia).

This is the provision under which treachery qualifies the killing of the victim as murder.

The same article, in its second paragraph as quoted in the decision, defines treachery:

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

This definition supplies the two elements the Court applied to the facts: an execution that leaves the victim no real chance to defend himself, and a mode of execution consciously chosen to secure that result.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as discussed in the decision, prescribed for murder, at the time the crime was committed in 1989, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. This is the penalty range from which the Court drew the correct penalty after finding treachery.

Article 64, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as invoked in the decision, governs the application of penalties when there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances. The Court applied it to impose reclusion perpetua, since treachery was the only circumstance and it was merely qualifying.

Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, as invoked in the decision, governs the application of indivisible penalties. The Court relied on it to hold that reclusion perpetua, being indivisible, must be imposed as such.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that treachery was proved beyond reasonable doubt. The essence of treachery, the Court said, is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. Here, the attack was sudden. The victim had no inkling that the appellant would arrive and shoot him pointblank on his left temple. He had no opportunity to defend himself or fend off the attack. The crime was therefore murder, not homicide.

On the second issue, the Court held that the trial court imposed the wrong penalty. When the crime was committed in 1989, the penalty for murder under Article 248 was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Since the felony was attended by no modifying circumstance except the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the appellant had to be sentenced to reclusion perpetua under Article 64, paragraph 1. Reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty and must be imposed as provided in Article 63. The Court added that even under the later amendatory law, reclusion perpetua remained indivisible, because that law did not amend the article enumerating the divisible penalties nor reclassify reclusion perpetua as divisible.

On the third issue, the Court held that the trial court should have awarded moral and exemplary damages. Conformably to current jurisprudence, the heirs of the victim are entitled to 50,000 pesos as moral damages and 25,000 pesos as exemplary damages.

Doctrine

Treachery, or alevosia, qualifies a killing as murder when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime that tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense the offended party might make. Its essence is a sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the victim of any real chance to defend himself, ensuring the crime's commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. Alevosia must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself.

For the penalty, a candidate must remember that the penalty for murder is determined by the law in force at the time of the crime's commission. Where treachery is the only circumstance and it is merely qualifying, there being no other modifying circumstance, the penalty is reclusion perpetua, an indivisible penalty, imposed under Articles 63 and 64 of the Revised Penal Code. An indeterminate sentence is improper for an indivisible penalty.

Finally, the heirs of a murder victim are entitled to moral damages of 50,000 pesos and exemplary damages of 25,000 pesos, in addition to the civil indemnity, conformably to current jurisprudence.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Crisogono Botona for murder, with modifications: it sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay the heirs of Pepito Sulapas 50,000 pesos as moral damages and 25,000 pesos as exemplary damages, with no costs.

Remember This

Memorize this line: treachery's essence is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim, depriving him of any real chance to defend himself, without risk to the aggressor and without provocation on the victim's part. Examiners use this case to test whether you can distinguish a qualifying circumstance from a modifying one, and whether you know that an indivisible penalty such as reclusion perpetua cannot be imposed as an indeterminate sentence.