EVELYN S. CABUNGCAL, ELVIRA J. CANLAS, MARIANITA A. BULANAN, REMEDIOS S. DE JESUS, AND NUNILON J. MABINI, PETITIONERS, VS. SONIA R. LORENZO, IN HER CAPACITY AS MUNICIPAL MAYOR O…

Cabungcal versus Lorenzo

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by five permanent employees of the Rural Health Unit of the Municipality of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, against the Municipal Mayor and the members of the Sangguniang Bayan and Sangguniang Panlalawigan, arising from a local government reorganization that abolished their positions and led to their separation from service. The petitioners went straight to the Court of Appeals on a petition for prohibition and mandamus, asking that the reorganization resolutions be nullified and that the respondents be stopped from implementing them. The case matters because the Supreme Court, while agreeing that the petition must fail, rejects the appellate court's reasoning and rests the dismissal on a single procedural ground: the petitioners never exhausted their administrative remedies before the Civil Service Commission, the agency that has primary jurisdiction over their separation.

Procedural History

The petitioners filed their petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and a restraining order, directly with the Court of Appeals, without first going to the Civil Service Commission. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit, holding that the reorganization was authorized under the Local Government Code, that no bad faith attended it, and that mandamus would not lie to compel a discretionary act. The petitioners moved for reconsideration, and the Court of Appeals denied the motion. The petitioners then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The Supreme Court required the parties to submit supplemental memoranda on the question of jurisdiction, and it decided the case on that threshold ground.

Facts

On July 9, 2001, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, issued a resolution declaring the reorganization of all offices of the municipal government, and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan approved it. On November 12, 2001, the Sangguniang Bayan passed another resolution approving and adopting the proposed new staffing pattern of the municipal government, which the Sangguniang Panlalawigan likewise approved.

On December 21, 2001, the respondent Mayor issued a memorandum informing all employees that, pursuant to the reorganization, all positions were deemed vacant and that every employee had to file an application for the newly created positions on or before January 10, 2002, failing which they would not be considered at all. The petitioners were permanent employees of the Rural Health Unit holding positions ranging from Dentist II and Nurse III to Midwife III, Dental Aide, and Sanitation Inspector I, with employment dating as far back as 1978.

Instead of applying, the petitioners filed their petition with the Court of Appeals on January 17, 2002. While the case was pending, the Mayor issued a letter terminating the services of those who did not re-apply as well as those who were not selected for the new positions, effective April 21, 2002.

Issues

• Whether or not the petitioners' automatic resort to the Court of Appeals, instead of to the Civil Service Commission, was proper.
• Whether or not the case falls under any of the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3, Article IX-B of the Constitution provides:

The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service.

This anchors the Commission's role as the central personnel agency, which the Court uses to locate jurisdiction over the petitioners' separation.

Section 4 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular Number 19-99 provides:

Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service Commission shall have the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees.

This is the direct source of the Commission's authority over removal and separation, which the Court applies to the petitioners as civil service employees.

Section 9 of Republic Act Number 6656 provides:

All officers and employees who are found by the Civil Service Commission to have been separated in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be ordered reinstated or reappointed as the case may be without loss of seniority and shall be entitled to full pay for the period of separation.

This shows that even the very statute the petitioners invoke vests the determination of unlawful separation in the Commission, not in the courts.

Section 8 of Republic Act Number 7305, the Magna Carta of Health Workers, provides:

In case of regular employment of public health workers, their services shall not be terminated except for cause provided by law and after due process: Provided, That if a public health worker is found by the Civil Service Commission to be unjustly dismissed from work, he/she shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his/her back wages with twelve percent interest computed from the time his/her compensation was withheld from him/her up to the time of reinstatement.

This likewise confirms that the finding of unjust dismissal of a health worker belongs to the Commission, reinforcing the ruling on primary jurisdiction.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petitioners' recourse should have been with the Civil Service Commission and not with the Court of Appeals. As the central personnel agency, the Commission has jurisdiction over disputes involving the removal and separation of all employees of government branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, and it is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service. The petitioners were former local government employees whose services were terminated by reason of reorganization, and since they belong to the civil service, the Commission has jurisdiction over their separation. The Court stressed that even the laws the petitioners relied upon, Republic Act Number 6656 and Republic Act Number 7305, vest in the Commission the power to determine whether a separation was carried out in violation of law and to reinstate or reappoint an unlawfully separated employee. Consequently, the resort to the Court of Appeals was premature.

On the second issue, the Court held that the case falls under none of the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Court listed the recognized exceptions, among them a violation of due process, a purely legal question, patent illegality amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, estoppel, irreparable injury, unreasonableness, nullification of a claim, absence of a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and urgency of judicial intervention. None applied. The Court added that mandamus and prohibition may be availed of only when there is no appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and that as extraordinary remedies they are reserved for cases of extreme necessity. The petitioners should have first brought the matter to the Commission, which has primary jurisdiction.

The Court thus agreed with the result reached by the Court of Appeals but not with its grounds, holding that the appellate court should have dismissed the petition for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Having so ruled, the Court found no reason to resolve the other issues raised.

Doctrine

First, the Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency under Section 3, Article IX-B of the Constitution, has primary jurisdiction over disputes involving the removal and separation of civil service employees, including local government employees separated by reason of reorganization. Second, a party must first exhaust administrative remedies before going to the courts, and a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed with the Court of Appeals before the Commission has acted is premature and must be dismissed. Third, the rule on exhaustion admits of exceptions, but the party invoking an exception must show that the case falls squarely within it. Fourth, mandamus lies only to compel a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one, and together with prohibition is an extraordinary remedy available only where no plain, speedy and adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law.

Disposition

The petition was denied, and the dismissal of the petition by the Court of Appeals was affirmed, but on the ground that the petitioners failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to them before the Civil Service Commission.

Remember This

Memorize this line: separation from the civil service by reason of reorganization is a matter for the Civil Service Commission in the first instance, and going straight to the Court of Appeals is premature. Examiners use this case to test primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies, and to test whether a candidate can distinguish the correct ground for dismissal from the wrong one.