CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENT.

Civil Service Commission versus Court of Appeals

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by the Civil Service Commission against the Court of Appeals, which had reversed the Commission and ordered the reinstatement of a municipal accountant, Luzviminda Maniago, who had been penalized for obtaining a personal loan out of municipal funds. The case matters for two reasons a reviewee should hold onto: it is a clean illustration of the rule that certiorari under Rule 65 is not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal under Rule 43, and it restates the settled administrative-law standard that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard, which may be satisfied through pleadings rather than a trial-type hearing.

Procedural History

An anonymous complaint prompted the Commission on Audit Regional Office to conduct a fraud audit of the municipal government of Infanta, Pangasinan, which produced a Fraud Audit Report. A resident, Celso Manuel, then filed a complaint against Luzviminda Maniago before the Office of the Mayor for violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. The Acting Mayor, Charlito Kho, found her guilty of Grave Misconduct and dismissed her from the service. On appeal, the Civil Service Commission modified the resolution, finding her guilty only of Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and reducing the penalty to suspension of one year. Her motion for reconsideration was denied.

Luzviminda then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court noted that her proper remedy was a petition for review under Rule 43, but relaxed the rules to avoid a miscarriage of justice and gave the petition due course. In its decision of June 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the Commission and ordered her reinstatement, reasoning that the Fraud Audit Report did not establish that her loan formed part of the cash shortage, that the Ombudsman had not indicted her, and that the factual findings of administrative agencies may be set aside upon proof of arbitrariness or grave abuse of discretion. The Commission's motion for reconsideration was denied, so it elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari.

Facts

A fraud audit of the municipal government of Infanta, Pangasinan, covering a period in 1998, found that the Municipal Treasurer had granted various loans to municipal officers and employees amounting to 993,686 pesos and nine centavos, in violation of a Commission on Audit circular, thereby putting public funds to idle use. One of the borrowers was the Municipal Accountant, Luzviminda Maniago, who at the time of the audit had an outstanding loan balance of 17,200 pesos, which she had fully paid by the time the audit report was submitted.

Celso Manuel, a resident of Infanta, later filed a complaint against Luzviminda before the Office of the Mayor for violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, in connection with the loan. In her Answer, Luzviminda claimed that the loan had been extended to her by the Municipal Treasurer in the latter's personal capacity. The Acting Mayor, relying on the Fraud Audit Report, found her guilty of Grave Misconduct and dismissed her from the service.

On appeal, the Civil Service Commission modified the ruling, finding her guilty only of Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and imposing suspension of one year. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered her reinstatement, and the Commission brought the matter to the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to Luzviminda's petition for certiorari under Rule 65 despite the availability of the remedy of appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
• Whether or not there is substantial evidence to hold Luzviminda guilty of Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.

Applicable Provisions

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as stated in the decision, provides:

Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, certiorari may only be availed of when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

This is the provision that governs whether Luzviminda's choice of remedy was proper, and its requirement that there be no appeal is the very element her petition failed.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Court of Appeals erred. A special civil action for certiorari is a limited form of review which cannot be used as a substitute for a lost or lapsed remedy of appeal. Because the remedy of a petition for review under Rule 43 was available to Luzviminda, her right to resort to certiorari was foreclosed. The Court noted that she had until February 2002 to file a petition for review, but instead sought and obtained an extension to file a petition for certiorari. Her petition, the Court added, did not justify a relaxation of the rules.

On the second issue, the Court held that there was substantial evidence to support the finding of guilt. The audit team had confirmed that the loan granted to Luzviminda formed part of the cash shortage of the Municipal Treasurer. The decision of the Acting Mayor, which the Commission affirmed, rested not only on the Fraud Audit Report but also on Luzviminda's Answer, in which she did not deny having secured the loan, her only defense being that it did not involve public funds, a defense unsupported by any proof.

On her claim that she was denied due process because the complaint was decided without a hearing, the Court held that the absence of a hearing did not deprive her of due process, since she was given and took the opportunity to file an Answer and to appeal to the Commission. The Court stated the governing standard:

Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself.

And further:

The essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even many times more creditably and practicable than oral argument, through pleadings.

Finally, her claim of payment did not help her, because the loan, though paid in full, resulted in the diversion of municipal funds for purposes other than those for which they were appropriated, and thus public service was prejudiced.

Doctrine

A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is a limited form of review and cannot be used as a substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal; where the remedy of a petition for review under Rule 43 is available, the right to resort to certiorari is foreclosed. The factual findings of administrative agencies, when supported by substantial evidence, are binding, and the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority will be reinstated where the appellate court improperly set it aside. Due process in administrative proceedings does not always require a trial-type hearing; it is satisfied when the person charged is notified of the charge and given a reasonable opportunity to explain or defend, and that opportunity may be exercised through pleadings. Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied in administrative proceedings.

Disposition

The petition was granted; the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed and set aside, and the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were reinstated.

Remember This

Memorize the line that certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal, and that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard, which may be satisfied through pleadings. Examiners use this case to test the Rule 65 versus Rule 43 distinction and the standard of administrative due process in disciplinary proceedings.