CALVIN K. LO, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLEE.

Petitioner seeks Philippine citizenship in a petition filed before the Court
of First Instance of Manila. His petition is supported by the affidavits of
Julian S. de Guia, who worked once as secretary and accountant of the Keyser
Mercantile Co., Inc., and Francisco V. Alfonso, a stock clerk of the same
firm.

After hearing, the court denied the petition on the following grounds: (1)
petitioner failed to state in his petition his former places of residence; (2)
he failed to allege the proximate date of his arrival in the Philippines and the
place of his debarkation; and (3) the witnesses he presented were biased and
unreliable. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner
interposed the present appeal.

It is argued that the lower court should not have dismissed appellant’s
petition considering as one of its grounds his failure to allege his former
places of residence as well as the proximate date of his arrival and the name of
the port of his debarkation for the reason that, while the petition suffers from
that omission, he was however able to introduce evidence regarding those matters
to the extent that such deficiency, if any, had been cured it appearing that the
evidence was submitted without objection on the part of the representative of
the government.

This contention has no merit. Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law
expressly requires that the petitioner should set forth in his petition, besides
his name and surname, “his present and former places of residence; * * * the
approximate date of his or her arrival in the Philippines, the name of the port
of debarkation and, if he remembers, the name of the ship on which he came.” The
fact that he was able to present evidence proving the abovementioned facts does
not necessarily mean that he has not transgressed the above requirements because
his ulterior proof cannot have the effect of curing such transgression. The
reason behind such requirement is obvious: said facts are required to be stated
in the petition in order that, upon its publication, the public as well as the
investigating agencies of our government may be given the needed opportunity to
be informed thereof and voice their objection, if any, to petitioner’s desire to
become a Filipino citizen. By omitting said facts from the petition the public
and said agencies are deprived of such opportunity thereby defeating the purpose
of the law. The fact that petitioner presented several clearances from different
agencies of the government does not entirely eliminate the possibility of not
having been able to cover certain clues that might lead to petitioner’s
disqualification precisely because of such omission. Hence the importance of
this requirement of the law.

With regard to the claim that the trial court erred in not giving credence to
the character witnesses of appellant on the ground of bias, the following is
what the court said of them: “Julian S. de Guia of Caloocan, Rizal, once worked
as secretary and accountant of the Keyser Mercantile Co., Inc., and therefore
was a subordinate of the petitioner who is its assistant manager and who must
have a moral influence over him. Francisco V. Alfonso of Cavite City is a stock
clerk in the same firm, having been employed there at the recommendation of the
same petitioner, so that over this witness he has until the present not only
moral but also economic influence. Besides, taking into consideration that
petitioner never lived either in Caloocan or in Cavite City, the association if
any that these witnesses have with the petitioner is very limited despite their
claim to the contrary.”

We find this comment sound and logical for indeed these witnesses who had
been and are under the authority and influence of petitioner cannot testify with
such independence of mind as is required of character witnesses. Sound policy
requires that they not only be trustworthy but should possess such knowledge as
would enable them to act as insurers of the moral character of petitioner.^[1] Verily, these witnesses are not in a position
to act as such.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
appellant.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Paredes, Dizon, De Leon, and Natividad, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Fong vs. Republic, L-9153, May
17, 1957; Young vs. Republic, L-11278, May 19, 1958; Ong vs.
Republic, 103 Phil., 964; Ng Liam Keng vs. Republic, supra, p.
854.