G.R. No. 16017. August 31, 1961
PHILIPPINE TOBACCO FLUE-CURING & REDRYING CORPORATION, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. MANUEL SABUGO, FRUCTUOSO ALBAN, AS CHIEF, LABOR RELATIONS SECTION, AND PEDRO A. DE LEON AS HEA…
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
review questioning the validity of Reorganization Plan 20—A, which
grants to regional offices of the Department of Labor exclusive and
original jurisdiction over money claims enumerated under Section 25 of
said plan.
The present dispute arose when Manuel Sabugo, one of the appellants
herein, filed with Regional Office No. 1, Department of Labor, a
complaint against the Philippine Tobacco Flue Curing and Redrying
Corporation, demanding the payment of overtime compensation for
services allegedly rendered in excess of the statutory eight (8) hours
from November, 1951, to September 30, 1958. On the thesis that
Reorganization Plan 20—A is null and void, the corporation filed with
the Court of First Instance of Quezon City a petition for prohibition,
with preliminary injunction, to restrain therein defendants Fructuoso
Alban, as Chief of the Labor Relations Section, and Pedro de Leon, as
Hearing Officer of the regional office, from hearing and adjudicating
Sabugo’s complaint. As prayed for, a writ of preliminary injunction was
issued.
Issues having been joined upon the filing of the Labor officials’
answer, the lower court rendered judgment on the pleadings, dated 2
July 1959, sustaining the employer’s contention and issuing the writ of
prohibition on two grounds (a) That the conferment upon the
regional offices of jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate certain money
claims constitutes an undue delegation of judicial powers, and (b)
that Reorganization Plan 20—A is a nullity, it having failed to meet
the constitutional requirements on enacting bills. From the decision,
this appeal was taken.
Appellants’ assignments of error are no different from the ones
previously raised and passed upon in cases recently decided by this
Court. As to the contention that the lower court erred in holding that
“the authority granted upon the defendant officials of the Department
of Labor by plan 20—A to hear and decide cases constitutes an undue
delegation of judicial power,” this Court has noted and ruled that
neither Republic Act No. 997 nor the amendatory provisions of Republic
Act No. 1241 empowered the Government Survey and Reorganization
Commission to abolish or create judicial functions.
“It is true that in Republic Act No. 1241, amending
Section 4 of Republic Act 997, which created the Government Survey and
Reorganization Commission, the latter was empowered—(2) To abolish departments, offices, agencies, or functions which may not be necessary, or create those which may be necessary for the efficient conduct of the government service, activities, and functions. (Italics supplied)
But these ‘function’, which could thus be created, obviously refer
merely to administrative, not judicial, functions. For the Government
Survey and Reorganization Commission was created to carry out the
reorganization of the Executive Branch of the National Government
(See Section 3 of R. A. No. 997, as amended by R. A. No. 1241), which
plainly did not include the creation of courts. And the Constitution
expressly provides that “the Judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by
law.’ (Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the Constitution). Thus, judicial power
rests exclusively in the judiciary. It may be conceded that the
legislature may confer on administrative boards or bodies
quasi-judicial powers involving the exercise of judgment and
discretion, as incident to the performance of administrative functions.
But in so doing, the legislature must state its intention in express
terms that would leave no doubt, as even such quasi-judicial
prerogatives must be limited, if they are to be valid, only to those
incidental to or in connection with the performance of administrative duties, which do not amount to conferment of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in the courts.”[1]
Appellants also argue that the questioned reorganization plan
should, nevertheless, be considered a valid legislation by non-action
on the part of Congress, pursuant to the provisions of Section 6(a),
Republic Act No. 997, which provides that the plans shall be deemed
approved seventy session days after their transmittal to Congress
unless disapproved by the concurrent resolution.
On this point, we have ruled that:
“It is an established fact that the Reorganization
Commission submitted Reorganization Plan No. 20—A to the President who,
in turn, transmitted the same to Congress on February 14, 1956.
Congress adjourned its sessions without passing a resolution
disapproving or adopting the said reorganization plan. It is now
contended that, independent of the matter of delegation of legislative
authority (discussed earlier in this opinion) said plan, nevertheless,
became a law by non-action on the part of Congress. * * ** * * * *
“Such a procedure of enactment of law by legislative inaction is not countenanced in this jurisdiction. * * *”
* * * * *
“A comparison between the procedure of enactment provided in Section 6(a)
of the Reorganization Act and that prescribed by the Constitution will
show that the former is in distinct contrast to the latter. Under the
first, consent or approval is to be manifested by silence or
adjournment or by ‘concurrent resolution.’ In either case, the
contemplated procedure violates the constitutional provisions requiring
positive and separate action by each House of Congress. It is contrary
to the settled and well understood parliamentary law which requires
that the two houses are to hold separate sessions for their
deliberations, and the determination of the one upon a proposed law is
to be submitted to the separate determination of the other. (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitation, 7th ed., p. 187).Furthermore, Section 6(a)
of the Act would dispense with the ‘passage’ of any measure, as that
word is commonly used and understood, and with the requirement of
presentation to the President, * * * for under it, the President would
propose the legislative action by submitting the plan, rather than
approve or disapprove the action taken by Congress.”[2]
It follows that if Reorganization Plan No. 20—A did not validly
confer on the regional offices of the Department of Labor the authority
to hear and adjudicate claims for money under Section 25 thereof, then
appellants’ final contention that said offices may issue writs of
execution to enforce their decision must likewise fail.
Wherefore the judgment appealed from is affirmed. Without special pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, De Leon, and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., did not take part.
[1] Miller vs. Mardo and Gonzales, Chin Hua Trading Co. vs. Mardo et al., Raganas vs. Sen Bee Trading Co., et al., Romero vs. Hernando et al., Fred Wilson & Co. vs. Parducho, etc., et al., supra, p. 792; See. also Pitogo vs. Sen Bee Trading Co., et al., supra, p. 842; Corominas, Jr., et al., vs. Labor Standard Commission, et al., MCU vs. Calupitan, et al., Wong vs. Carlim, et al., Balrodgan Co., et al., vs. Fuentes, et al., supra, p. 551; Lectura vs. Regional Office No. 8, et al., Leung vs. Fuentes, et al., Regina Inc. vs. Arnado, et al., supra, p. 837; Liwanag vs. Central Azucarrera de Don Pedro, supra. p. 834.
[2] Bill Miller vs. Mardo and Gonzales, Chin Hua Trading Co. vs. Mardo, et al., Raganas vs. Sen Bee Trading Co., et al., Romero vs. Hernando, etc. et al., Fred Wilson & Co. Inc. vs. Parducho, etc., et al., all jointly decided, July 31, 1961, supra, p. 792.