PATRICIO ALIFIO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. FORTUNATO ADOVE ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

In his amended complaint, the plaintiff
prays that judgment be rendered herein, making absolute the writ of
preliminary injunction issued at the time of filing the original
complaint; that he be declared the exclusive owner of the land in
question, for the reason that the right of redemption alleged by the
defendants was extinguished long ago; and that the defendants be
sentenced to pay him the sum of P2,000 as damages, and the costs of the
proceeding.

In their [amended] answer, the defendants allege that on May 14,
1906, they sold to plaintiff Patricio Alino with the right to
repurchase, for the sum of P1,573, the land described in the complaint,
no stipulation having been inserted in the deed of sale that was
executed as to the period within which the redemption should be made;
that before the expiration of the legal period of redemption, to wit,
on May 14, 1915, the defendants tendered to the plaintiff the sum of
P1,573 for the purpose of redeeming the said land; that as seven
parcels of the land were planted to sugar cane, which were to be milled
on the land in the year 1916, the plaintiff entered into an agreement
with the defendants whereby the plaintiff was to be allowed to mill the
canes in that year, and the defendants would have the right to
immediately use and cultivate the lands under cultivation; that after
the milling, which was finished in July, 1916, the defendants offered
again to redeem the land, tendering the sum of P1,573, but as the
plaintiff refused to receive it, the defendants deposited said sum in
the justice of the peace court of Balayan at the disposal of the
sheriff of the court; that the plaintiff having refused to receive said
sum, the defendants pray that he be compelled to accept it and to
execute the necessary deed of resale.

The court a quo, in its decision, found:

“That on May 14, 1910, the period allowed to the
defendants to repurchase the land in question expired, and,
consequently, on May 14, 1915, their right of redemption had prescribed
and Patricio Alino’s title to the land had become absolute; and it is
ordered that the defendants return to plaintiff the land in question,
together with the improvements thereon as belonging to him, and to pay
the plaintiff the sum of P1,325, which is one-half of the net value of
the sugar that could have been obtained from the sugar canes, and the
costs. The right is reserved to the workers on shares of Patricio
Alino, owners of the milled canes, to bring the proper action against
the defendants for the recovery of the sum of P1,325.”

We have simplified the points at issue in this case by treating the
allegations of the counterclaim and the cross-complaint as defendants’
special defense, inasmuch as the action, which was at first an
injunction proceeding, now has been converted into an action for the
recovery of the title to real property. The allegations of the parties
being thus stated, the question that we have to decide is whether or
not the right of redemption of the defendants could be exercised on May
14, 1915, the land in question having been sold by them to plaintiff on
May 14, 1906, with the right to repurchase, but without specifying the
period within which the redemption could be effected.

The appellants contend that their right of redemption can be
exercised within ten years from May 14, 1906, alleging in support of
this contention that article 1508 of the Civil Code was repealed by
section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Appellants’ contention is
untenable.

It must not be forgotten that according to article 1508 of the
Civil Code, in this kind of contracts the period may be either
conventional or legal. The former is fixed by the parties and cannot
exceed ten years; the latter is fixed by the law at four years. So that
in every case there is always a period within which the right of
redemption must be exercised. In the case of Albert and Albert vs. Punsalan (9 Phil., 294), this court said: “Where the property is sold under an agreement of pacto de retro, and
the right to repurchase is not exercised within the time fixed by the
agreement or within the maximum period allowed by the Civil Code when
no period is stipulated, the title of the purchaser becomes absolute.”
In the case of Buencamino vs. Viceo (13 Phil., 97), it was
held that: “In a contract of sale with a right to repurchase, when no
time is specified within which the repurchase must be made, it must be
done within four years.” (Alano vs. Babasa, 10 Phil., 511; Tuazon vs. Goduco, 23 Phil., 342; Facundo vs. Macapagal and Crisostomo, 30 Phil., 284.)

The fact that in 1915, the defendants tried to repurchase the land,
depositing the price of the redemption in the court of the justice of
the peace of Balayan, does not affect the question at issue. Even
admitting that in 1915, the plaintiff was willing to sell the land to
the defendants for the sum stated in Exhibit 2, to wit, P11,415, still
it can not be said that there was a novation of the original contract,
that is, of the contract of purchase and sale in 1906, inasmuch as the
title of the plaintiff to the land became absolute in 1910, and there
cannot be novation of a contract that has already been consummated. The
new contract not having been perfected because of the defendants’
failure to comply with the conditions imposed by the plaintiff in 1915,
we are of the opinion, and so decide, that the defendants’ contention
is groundless.

For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Johnson, Street, and Avancena, JJ., concur.