JEANY-VI G. KIANI, PETITIONER, VS. THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION (BID); EDGARDO CABRERA, ELISEO EXCONDE AND JOSE VALE, JR., RESPONDENTS.

Kiani versus Bureau of Immigration and Deportation

The Case

This is the case of Kiani versus the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, a petition for review on certiorari brought before the Supreme Court by Jeany-Vi Kiani, the Filipina wife of a detained British national of Pakistani birth, Javed Kiani. She sought to nullify the decision of the Court of Appeals which had dismissed her appeal and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of her petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in behalf of her husband. The case matters because it gathers in one decision the rules on the proper remedy against a deportation order, the limits of the writ of habeas corpus once a charge has been filed, and the consequences of forum shopping. It is a favorite of examiners on immigration law and on the writ of liberty.

Procedural History

Jeany-Vi Kiani filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8, naming the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and its intelligence officers as respondents. The trial court initially granted bail and ordered the respondents to file their return. On motion for reconsideration by the Office of the Solicitor General, the trial court set aside its earlier order and dismissed the petition, ruling that the filing of the Charge Sheet before the Board of Special Inquiry barred any challenge to the arrest and detention, and that it had no jurisdiction to reverse the Summary Deportation Order of the Board of Commissioners.

Kiani appealed to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the appeal. The appellate court held that habeas corpus could no longer be allowed since the party sought to be released had already been charged before the Board of Special Inquiry, and that any infirmity in the arrest was cured by the filing of the Charge Sheet. It likewise affirmed that the remedy against the Summary Deportation Order was a petition for review under Rule 43, and that the failure to avail of it rendered the order final and executory. Her motion for reconsideration was denied. She then filed the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Facts

Javed Kiani, a British national by then but Pakistani by birth, was married to the petitioner Jeany-Vi on July 27, 1988. He was admitted as an immigrant and issued a permanent resident visa on March 17, 1993. In June 2002, two Indian nationals, Iqbal Singh and Balbir Singh, were arrested, and they pointed to Javed Kiani as the person who had furnished them with fake immigration documents and as their protector. The forms used were certified as not official forms of the Bureau.

On June 20, 2002, the Commissioner of Immigration issued a Mission Order directing officers of the Bureau to verify the admission status and activities of Javed Kiani and, if he was found to have violated the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, to immediately place him under arrest. A week later, on June 27, 2002, he was arrested by intelligence operatives of the Bureau. On July 1, 2002, the Bureau Prosecutor filed a Charge Sheet against him before the Board of Special Inquiry for violation of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. On that same day, the Board of Commissioners conducted a summary proceeding and issued a Summary Deportation Order revoking his visa and ordering his summary deportation, with an administrative fine.

The next day, July 2, 2002, Jeany-Vi filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of her husband, alleging that his arrest and detention had no factual and legal basis since no deportation order had yet been issued at the time of arrest. He had been detained at the detention center since July 3, 2002. During the pendency of the case, Javed Kiani himself filed an Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam with the Bureau, seeking the same reliefs his wife prayed for, and the Immigration Commissioner later granted it and ordered his provisional release.

Issues

• Whether or not the petitioner engaged in forum shopping.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus before the trial court was not the proper remedy of the petitioner.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the validity of the Summary Deportation Order issued by the Board of Commissioners.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that such order had become final and executory.

Applicable Provisions

Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge; or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.

This provision is the basis for the rule that the writ will not issue where the person is held under a valid process, and that a person duly charged may no longer be discharged through habeas corpus.

Section 6, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court, on the certification against forum shopping, provides:

The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a certification under oath that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom.

This requirement, read with Section 5, Rule 45, is the ground for dismissing a petition where the party has simultaneously sought the same relief in another forum.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petitioner did engage in forum shopping. Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. While the petition was pending, Javed Kiani himself filed an Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam with the Bureau seeking the same reliefs, and neither he nor his wife informed the Court of it. Both were represented by the same law firm and the same lawyer. The Court stressed that the petition was filed for and in behalf of Javed Kiani, who is the real party in interest, so that in effect the habeas corpus petition was his, filed through his wife as representative.

On the second issue, the Court held that the Court of Appeals acted in accord with jurisprudence in ruling that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy. The writ is not in the nature of a writ of error, and cannot take the place of appeal or certiorari. The inquiry is addressed only to whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void. When the petition was filed, a Charge Sheet had already been filed against Javed Kiani, and the filing of the Charge Sheet cured whatever irregularities attended his arrest. The remedy was to move for the dismissal of the Charge Sheet and the Mission Order, not to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court quoted its earlier ruling that once a person detained is duly charged, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and that the term court includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.

On the third and fourth issues, the Court held that the trial court had no jurisdiction to set aside the Summary Deportation Order. The power to deport aliens is vested in the President, subject to due process, and the Immigration Commissioner is vested with authority to deport under the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. A party aggrieved by a deportation order may file a motion for reconsideration before the Board of Commissioners, then appeal to the Secretary of Justice, then to the Office of the President, or file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, or a petition for review under Rule 43. The petitioner availed of none of these remedies. The Court also held that the thirty-day period for a Board decision to become final, counted from promulgation, did not apply, because what was assailed was a Summary Deportation Order, not a decision based on the recommendation of the Board of Special Inquiry after due hearing.

Doctrine

First, habeas corpus is not a writ of error. It cannot substitute for appeal, certiorari, or a motion to quash, and it will not be granted where the law provides other remedies in the regular course, absent exceptional circumstances. Second, once a person detained is duly charged before a court or a quasi-judicial body such as the Board of Special Inquiry, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus; the filing of the Charge Sheet cures whatever incipient infirmity there was in the arrest. Third, a party aggrieved by a deportation order must follow the sequence of remedies: motion for reconsideration before the Board of Commissioners, appeal to the Secretary of Justice, appeal to the Office of the President, or a petition for certiorari or review, and may not assail the order before the trial court even through habeas corpus. Fourth, forum shopping is an act of malpractice that trifles with the courts and abuses their processes, and the failure to comply with the certification requirement is a sufficient ground for dismissal.

Disposition

The petition was denied for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner, and the decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.

Remember This

Memorize the line that once a detainee is duly charged, the remedy is to quash the charge and not to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, because the writ is not a writ of error. Examiners use this case to test the hierarchy of remedies against a deportation order and to test forum shopping where a spouse files for a husband who simultaneously seeks the same relief elsewhere.