LEONCIO SESA Y MEDINA, APPLICANT AND APPELLANT, VS. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY AND THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, OBJECTORS AND APPELLEES.

This is an application for the
registration of a parcel of land situated in the barrio of Palsabangon,
municipality of Pagbilao, Province of Tayabas, containing three lots of
which lot No. 2 is the only one in question. Said lot No. 2 is composed
of 35,327 square meters, and is occupied by the Manila Railroad
Company, the same being within civil reservation No. 3 of the Court of
First Instance of Tayabas (G. L. R. O. Reservation Case No. 242). The
lower court denied the registration of said lot upon the ground that
the application for registration had not been presented within the time
required by law in said civil reservation proceedings.

It appears that by Executive Order No. 112, dated December 3,
1914, the Governor-General, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 648,
reserved “for railroad purposes” a strip of land 30 meters wide and
more than 80 kilometers long, from the municipality of Lucena to the
municipality of Calauag, Province of Tayabas. Lot No. 2 in question is
included within said reservation.

Upon being duly notified by the Governor-General of said Executive
Order, the Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Tayabas, pursuant to the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 648, on the
21st day of December, 1914, issued the following notice to all the
parties concerned:

“Whereas under the provisions of Act No. 648 of the
Philippine Commission, by executive order there have been reserved from
settlement or public sale and for railroad purposes the following
described lands of the public domain the use of which has not otherwise
been directed by law:

* * * * * * *

“And whereas the Governor-General has certified in
writing that said lands are reserved for civil public uses, and has
given notice thereof to the Judge of the Court of First Instance of the
Fourteenth Judicial District;

“Now, therefore, in pursuance of the requirements of said act,

“Notice is hereby given that claims for all private lands, buildings,,
and interests therein, within the limits aforesaid, must be presented
in said court for registration under ‘The Land Registration Act’ within
six calendar months from the date of this notice, and that all lands,
buildings and interests therein, within the limits aforesaid not so
presented within the time herein limited will be conclusively adjudged
to be public lands, and all claims on the part of private individuals
for such lands, buildings, or an interest therein not so presented will
be forever barred.”

On the 10th of February, 1915, the petitioner herein, through his
attorney, Felipe Agoncillo, presented a motion in the Court of First
Instance, asking that said Executive Order No. 112 be declared
unconstitutional and that the proceedings thereunder be dismissed. The
court refused to decide that motion for the reasons set forth in its
order of May 18, 1915.

On the 22d day of May, 1915, the petitioner, Leoncio Sena, was
personally served with notice of the reservation proceedings, and five
months thereafter, to wit, on the 22d day of October, 1915, he
presented in the Court of First Instance a “comparecencia” in which he
alleged that part of his land, composed of 36,510 square meters, was
included in said reservation; and that he was about to present a
petition for the registration of the same under the Land Registration
Act, and asked permission of the court to present said petition.

On the 9th day of August, 1918, more than three years since the
receipt of the notice above referred to, the petitioner presented the
present petition for the registration of the land in question. The
lower court denied said petition upon the ground that, the same not
having been presented within the six months* period provided by Act No.
627, the land in question was conclusively presumed to be public land.

The appellant makes two principal assignments of error: That the
lower court erred (1) in not finding that Executive Order No. 112 was
void and of no effect; and (2) in finding that the right of the
petitioner had prescribed.

Under the first assignment of error the appellant contends that
Executive Order No. 112 was void and of no effect in so far as lot No.
2 in question was concerned because (a) the Governor-General had ho authority to reserve private property, and (b)
even if he had such authority, he was not authorized to reserve the
same for railroad purposes. In answer to that contention it is
sufficient to say that the Governor-General, in said executive order,
did not reserve any private property but only “all public lands
included within the limits described” in said executive order. Indeed,
it was expressly ordered that “all private lands or interests therein
within the limits described, ought forthwith to be brought within the
operation of ‘The Land Registration Act,’ and to become registered land
within the meaning of said ‘The Land Registration Act,’ in pursuance of
the provisions of Act No. 627 of the Philippine Commission.” It is
clear, then, that it was not attempted by said executive order to
appropriate private property without compensation and without due
process of law.

It was earnestly urged by the appellant that the Governor-General
had no authority, under Act No. 648, to reserve any part of the public
domain “for railroad purposes;” that he was only authorized by said Act
to reserve it “for specific public uses.” “Railroads may properly be
termed public highways, whether constructed by the Government itself or
by the agency of corporations or individuals under legislative
authority.” (33 Cyc., 37.) “A historical research discloses the meaning
of the term ‘public use’ to be one of constant growth. As society
advances, its demands upon the individual increase and each demand is a
new use to which the resources of the individual may be devoted.” (6
Words & Phrases, 5828.) It cannot be denied that a railroad is a
public necessity in this country—a factor indispensable to its economic
development and material welfare. It is in recognition of this fact
that railroad corporations are empowered by law to exercise the right
of eminent domain. We are therefore of the opinion that a railroad is a
public use, for “whatever is beneficially employed for the community is
a public use.” (Aldrige vs. Tuscumbia C. & D. R. R. Co.
[Ala.], 23 Am. Dec, 307.) It cannot be questioned that a railroad for
general travel or the transportation of produce for the country at
large is a public use. (Buffalo Bayou, etc. R. Co. vs. Ferris, 26 Tex., 588, 598.)

Referring to the second assignment of error with regard to the
question of prescription, it will be noted that on the 22d day of May,
1915, five months ‘after receipt of notice in the civil reservation
proceedings, the appellant notified the Court of First Instance that
lot No. 2 in question belonged to him and that he was about to present
an application for its registration under the Land Registration Act,
and asked permission of the court to do so. The appellant did not
present that application until after more than three years had elapsed.

The question now arises as to whether the appellant had fulfilled
the requirements of the law so as to preserve his rights to the land
claimed by him. Section 3 of Act No. 627, among other things, provides
that “claims for all private lands, buildings, and interests therein”
within the limits of the reservation, “must be presented for
registration under the Land Registration Act within six calendar months
from the date of issuing the notice, and that all lands, buildings, and
interests therein within the limits aforesaid not so presented within
the time therein limited will be conclusively adjudged to be public
lands, and all claims on the part of private individuals for such lands
buildings, or an interest therein not so presented will be forever
barred.”

The appellant contends that the notice or claim presented by him on
May 22, 1915, was a sufficient compliance with the foregoing provisions
of law to preserve his right. It will be noted that the appellant did
not present a claim for the registration of the land in question under
the Land Registration Act, as required by section 3 of Act No. 627, but
merely notified the court that he was about to present such claim, and
asked permission to do so. That notice was wholly unnecessary; it was
not required by law, and its presentation had no legal effect. What the
appellant ought to have done was to present the petition for
registration, spoken of in said notice, within six months after receipt
of notice. He did not present it until after more than three years had
elapsed. Under these circumstances, and in view of the decisions of
this court in the cases of Jose vs. Commander of Philippine Squadron (16 Phil., 62); Ruymann and Farris vs. Director of Lands (34 Phil., 428); and Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs.
Barrio of Santo Cristo (39 Phil., 1), we are constrained to concur with
the opinion of the lower court that the appellant’s claim has
prescribed under said section 3 of Act No. 627.

Therefore, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

Araullo, Street, Avancena and Villamor, JJ., concur.