JOHN O. YU, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. MAXIMO DE LARA, JUAN PANLILIO, LUCIA RIVERO, FLORENTINO ROQUE AND DOMINGO SAMSON, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

This is an ejectment case decided first by the Justice of the Peace Court of
Caloocan and, on appeal, by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig branch,
which ordered the defendants “to vacate the premises in question, to pay the
monthly rental of P15.00 to begin from the time this action was filed ap to the
time they vacate the premises, and to pay the costs.”

The pertinent facts are the subject of stipulation below. Lot No. 14, block
No. 51-C of the Grace Park subdivision, with an area of 682.5 meters, is the
disputed property. It was originally registered in 1916 (O. C. T. No. 868 of the
Registry of Deeds of Rizal), subsequently acquired by the Philippine Realty
Corporation (T. C. T. No. 22104) and sold by it on 28 November 1956 to
plaintiff-appellee, John O. Yu, a Filipino citizen, who obtained T. C. T. No.
11267 in his name. In 1945 several persons settled on the property and
constructed houses thereon without permission from, or contract with, the
Philippine Realty Corporation, then the registered owner. On various dates
thereafter, between 1947 and 1952, appellants here bought the houses of those
settlers and continued in occupancy thereof without paying any rents to the
owner of the land. In February 1957 plaintiif-appellee advised them in writing
to vacate within 30 days, and in view of their refusal filed a complaint of
unlawful detainer within the statutory period of one year.

The first point raised by appellants is that the Philippine Realty
Corporation had loat possession of the property by abandonment, under Article
555, paragraph 1, of the Civil Code, in failing to take action against them and
showing lack of interest in said property since they started their occupancy.
The circumstances adverted to are insufficient to constitute abandonment, which
requires not only physical relinquishment of the thing but also a clear
intention not to reclaim or reassume ownership or enjoyment thereof. Indeed,
abandonment which according to Manresa (Vol. 4, 5th ed., p. 277) converts the
thing into res nullius, ownership of which may be acquired by occupation,
can hardly apply to land, as to which said mode of acquisition is not available
(Art. 714, Civil Code), let alone to registered land, to which “no title * * *
in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession” (Sec. 46, Act No. 496). No possessory rights whatsoever
can be recognized in favor of appellants, because they are in fact nothing but
squatters, who settled on the land without any agreement with the owner, paying
neither rents to him nor land taxes to the government, and who impliedly
recognized their squatters’ status by purchasing only the houses built by the
original settlers. Their occupancy of the land was at the owner’s sufferance,
and their acts were merely tolerated which could not affect the owner’s
possession (Arts. 537 and 1119, Civil Code).

Appellants next contend that since there is no showing that there was any
promise on their part, express or implied, to return the land to appellee, or
that they failed to do so after their right to retain it had expired, they
cannot be considered as unlawfully withholding possession within the meaning of
Section 1 of Rule 72. The implication of the argument is that this action of
unlawful detainer was improperly brought against them in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Caloocan. A person who occupies the land of another at the
latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is
necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing
which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. In any
event, whatever might be said on this point in so far as it relates to the
original jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court—and hence to the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance—it does not appear that
the question was raised in the former court at all. Consequently the latter
court could take cognizance of the case—as one for recovery by the owner of the
right of possession—in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, pursuant to
section 11 of Rule 40.

The third and last contention of appellants is that the Court of First
Instance lacked jurisdiction to decide this case because there were prejudicial
questions pending before us on appeal in cases G. R. Nos. L-12614 and
L-12615^* concerning the same property.
The issue in those two cases was the propriety of the registration of
appellants’ adverse claim to the said land, which was resolved against them by
the Land Registration Commissioner. In the first place the issue was not
prejudicial in nature: it could not affect appellee’s right to the possession of
his land, which has nothing to do with the registrability or non-registrability
of appellants’ alleged adverse claim; and secondly, the said cases have already
been decided by us on January 29, 1960, by upholding the action taken by the
Land Registration Commissioner.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera,
Paredes, Dizon, and Regala, JJ., concur.

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* Estella, et al. vs. Register of Deeds (106 Phil.,
911; 57 Off. Gaz., [17] 3115).