CAYETANO A. TEJANO, JR., PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. OMBUDSMAN AND THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, RESPONDENTS.

Tejano versus Ombudsman

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari filed by Cayetano Tejano, Junior against the Honorable Ombudsman and the Honorable Sandiganbayan. Tejano was the Vice President and Branch Manager of the Philippine National Bank Cebu City Branch, and he stood charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in connection with an alleged unfunded withdrawal of two million two hundred thousand pesos. The case matters because it fixes a due process rule for the Ombudsman's own house: the officer who reviews a case on reinvestigation must not be the same officer who earlier recommended the filing of the information. It is a study in grave abuse of discretion, in the duty to recuse, and in the limits of this Court's interference with the Ombudsman's prosecutory powers.

Procedural History

The matter began with a report of the Philippine National Bank Resident Auditor on an alleged unfunded withdrawal. After preliminary investigation, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas recommended the filing of an information for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act Number 3019 against Tejano and the spouses Juana and Vicente dela Cruz, while the case against two bank officers was dismissed for lack of evidence. That recommendation was approved by the Deputy Ombudsman, by then Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez, and by then Special Prosecutor Aniano Desierto, who concurred in its approval. An information was then filed before the Sandiganbayan.

Tejano moved for reinvestigation, and the Sandiganbayan granted it and directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor to conduct the reinvestigation. The reinvestigating prosecutor recommended dismissal for lack of probable cause, but Ombudsman Desierto disapproved that recommendation. Tejano's motion for reconsideration was later denied in a memorandum approved by Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo, who had succeeded Ombudsman Desierto. Tejano then came to this Court by petition for certiorari with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, which the First Division granted, later transferring the petition to the Second Division.

Facts

On the morning of 17 July 1992, a bank executive officer handed a note to the cashier of the Cebu branch instructing her to include in her cash requisition for the day, from the Central Bank Cebu, the amount of two million two hundred thousand pesos in one thousand peso denominations. On 20 July 1992, upon the instruction of Tejano, a cashier took that amount and delivered it to Tejano. At about noontime of the same day, a pre-signed withdrawal slip against the savings account of V and G Better Homes Subdivision for the same amount was handed to the cashier to replace the cash withdrawn and to serve as cash on hand at the end of the day's transaction. Tejano approved that withdrawal slip, and it was postdated 21 July 1992.

As of 20 July 1992, the savings account of V and G Better Homes held only thirty three thousand four hundred thirty six pesos and seventy eight centavos. In the afternoon of that day, a teller received the amount of two million three hundred thirty six thousand five hundred sixty three pesos and thirty two centavos as payment for the loan of V and G Better Homes, for which an official receipt was issued. The transaction was recognized as an increase in the branch's cash on hand and a decrease in the loan account of V and G Better Homes.

On 21 July 1992, the loan proceeds were credited to the account of V and G Better Homes, the same day that the withdrawal slip for two million two hundred thousand pesos was taken from the cashier and given to another teller to be taken as her transaction for the day. Upon instruction, the savings account of V and G Better Homes was debited and the withdrawal slip was validated, although no actual cash withdrawal was made. The Resident Auditor's report implicated Tejano, two other bank officers, and the spouses dela Cruz of V and G Better Homes.

Issues

• Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in disapproving the recommendation for the dismissal of the case against all the accused without any cogent or verifiable reason.
• Whether or not the case filed against the accused is a clear case of persecution rather than prosecution under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
• Whether or not the Honorable Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case.

Applicable Provisions

Section 15 of Republic Act Number 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:

Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties: . . . (10) Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such authority or duty as shall ensure the effective exercise or performance of the powers, functions and duties herein or hereinafter provided; . . .

This provision bears on the case because it supplied the lawful path Ombudsman Desierto should have taken: having participated earlier, he should have delegated the review of the reinvestigation to his Deputies instead of acting on it himself.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Ombudsman did commit grave abuse of discretion. It began from the settled rule that it will not interfere with the Ombudsman's constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutory powers, save where there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion means a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The Court found that abuse here, because Ombudsman Desierto had earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation and had concurred in the recommendation to file the information, yet later took it upon himself to review and disapprove the reinvestigation recommendation for dismissal.

The Court rested this on the steadfast rule that the officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be the same person whose decision is under review, and on the demand of due process that one called upon to resolve a dispute may not review his own decision on appeal. It quoted its earlier ruling in Zambales Chromite Mining Company against the Court of Appeals:

In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case.

The Court added that the denial of the motion for reconsideration by a different reviewing officer, Ombudsman Marcelo, did not cure the infirmity, because the right to an impartial review begins from the time the review is first undertaken. Having resolved the case on this ground, the Court found it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised.

Doctrine

First, the Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutory powers are beyond the domain of this Court to review, except upon a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Second, the reviewing officer must be someone other than the officer whose decision is under review; due process forbids a reviewing officer from passing upon his own earlier finding. Third, an Ombudsman who earlier participated in the preliminary investigation and recommended the filing of the information must recuse himself from the reinvestigation review and should delegate that review to his Deputies under Section 15 of Republic Act Number 6770. Fourth, a subsequent denial of reconsideration by another officer does not cure the taint, because the right to an impartial review attaches from the start.

Disposition

The Court set aside the Ombudsman's disapproval of the recommendation to dismiss and the memorandum denying reconsideration, and remanded the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for further proceedings, without costs.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: the reviewing officer must never be the officer whose decision is under review, and an Ombudsman who earlier recommended the filing of the information must recuse and delegate under Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act. Examiners use this case to test grave abuse of discretion, the duty of recusal in quasi-judicial and prosecutory bodies, and the narrow window through which this Court may review the Ombudsman.