AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER – HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, IN H…

Calilung versus Datumanong

The Case

This is a lecture on Calilung versus Datumanong, an original action for prohibition brought by a member of an organization of teachers and allied workers against the then Secretary of Justice, the official tasked to implement the laws governing citizenship. The petitioner asked the Supreme Court to stop the Secretary from implementing the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, Republic Act Number 9225, on the ground that it is unconstitutional. He argued that the law permits dual allegiance, which the Constitution declares inimical to the national interest. The case matters because it is the Supreme Court's clearest statement that the constitutional policy against dual allegiance is not self-executing, and that the judiciary must wait for Congress before it may rule on the parameters of dual allegiance.

Procedural History

The petitioner went directly to the Supreme Court. He filed an original action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, impleading the Secretary of Justice as respondent. There were no proceedings in a trial court and no appeal from the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court treated the petition as a direct challenge to the constitutionality of a statute and resolved it in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, raising and deciding two questions jointly: the constitutionality of Republic Act Number 9225, and whether the Court had jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance.

Facts

On the twenty-ninth of August 2003, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo signed into law Republic Act Number 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. The law declares as state policy that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of the Act. It provides that natural-born citizens who had lost Philippine citizenship by reason of naturalization in a foreign country are deemed to have reacquired it upon taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic, and that those who become foreign citizens after the effectivity of the Act retain Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath.

The petitioner, a member of an organization advocating social justice for school teachers and allied workers, filed a petition for prohibition against the Secretary of Justice. He contended that the law cheapens Philippine citizenship. In particular, he argued that Sections 2 and 3 of the law, taken together, allow dual allegiance and not merely dual citizenship, because the law lets natural-born citizens regain Philippine citizenship by simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign allegiance.

The Office of the Solicitor General defended the law. It argued that Section 2 merely declares a state policy, and that the oath in Section 3 is an effective renunciation and repudiation of foreign citizenship, since the applicant recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the Philippines. The petitioner countered that even without an enabling law on dual allegiance, the Court could rule, because the case of Mercado versus Manzano had already drawn guidelines distinguishing dual allegiance from dual citizenship. The Solicitor General replied that until Congress enacts a law on dual allegiance, the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the issue.

Issues

• Whether or not Republic Act Number 9225 is unconstitutional for violating Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance.
• Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance in the absence of an enabling law.

Applicable Provisions

Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.

This is the constitutional policy the petitioner invokes, and the Court holds that it is a declaration of policy that is not self-executing, so that Congress must first enact the law that deals with dual allegiance.

Section 2 of Republic Act Number 9225 provides:

It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.

This declaration of policy is the provision the petitioner says permits dual allegiance, but the Court reads it as recognizing Philippine citizenship without speaking to the other citizenship.

Section 3 of Republic Act Number 9225 provides:

Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic.

This is the reacquisition mechanism, and the Court holds that the oath it requires is an implicit renunciation of foreign citizenship, so that the law stays clear of the problem of dual allegiance.

Section 1 of Commonwealth Act Number 63 provides:

A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and or events, by naturalization in a foreign country.

This is the old rule that took away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos naturalized abroad, and the Court finds that Republic Act Number 9225 was intended to do away with it.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court upheld the law. It resorted to the deliberations of Congress to determine legislative intent, and found that the intent was to do away with the provision of Commonwealth Act Number 63 that stripped natural-born Filipinos of Philippine citizenship upon naturalization abroad. What the law does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipinos who lost Philippine citizenship by reason of naturalization in a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. The law stayed clear of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting that issue to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of the law.

On the second issue, the Court held that it had no jurisdiction yet to rule on dual allegiance. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law setting the specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance, and until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including the Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance. The petitioner misread Mercado versus Manzano, which did not set the parameters of dual allegiance but merely distinguished dual allegiance from dual citizenship. Invoking the doctrine of separation of powers and the presumption that the legislature acted with full knowledge of the facts, the Court said it could not arrogate to itself the duty of setting those parameters when the Constitution itself had delegated that duty to Congress.

Doctrine

First, the constitutional command that dual allegiance is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law is a non-self-executing declaration of policy. It requires an enabling act from Congress, and until that act is passed, any judicial ruling on dual allegiance is premature.

Second, Republic Act Number 9225 allows dual citizenship but does not recognize dual allegiance. The oath of allegiance to the Republic is an implicit renunciation of foreign citizenship, and the law leaves the consequences on the foreign side to the foreign country concerned.

Third, the case of Mercado versus Manzano did not supply the parameters of dual allegiance; it only distinguished dual allegiance from dual citizenship. The setting of those parameters belongs to Congress under the Constitution.

Fourth, the principle of separation of powers and judicial restraint counsel the Court to act with caution and forbearance, presuming that the legislature passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the public welfare.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit, and the Court declined to prohibit the implementation of Republic Act Number 9225.

Remember This

The one line to memorize is that the constitutional policy against dual allegiance is not self-executing, and Republic Act Number 9225 permits dual citizenship but not dual allegiance. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between dual citizenship and dual allegiance, and to test whether a student knows that the judiciary cannot rule on dual allegiance until Congress enacts the enabling law.