RENNIE DECLARADOR, PETITIONER, VS. HON. SALVADOR S. GUBATON, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 14, ROXAS CITY, AND FRANK BANSALES, RESPONDENTS.

Declarador versus Gubaton

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari filed by Rennie Declarador, the surviving spouse of a teacher who was stabbed to death in her own classroom, against the presiding judge of a regional trial court and against the juvenile who killed her. The petitioner asks the Supreme Court to nullify that portion of the trial court's decision which suspended the sentence of the juvenile and committed him to a rehabilitation center. The case matters because it fixes a single, examinable rule: the disqualification of a youthful offender from the benefit of a suspended sentence is measured by the penalty imposable by law for the crime charged, not by the penalty actually imposed after trial.

Procedural History

An information for murder was filed against Frank Bansales before the regional trial court sitting as a family court in Roxas City. After his plea of guilty and the presentation of the prosecution's evidence, the trial court rendered judgment finding him guilty of murder, but suspended his sentence and ordered his commitment to the Regional Rehabilitation Center for Youth. The petitioner then went directly to the Supreme Court by a special civil action for certiorari, assailing the order of suspension. The juvenile argued in his comment that the petitioner had no standing and that the suspension was automatic. The Office of the Solicitor General filed its own comment, joining the petitioner in seeking the nullification of the assailed portion of the decision.

Facts

Frank Bansales was born on June 3, 1985, and was a student at the Cabug-Cabug National High School in President Roxas, Capiz. At around 9:45 in the morning of July 25, 2002, his teacher, Yvonne Declarador, was stabbed to death inside a classroom. The autopsy showed that the victim sustained fifteen stab wounds on different parts of her body.

An information for murder was filed against Bansales. It alleged that, armed with a knife and with intent to kill, he attacked and stabbed his teacher, inflicting multiple fatal stab wounds which caused her immediate death. It further alleged the qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, the attack having been made with a long knife carried from his house to the school against a lady teacher who was unarmed and defenseless.

The trial court found Bansales guilty of murder, but because he was seventeen years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, it treated his minority as a special mitigating circumstance, imposed an indeterminate sentence, awarded civil indemnity, moral damages, funeral expenses, attorney's fees and unearned income, and then suspended the sentence and ordered his commitment to the rehabilitation center. The court later set a preliminary conference, noting that the accused would turn eighteen on June 3, 2003.

Issues

• Whether or not the petitioner, as the surviving spouse of the deceased and the offended party, has standing to file the petition for certiorari.
• Whether or not the petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in filing his petition directly with the Supreme Court.
• Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the suspension of the sentence of Bansales and his commitment to the rehabilitation center.

Applicable Provisions

Article 192 of Presidential Decree Number 603, as amended, provides:

Art. 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of Youthful Offender. – If after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings, the court should find that the youthful offender has committed the acts charged against him, the court, shall determine the imposable penalty, including any civil liability chargeable against him. However, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court, upon application of the youthful offender and if it finds that the best interest of the public, as well as that of the offender will be served thereby, may suspend all further proceedings and commit such minor to the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or to any training institution operated by the government or any other responsible person until he shall have reached twenty-one years of age, or for a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering the reports and recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or the government training institution or responsible person under whose care he has been committed.

This is the provision that grants the benefit of a suspended sentence, and its third paragraph supplies the disqualification on which the entire case turns.

The same article continues:

The benefits of this article shall not apply to a youthful offender who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence under its provisions or to one who is convicted for an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment or to one who is convicted for an offense by the Military Tribunals.

This is the disqualifying clause: a youthful offender convicted of an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment may not enjoy the suspension.

Section 32 of the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, which reproduced the law, provides in its third paragraph:

The benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply to a juvenile in conflict with the law who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence, or to one who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when at the time of promulgation of judgment the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or over.

This rule adds reclusion perpetua to the disqualifying penalties, and it is the provision the trial court was bound to apply.

Section 38 of Republic Act Number 9344, which took effect on May 20, 2006, provides:

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. – Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

The Court examined this later law to confirm that the other disqualifications were not deleted, but merely supplemented.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled for the petitioner. As the surviving spouse of the deceased and the offended party, he has sufficient personality to file the special civil action for certiorari, in line with the liberal construction of the Rules of Court to promote their object. The Office of the Solicitor General, moreover, joined him in seeking nullification of the assailed portion of the decision.

On the second issue, the Court acknowledged the general rule that a petition seeking to nullify an order of the regional trial court should be filed in the Court of Appeals in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, and that a direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction is allowed only for special and important reasons clearly set out in the petition. Nevertheless, considering the nature and importance of the issues raised, the interest of speedy justice, and the need to avoid future litigation, the Court took cognizance of the case, involving as it does a juvenile and the application of the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.

On the third issue, the Court held that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. The charge was murder, whose imposable penalty under the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is reclusion perpetua to death. The Court stressed that the disqualification is based on the nature of the crime charged and the imposable penalty therefor, and not on the penalty imposed by the court after trial. It defined the operative word with precision:

"Punishable" is defined as "deserving of, or capable, or liable to punishment; liable to be punished; may be punished; liable to punishment."

The Court added that the word does not mean must be punished, but liable to be punished, so that the term refers to the possible, not the actual, sentence. It then turned to Republic Act Number 9344 and held that the new law merely amended the earlier provisions in that suspension shall be enjoyed even if the juvenile is already eighteen years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of guilt, while the other disqualifications were retained. Statutes in pari materia, the Court explained, should be read and construed together. Hence, juveniles convicted of a crime whose imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, reclusion perpetua to death, or death are disqualified from having their sentences suspended.

Doctrine

First, the disqualification of a youthful offender from the benefit of a suspended sentence under Article 192 of Presidential Decree Number 603, as amended, and Section 32 of the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, is determined by the imposable penalty for the crime charged, not by the penalty actually imposed after trial. The term punishable means liable to punishment, referring to the possible and not the actual sentence.

Second, a juvenile convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment may not avail of the suspension of sentence, and a court that suspends the sentence of such a juvenile commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.

Third, Republic Act Number 9344 did not delete the other disqualifications; it merely provided that suspension still applies even if the juvenile is eighteen years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of guilt. Statutes in pari materia are read and construed together.

Fourth, the surviving spouse of the deceased and the offended party has sufficient personality to file a special civil action for certiorari assailing an order in a criminal case, especially where the Office of the Solicitor General joins the cause.

Disposition

The petition was granted, and the order of the respondent judge suspending the sentence of Frank Bansales was nullified.

Remember This

Memorize the line: the disqualification from a suspended sentence depends on the penalty imposable by law, not the penalty imposed by the court. Examiners use this case to test the juvenile justice disqualifications and the statutory construction of Article 192 of Presidential Decree Number 603 alongside Republic Act Number 9344.