JAIME BELTRAN LUZ, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION, RESPONDENT.

Luz versus National Amnesty Commission

The Case

This is a petition for review filed by Jaime Beltran Luz against the National Amnesty Commission, asking the Supreme Court to reverse the Court of Appeals, which had refused to entertain his petition for review of an amnesty denial because his second motion for extension of time was filed out of time. The case matters because it is the Supreme Court's own occasion to clarify how the fifteen-day extension period is counted under the Rules of Court, as clarified by its administrative resolution, and to decide when strict computation must yield to the liberal interpretation of the Rules in the interest of substantial justice.

Procedural History

The petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearms before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. He later applied for amnesty with the Local Amnesty Board for Metro Manila, which denied his application. The National Amnesty Commission affirmed the denial, and denied his motion for reconsideration in a resolution he received on November 22, 2002.

Under the National Amnesty Commission's own administrative order, he had until December 7, 2002, a Saturday, to file a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On December 9, 2002, he filed a first motion for a fifteen-day extension. He never filed his petition within that first extension. On December 26, 2002, he filed a second motion for a further fifteen days, and on January 10, 2003, he filed his petition for review.

The Court of Appeals granted the first motion but counted the fifteen days from December 7, 2002, not from December 9, 2002 as he had prayed. It denied the second motion as filed out of time, and denied his motion for reconsideration, relying on the Supreme Court's administrative resolution. He then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review.

Facts

On July 18, 1988, Jaime Beltran Luz was charged with violation of Presidential Decree Number 1866, illegal possession of firearms, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. On March 22, 2000, he filed an application for amnesty with the Local Amnesty Board for Metro Manila. The board denied the application, and on August 26, 2002, the National Amnesty Commission affirmed the denial. His motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated November 13, 2002, which he received on November 22, 2002.

Under the commission's administrative order, he had until December 7, 2002, a Saturday, to file a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On December 9, 2002, he filed a motion for a fifteen-day extension, until December 24, 2002, saying he had just engaged counsel who needed time to study the case and draft the petition. He failed to file the petition within that period. December 24 and December 25, 2002 were both holidays. On December 26, 2002, he filed a second motion for a further fifteen days, until January 10, 2003, and on January 10, 2003, he filed his petition for review.

On January 13, 2003, the Court of Appeals granted the first motion, counting the fifteen days from December 7, 2002, or until December 22, 2002. On February 20, 2003, it denied the second motion as filed out of time. He moved for reconsideration, arguing that because the last day fell on a Saturday and the next day was a Sunday, his period ran until December 9, 2002, making his first motion timely. On August 19, 2003, the Court of Appeals denied reconsideration, relying on the Supreme Court's administrative resolution.

Issues

• Whether or not the petitioner timely filed his second motion for extension of time to file his petition for review.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly reckoned the first extension from the original expiration of the period rather than from the next working day.
• Whether or not the petitioner may be granted a liberal interpretation of the Rules in the interest of substantial justice.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Rule 22 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Section 1. How to compute time. – In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.

This is the rule the Court construes, and it is the provision the Court of Appeals applied when it counted the extension from December 7, 2002.

The Supreme Court's administrative resolution, which clarified that provision, declares:

Any extension of time to file the required pleading should therefore be counted from the expiration of the period regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.

This is the ruling that governs the reckoning of the extension and that the Court of Appeals followed.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the second motion for extension was filed out of time. The extension granted is tacked to the original period and commences immediately after its expiration. The Court of Appeals had no discretion to reckon the commencement of the extension from a date later than the expiration of the original period, regardless of the fact that the due date was a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday.

On the second issue, the Court held that the Court of Appeals could not be faulted for granting the first motion for fifteen days reckoned from December 7, 2002, and not from December 9, 2002 as prayed for. In so doing, it merely applied, with fealty, Section 1 of Rule 22 as clarified by the administrative resolution. Had it reckoned the period from December 9, 2002, it would have acted with grave abuse of discretion. The petitioner could not find refuge in the earlier case of Labad against the University of Southeastern Philippines, because when the petition in that case was filed, the administrative resolution was not yet in existence.

On the third issue, however, the Court agreed with the petitioner's plea for a liberal interpretation in light of the peculiar facts. His counsel relied in good faith on the earlier ruling in Moskowsky against the Court of Appeals. More importantly, the petitioner filed his petition for review on January 10, 2003, even before the Court of Appeals acted on his first motion. When the first motion was granted, the petition was already filed, even as the second motion remained unresolved. The Court quoted its ruling in Labad:

The underpinning consideration in Moskowsky, Vda. de Capulong and in the case at bar, is the liberal interpretation of the Rules to achieve substantial justice. Petitioner would be outright denied her right to appeal if the original period of December 26, 1998 would be the basis of the 15-day extension period. While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless "it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities."

Doctrine

First, under Section 1 of Rule 22, when the last day of the period falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, the time does not run until the next working day. But once a party seeks an extension and the extension is granted, the due date ceases to be the last day, and the provision no longer applies. The extension is counted from the expiration of the original period, regardless of the fact that the due date is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. The court has no discretion to reckon the extension from a later date.

Second, the right to appeal is statutory, not natural, but it is an essential part of the judicial system. Courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, and should ensure that every litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities. Where a party relies in good faith on prior jurisprudence and files his pleading before the court acts on his motion, the Rules may be liberally applied in the interest of substantial justice.

Disposition

The petition was granted, and the assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals were reversed and set aside, with no costs.

Remember This

Memorize this line: an extension of time is counted from the expiration of the original period, regardless of the fact that the due date is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. Examiners use this case to test the computation of extension periods under Rule 22 and the limits of liberal interpretation of the Rules in favor of the right to appeal.