PORFIRIO VILLAMOR, ANGEL DE LA CRUZ, DONATO HALILI, JUAN TAON, PEDRO PRIPOCI, ET AL., PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS, VS. THE HON. ARSENIO H. LACSON, HON. JUAN C. PAJO, EMILIO EJERC…

PAREDES, J.:

Sometime in the month of August, 1956, eleven employees of the Department of
Public Services, City of Manila, falling under the unclassified civil service,
were administratively charged for violation of office regulations, which
prohibited drivers and garbage collectors from gathering and selling empty tin
cans, refuse and waste papers, etc. Respondent Arsenio H. Lacson, then mayor,
found the petitioners herein guilty of the charge and required them to tender
their resignations, within 72 hours after receipt of the decision. Not in
conformity with the decision, petitioners brought the matter to the Office of
the President, pursuant to Sec. 22 of Republic Act 409 of the Manila Charter. On
August 5, 1956, due to the refusal of the petitioners to resign, they were
ordered to stop working, pending the resolution of their appeal.

During the period of their stoppage of work, they were not paid their
salaries.

Under date of November 29, 1957, the Office of the President, decided the
appeal, stating:

“In view of the foregoing facts, we arc constrained to maintain that the
original decision declaring the respondents guilty of the charges herein imputed
to them is beyond question.

“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, with the modification
that the suspension of over one year (from August 5, 1056 to date), already
suffered by the respondents be considered sufficient punishment. To that effect,
their immediate reinstatement in the service, with the exception of driver
Margarito Pedrieta, is hereby ordered. Driver Pod riot a is excepted from this
order for the reason that he had resigned from the service on August 5, 1955,
after receiving notice of the Mayer’s decision herein mentioned. However, his
reinstatement should be, as it is hereby, left to the discretion of the Mayor,”

The petitioners herein were reinstated on January 15, 1958. Contending that
the proper punishment for which petitioners were liable was only suspension,
instead of dismissal, they claimed that applying Section 695 of the
Administrative Code, such suspension could not last more than two (2) months;
and that from August 5, 1956 to January 15, 1958, the date of their
reinstatement a period of one (1) year, five (5) months and nine (9) days had
elapsed, thus making their suspension in excess of one (1) year, three (3)
months and nine (9); days, for which they should be entitled to their salaries.
For the excess period, petitioners asked the then Mayor” Lacson for the payment
of the corresponding amounts, not as back wages, but as salaries withheld. This
matter was referred to the Office of the President, which denied the claim, for
the reason that petitioners were not protected and embraced by said Section 695,
and, hence, not entitled to the payment of their salaries which accrued during
the period they had not worked. The petitioners Presented the instant case of
mandamus, to compel respondents to pay their salaries for the period of
one (1) year, three (3) months and nine (9) days, plus P1,000.00 by way of
attorney’s fees and the costs (Sp. Civil Case No. 39061).

The respondents City Hall officials, contended that for all intents and
purposes, petitioners were all considered resigned or dismissed from the service
a3 of August 6, 1956, as a disciplinary penalty; that petitioners were not
merely suspended, so that the provisions of Sections 260 and 695 of the Revised
Administrative Code, are not applicable to their case; that the Mayer, under the
Manila Charter, has the power to impose the punishment in question, but the
Office of the President, although agreeing on the finding of guilt of the
petitioners, had considered their separation from the service for a period of
one (1) year, five (5) months and nine (9) days, as sufficient punishment, in
lieu of outright dismissal; and that since petitioners did not perform work
during that period, they are not entitled to payment of salaries. The respondent
Executive Secretary followed the trend of the defenses interposed by the City
Hall officials, and contended that the petition for mandamus did not state any
valid and sufficient cause of action against them.

After the filing of the answers, the petitioners moved for a judgment on the
pleadings. Under date of June 11, 1959, the lower court rendered judgment on the
pleadings, the pertinent portions of which read:

“From the petition of the plaintiff and the motion for judgment of the
pleadings, it is presumed that said plaintiffs admitted the truth of the
principal allegations of the answers together with legal imputations, to wit:

