HILARIO P. SORIANO, PETITIONER, VS. OMBUDSMAN SIMEON V. MARCELO, HON. MARILOU B. ANCHETA-MEJIA, GRAFT INVESTIGATION OFFICER II, AND ATTY. CELEDONIO P. BALASBAS, RESPONDENTS.

Soriano versus Ombudsman Marcelo

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari filed by Hilario P. Soriano against Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, Graft Investigation Officer Marilou B. Ancheta-Mejia, and Assistant City Prosecutor Celedonio P. Balasbas. Soriano asks the Supreme Court to set aside the Ombudsman's dismissal of his criminal complaint against Balasbas for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The case matters because it draws the line between an error of judgment, which certiorari cannot reach, and an error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, which it can — and because it explains why a subordinate prosecutor who merely obeys a lawful directive of his superior does not thereby commit a corrupt practice.

Procedural History

Soriano first filed an affidavit-complaint for Falsification of Public Documents and Use of Falsified Document against Mely S. Palad with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Acting City Prosecutor Balasbas recommended that Palad be charged with falsification and that the charge of use of falsified document be dropped. The recommendation went to Second Assistant City Prosecutor Leoncia R. Dimagiba, who recommended the filing of the information, and then to the City Prosecutor for approval. Palad moved to reopen the case on the ground that she had never received a copy of the subpoena or any notice. Dimagiba recommended reopening, the City Prosecutor approved, and Balasbas issued a subpoena setting the case for investigation.

Soriano then filed a criminal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against Balasbas for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act Number 3019. The Ombudsman, through Graft Investigation Officer Charity Grace A. Rico, recommended dismissal for want of sufficient basis, and Ombudsman Marcelo approved. Soriano's motion for reconsideration was denied. Soriano went directly to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and the Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the Ombudsman.

Facts

On 1 June 2001, Soriano filed an affidavit-complaint against Palad, a bank examiner of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, for Falsification of Public Documents and Use of Falsified Document under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. The complaint was docketed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. On 27 August 2001, Balasbas issued a resolution recommending that Palad be charged with falsification and that the charge of use of falsified document be dropped for lack of merit. That resolution was forwarded to Dimagiba, who recommended the filing of the information, and then to the City Prosecutor for approval.

On 25 January 2002, Palad filed a motion to reopen the case, claiming she had never been given a copy of the subpoena or any notice of the complaint against her. On 27 February 2002, Dimagiba recommended reopening, and City Prosecutor Ramon R. Garcia approved. On 26 March 2002, Balasbas issued a subpoena to the parties setting the case for investigation. Notably, when earlier asked to comment on Palad's motion, Balasbas had objected to reopening, saying it would only delay the final disposition of the case.

On 18 April 2002, Soriano filed a criminal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against Balasbas for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act Number 3019. He alleged that by reopening the case, Palad received an unwarranted advantage or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and gross inexcusable negligence, causing him undue injury. The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for want of sufficient basis, and denied reconsideration. Hence the petition.

Issues

• Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in dismissing the complaint against Balasbas.
• Whether or not Balasbas may be held liable under Section 3(e) of Republic Act Number 3019 for issuing the subpoena that reopened the case against Palad.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3(e) of Republic Act Number 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, provides:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

This is the very offense charged against Balasbas, and its elements define what Soriano had to establish.

Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Section 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. If the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint. Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action. No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy. Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the complaint but his recommendation is disapproved by the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy on the ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself, file the information against the respondent, or direct another assistant prosecutor or state prosecutor to do so without conducting another preliminary investigation. If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice may prescribe or motu proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties. The same Rule shall apply in preliminary investigations conducted by the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman.

This provision shows that the investigating prosecutor has no power over the final disposition of the case, which rests with his superiors.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition raises no error of jurisdiction but only an error of judgment, which is beyond the reach of certiorari. Certiorari is a remedy meant to correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. The Court quoted its earlier ruling that an error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, while an error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Court stressed that it will not re-examine conflicting evidence or substitute its findings for those below.

The Court nevertheless acknowledged that it may review the Ombudsman's action where grave abuse of discretion is charged. Grave abuse of discretion means a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, done in an arbitrary or despotic manner so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. On the records, the Court found none.

On the second issue, the Court held that the elements of Section 3(e) were not established. The elements are that the accused is a public officer discharging official functions, that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence, and that his action caused undue injury or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference. The Court found no undue injury because Soriano had suffered no actual damage. It also found no manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence. Balasbas had in fact objected to reopening the case; it was Dimagiba who recommended reopening in the interest of justice, and the City Prosecutor who approved it. Under Section 4, Rule 112, Balasbas had no other recourse but to follow the recommendation of his superior. The subpoena he issued was in pursuance of that approved recommendation.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, certiorari corrects errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment; a mistake in the evaluation of evidence is an error of judgment that certiorari cannot remedy. Second, the courts will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutory powers absent grave abuse of discretion, which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty. Third, the elements of Section 3(e) of Republic Act Number 3019 must all concur: a public officer acting in his official capacity, manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, and undue injury or unwarranted benefit. Fourth, good faith is presumed, and a public officer is presumed to have acted in good faith in the performance of his duties; bad faith requires a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. Fifth, under Section 4, Rule 112, the investigating prosecutor cannot file or dismiss a complaint without the prior written authority or approval of his superior, so a subordinate who merely implements an approved directive of his superior does not act with manifest partiality or evident bad faith.

Disposition

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the Ombudsman's resolution and order, with costs against Soriano.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: certiorari reaches errors of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion, never mere errors of judgment, and a subordinate prosecutor who follows an approved directive of his superior commits no corrupt practice. Examiners use this case on the distinction between errors of judgment and errors of jurisdiction, on the elements of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and on the deference owed to the Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutory discretion.