NELSON IMPERIAL, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. MARICEL M. JOSON, ET AL. RESPONDENTS.

Imperial versus Joson

The Case

This is a consolidated petition for review on certiorari brought by Nelson Imperial and Santos Francisco against Maricel Joson, her husband Gerard Ferdinand Joson, Santiago Giganto, Jr., Samuel Cubeta, and the various heirs and survivors of the victims of a three-vehicle collision. The petitioners were the owner and the driver of an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck that figured in a fatal highway accident, and they come before the Court complaining of several rulings of the trial courts of Naga, Valenzuela, Parañaque and Lucena, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The case matters to a reviewee because it draws together three recurring procedural themes: the proper office of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, the application of the interest of justice rule in resolving competing actions for damages arising from a single accident, and the standard for determining whether an accused's constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated.

Procedural History

After the collision, a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide, multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property was filed against Santos Francisco and Noel Imperial before the Municipal Trial Court of Sariaya, Quezon. Separately, the petitioners filed a complaint for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Naga City against the driver and helper of the Fuso truck and its alleged owners. In turn, Santiago Giganto and the Spouses Joson filed their own complaint for damages before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela City. The heirs and survivors of the deceased and injured passengers of the Kia Besta van filed a third complaint for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City.

Each side moved to dismiss the other's complaint on the ground of litis pendentia, and the trial courts issued conflicting orders. The Valenzuela court initially dismissed the complaint before it, then later reconsidered and reinstated it. The Naga court dismissed the petitioners' amended complaint on the ground that it was barred by the Parañaque action. The Parañaque court denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss. The petitioners then went to the Court of Appeals by petition for certiorari and prohibition. The Court of Appeals upheld the Naga and Parañaque courts and nullified the Valenzuela order of reinstatement. The petitioners elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari.

In the criminal case, the Sariaya court denied the petitioners' motion to compel and disqualify the public prosecutor and to correct the pre-trial order, and later denied their motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The Lucena Regional Trial Court dismissed their consolidated petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. That ruling too was brought to the Supreme Court. Finally, when the petitioners failed to appear at the pre-trial conference and to file their pre-trial brief in the Parañaque case, the trial court allowed the private respondents to present evidence ex parte. The Court of Appeals denied their petition for certiorari, and that decision was likewise elevated to the Supreme Court. The three petitions were consolidated.

Facts

At about two o'clock in the morning of 11 May 2001, along the national highway in Barangay Concepcion, Sariaya, Quezon, an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck owned by Nelson Imperial and driven by Santos Francisco collided with a Fuso six-wheeler truck driven by Santiago Giganto, Jr., who was accompanied by his helper, Samuel Cubeta. After that collision, the Isuzu truck rammed into a Kia Besta van driven by Arnel Lazo and owned by Noel Tagle, who was on board with several passengers.

The accident caused extensive damage to the vehicles and, far more tragically, killed Noel Tagle and seven passengers. Three other passengers survived but suffered serious physical injuries. A criminal complaint for reckless imprudence was filed against Francisco and Imperial, and multiple civil actions for damages were commenced in different courts by the different parties, each blaming the other for the mishap.

In the criminal case, Francisco proposed to stipulate that the Kia Besta driver had told the prosecutor that it was the Fuso truck that attempted to overtake, and that the prosecutor did not believe that account. The prosecutor refused to stipulate, and the trial court recorded the refusal in its pre-trial order. Francisco's motions to compel the prosecutor and to correct the order were denied, as was his later motion to dismiss on the ground that nine postponements of the pre-trial conference violated his right to a speedy trial. In the Parañaque civil case, the petitioners failed to attend the pre-trial conference and to file their pre-trial brief, prompting the trial court to authorize several respondents to present evidence ex parte.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the jurisdiction of the Parañaque Regional Trial Court over the Naga Regional Trial Court, in light of the petitioners' claim that the interest of justice, the speedier disposition of the cases and the accessibility of the witnesses favored the Naga court.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in failing to find that the nine postponements of the pre-trial conference in the criminal case, attributable to the prosecution, violated the petitioner's constitutional right to a speedy trial.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in discounting grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Parañaque Regional Trial Court when it authorized several respondents to present their evidence ex parte.

Applicable Provisions

The Constitution guarantees the right to a speedy disposition of cases, which the petitioners invoke in support of their choice of forum. It provides:

All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

This guarantee underlies the petitioners' argument that the case should proceed in the court that can most speedily and inexpensively resolve it.

The same Constitution secures the right of the accused to a speedy trial, which the petitioner invokes against the criminal proceedings. It provides:

All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

This right is the measure against which the nine postponements of the pre-trial conference are tested.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petitioners' arguments went to the wisdom of the rulings of the Naga and Parañaque courts, not to their jurisdiction to issue them. Certiorari and prohibition lie only to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Errors of judgment touching the legal soundness of a ruling are correctible by appeal, not by certiorari. The Court also found that, by filing their answer and third-party complaint and by repeatedly seeking positive relief from the Parañaque court, the petitioners had submitted themselves to its jurisdiction. Applying the interest of justice rule, the Court weighed the nature of the controversy, the comparative accessibility of the court to the parties, and similar factors, and concluded that the Parañaque court was the better forum because most of the parties lived closer to it and even the named witnesses lived nearer to it than to Naga.

On the second issue, the Court held that the right to a speedy trial is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. Adopting the balancing test, the Court identified four factors to consider:

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant.

Applying these factors, the Court found that the delays were largely attributable to the petitioner's own pursuit of extraordinary remedies against the interlocutory orders of the trial court and to the assignment of at least three public prosecutors to the case. They were not vexatious, capricious or oppressive.

On the third issue, the Court held that the Court of Appeals did not err in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Parañaque court when it authorized the presentation of evidence ex parte after the petitioners failed to attend the pre-trial conference and to file their pre-trial brief.

Doctrine

First, a writ of certiorari is issued only to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion means a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Errors of judgment concerning the wisdom or legal soundness of a decision are beyond the province of certiorari and are correctible only by appeal.

Second, under the interest of justice rule, where several actions arising from the same incident are pending in different courts, the court in a better position to serve the interests of justice is determined by considering the nature of the controversy, the comparative accessibility of the court to the parties, and other similar factors.

Third, the constitutional right to a speedy trial is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. It is assessed on an ad hoc basis using the four factors of length of delay, reason for the delay, the accused's assertion of the right, and prejudice to the accused. The right is a shield, not a weapon.

Disposition

The petitions were denied, and the decisions of the Court of Appeals were affirmed, so the private respondents prevailed.

Remember This

Memorize this line: certiorari corrects jurisdiction, not judgment, and the right to a speedy trial is violated only by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between errors of jurisdiction and errors of judgment, and to test the four-factor balancing test for speedy trial.