*          *          *          *          *          *          *

7. That Section 22 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (Rep. Act No.
   409, as amended), which particularly applies to said city, specifically vests
   with the respondent Mayor the power to remove, suspend, or otherwise discipline
   officers and employees of the city government not appointed by the President of
   the Philippines, and the exercise of said power by respondent Mayor is not
   subject to the provisions of Section 2C0 or Section 095 of the Revised
   Administrative Code, which govern the removal or suspension of all other
   subordinate officers and employees in (he government service;
8. That the President is fully empowered to impose upon petitioners, as
   punishment, their suspension from the service of “over one year (from August 6,
   1956 to date) without pay, for the constitutional authority vested in the
   President to exercise general supervision over all local governments and to take
   cure that the laws are faithfully executed is bread and pervasive (Planas
   vs. Gil, G. 11. No. 46440, prom, on January 18, 1939), and its exercise
   is not subject to or delimited by the provisions of either Section 260 or
   Section 695 of the Revised Administrative Code;
9. That an administrative proceeding like the petitioners’ case, an appeal to a
   higher authority does not have the effect of vacating or suspending the effect
   of the disputed judgment (Medrana, et al. va. Domerez, et at., CA-G.R. No.
   417-R, June 17, 1950, Court of Appeals Decisions, Vol. I, 1942-1954, p. 128), so
   that the judgment of respondent Mayor, dismissing petitioners was not vacated or
   suspended by petitioners’ appeal therefrom to the Office of the President, and
   their dismissal having been affirmed on appeal to the extent of the period that
   they were out of the service, petitioners can not, validly claim payment of
   salary for said period, * * * * ;
10. That petitioners arc laborers paid by the day of actual service, as shown by
    the certificate of respondent City Public Service Officer Emilio Ejercito hereto
    attached and made a part hereof as Annex “B” and as by respondent Mayor’s
    judgment they were ordered to stop working on August 6, 1956, they were not
    entitled to payment of salary for the period that they were out of the service;

*          *          *          *          *          *          *

IN VIEW OF THE ADMISSION OF THE PETITIONERS of the foregoing material facts
alleged in the answer, this Court hereby order judgment dismissing this case for
lack of merit. With costs against the petitioners.”

After the denial of the motion for reconsideration, presented by the
petitioners, the matter was elevated to this Court on three (3) counts, to wit:
the lower court erred-

(1) in dismissing the complaint on the ground that a movant in a motion for
judgment on the pleading admits not only the material allegations, but also the
conclusions of law contained in the answer of the adversary;

(2) in sustaining respondents’ contention that the petitioners may be
penalized with suspension v it limit pay for a period of one (1) year, five (5)
months, and nine (9) days;

(3) in declaring that the petitioners herein are not protected by the
provisions of Section 200 of the Revised Administrative Code, and therefore
should not be paid their salaries withheld during their preventive suspension.

There seems to be no serious dispute that the answers of the
respondents-appellees contain allegations of fact, as well as conclusions of
law. A party who prays for judgment on the pleadings, without offering proofs as
to the truth of his own allegations, and without giving the opposing party an
opportunity to introduce evidence, must be understood to admit the truth of all
material and relevant allegations of the opposing party, and to rest his motion
for judgment on these allegations, taken together with such of his own as are
admitted in the pleadings. (Evangelista vs. de la Rosa, 76 Phil.,
115; Falcasantos vs. How Suy Ching, L-4229, May 29,1952; Fabella
vs. Prov. Sheriff of Rizal, L-6090, November 27, 1953, cited in IV Rep.
of the Phil. Digest, p. 309). Consequently, petitioners are deemed to have
admitted the truth of the material and relevant allegations in respondents’
answers and their legal implications. However, even if it were to be held that
petitioners herein did not admit the conclusions of law contained in the
answers, we still find in the records sufficient basis to affirm the decision,
dismissing the case of petitioners.

In the mind of this Court, the respondent Mayor had the authority to dismiss
the petitioners who had been found guilty of violation of office regulations. As
far as the Mayor was then concerned, the punishment for such violation was
dismissal. The fact that the Office of the President modified the decision from
dismissal to a mere separation for one (1) year, five (5) months, and nine (9)
days, did not bring the punishment within the purview of a preventive suspension
which should be governed by Sec. 395 of the Revised Administrative Code. The
fallacy of petitioners’ argument springs from their assumption that the modified
decision had converted the penalty to that of suspension. The modified decision
connotes that although dismissal or resignation would be the proper penalty, the
separation from work for the period until their reinstatement, would be deemed
sufficient. Said decision did not, in the least, insinuate that suspension
should have been the penalty.

It will be noted also that the modified decision did not exonerate the
petitioners. And if we take into account the fact that they did not work during
the period for which they are now claiming salaries, there can be no legal or
equitable basis to order the payment of their salaries. The general proposition
is that a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he has not
rendered any service. As you work, so shall you earn. And even if we consider
the punishment as suspension, before a public official or employee is entitled
to payment of salaries withheld, it should be shown that the suspension was
unjustified or that the employee was innocent of the charges
proffered against him (F. B. Reyes vs. J. Hernandez, 71 Phil., 397),
which is not the case in the instant proceedings.

The action at bar is one of mandamus. For mandamus to He, the legal right of
the petitioner must be well defined, clear and certain, otherwise the petition
for the issuance of such writ, will be denied (III Moran’s Comments on the Rules
of Court, 1963 Ed. 172). Petitioners have not shown that they are entitled to
the salaries, as a matter of right.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision dismissing the case is hereby
affirmed. Costs taxed against Petitioners.

Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L. Barrera, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J. P. and Zaldivar, JJ. concur.