RUFINO O. ABUDA, PETITIONER, VS. AUDITOR GENERAL, RESPONDENT.

This petition for review seeks the reversal of respondent Auditor General’s
decision, denying the claim of petitioner Rufino O. Abuda for the payment of his
salary as Justice of the Peace of General MacArthur and Qinapundan, Samar,
during the period of his suspension.

Since 28 July 1952, petitioner was the Justice of the Peace of General
MacArthur and Quinapundan, Samar. On said date, he was convicted of the crime of
libel by the Court of First Instance of Samar and sentenced to pay a fine of
P200.00. No appeal from this judgment was perfected by him in due time. In an
administrative order dated 3 November 1952, petitioner was indefinitely
suspended from office, .effective upon receipt of said notice by him, in view of
the aforesaid conviction. The order was soon followed by another letter from the
Office of the President, dated 26 June 1953, asking petitioner to tender his
resignation from the service aa of the date of his suspension, or otherwise,
face dismissal. For the same reason, the Court of First Instance of Samar
suspended petitioner as of 22 June 1953 from the practice of law. This Court,
however, in its resolution of 23 July 1953, lifted the said order upon the
ground that “the act or offense of which he was found guilty * * * was not
sufficient to constitute gross misconduct in the office of an attorney-at-law,
nor did it involve moral turpitude.”

Petitioner filed petitions for reinstatement by the President, and likewise
sought absolute pardon; but his pleas were either denied or not acted upon.

Finally, on 19 January 1955, petitioner tendered his resignation to the
President. However, he withdrew the same on 14 February 1955, after he agreed to
submit to an administrative investigation to be conducted by the Court of First
Instance of Samar regarding his case.

Finding that the criminal case for libel was insufficient as a ground for
suspension, Judge Fidel Fernandez of the Court of First Instance of Samar
recommended petitioner’s exoneration from the administrative complaint. Acting
upon this recommendation, the President, concurring with his Secretary of
Justice, on March 6, 1956 ordered petitioner’s reinstatement, but without right
to salary during the period of suspension, on the thesis that, although the
offense committed by petitioner was neither serious nor directly connected with
his office, still “his conviction somehow reflected on his fitness for the
position, in view of which he should be punished accordingly” (Adm. Order No.
182, March 6, 1956).

The question now thus arises whether or not petitioner should be entitled to
recover his back salaries.

We think not. Section 260 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

“Payment of salary accruing pending suspension.—When the Chief of a
Bureau or Office suspends a subordinate officer or employee from duty, the
person suspended shall not receive pay during suspension unless the Department
Head shall so order; but upon subsequent reinstatement of the suspended person
or upon his exoneration, if death should render reinstatement impossible, any
salary so withheld shall be paid, but without prejudice to the application of
the disciplinary provision of section sis hundred and ninety-five hereof.

In case of a person suspended by the President of the Philippines, no salary
shall be paid during, suspension unless so provided in the order of suspension;
but upoh subsequent reinstatement or exoneration of the suspended person, any
salary so withheld may be paid in whole or in part, at the discretion of the
officer by whom the suspension was effected.” (Italics
supplied)

Petitioner’s case clearly falls under the second paragraph thereof, wherein
it is discretionary with the President to order or not the payment of the
suspended official’s salary during the. period of suspension. That discretion
having been exercised, this Court is without power to substitute its own for it.
It is clear from the text of Administrative Order No. 182 of President Magsaysay
that petitioner’s reinstatement was not an exoneration, but was ordered because
the petitioner has been sufficiently punished with his suspension without
salary.

Upon the other hand, Section 35 of Republic Act No. 2260^[1] (erroneously cited by petitioner as Section
35, Act No. 2265) took effect only on 19 June 1959, and cannot have any
application to this case.

There is, likewise, apparently no merit in petitioner’s contention that the
President, in not giving full effect to Judge Fidel Fernandez’s (of the Court of
First Instance of Samar) report and recommendation for exoneration, encroached
upon the powers of the judiciary. In the first place, it does not appear that
Judge Fernandez recommended the payment of petitioner’s salary during
suspension, and in the second place, said judge was acting not as the presiding
magistrate of his court but as a delegate of the President.

Petitioner’s plea for a review of the legality of his suspension is now
barred by his own laches. Since he was suspended in 1952, petitioner has not
attempted to question such action by appropriate court suit. It is the
established trend of our jurisprudence that the general interest demands that
questions of titte to or tenure of public office should be submitted for
judicial determination without loss of time, and that delay in instituting
action is adequate reason for denying relief.^[2]

Wherefore, the decision of the Auditor General appealed from is affirmed, and
the instant petition for review dismissed. Costs against
petitioner.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera,
Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.

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^[1] When the administrative case against
the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by
the Commission of Civil Service within the period of sixty (60) days after the
date of suspension of the respondent, the respondent shall be reinstated in the
service. If the respondent officer or employee is exonerated he shall be
restored to his position with full pay for the period of his suspension.”

^[2] Unabia vs. City Mayor, 99
Phil., 253; 53 Off. Gaz., 132; Velasquez vs. Gil. 99 Phil., 457; 53 Off.
Gaz., 5615; Cayabyab vs. del Rosario, G. R. No. L-10565, May 20, 1957;
Cuyo vs. Mayor of Baguio, 101 Phil., 558; Abella vs. Rodriguez,
102 Phil., 543; 54 Off. Gaz., 2879; Quingco vs. Rodriguez, G. R. No.
L-12144., September 17, 1958, Erauda vs. del Rosario, 103 Phil., 489; 54
Off. Gaz., 6253; Taborada vs. City of Cebu, et al., G. R. No. L-11574,
October 31, 1958; Cerna vs. Osmeña, et al., 105 Phil., 774.