AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (ATO) AND MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA), PETITIONERS, VS. APOLONIO GOPUCO, JR., RESPONDENT.

Air Transportation Office versus Gopuco

The Case

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 brought by the Air Transportation Office and the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority against Apolonio Gopuco, Junior. Gopuco sued to recover ownership of a lot that the government had expropriated from him decades earlier for the Lahug Airport, arguing that when that airport closed, the land reverted to him. The case matters because it settles, with unusual clarity, the rule that abandonment of the public use does not by itself return expropriated land to its former owner. What governs is the character of the title the judgment of expropriation conferred — whether it was conditional or in fee simple.

Procedural History

The original expropriation was filed by the Civil Aeronautics Administration in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, which in December 1961 declared the taking justified and ordered payment of compensation, with title to pass to the Republic. No appeal was taken, and that judgment became final and executory.

When the Lahug Airport later closed, Gopuco filed an amended complaint for recovery of ownership with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch Ten. The trial court dismissed the complaint and even ordered Gopuco to pay exemplary damages, litigation expenses, and costs. Gopuco appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court, ordered reconveyance of the lot to Gopuco upon payment of a reasonable price, and deleted the awards of damages and costs. The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration, and the government came to the Supreme Court by petition for review.

Facts

Gopuco owned a lot of 995 square meters near the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. In 1949 the National Airport Corporation told surrounding landowners that the government was acquiring their lands for expansion. Some owners sold on the assurance that they could repurchase once the airport no longer used the land. Gopuco refused to sell. The government therefore expropriated his lot, among others, and in December 1961 the Court of First Instance of Cebu rendered judgment declaring the expropriation justified and fixing the compensation due him. No appeal was taken, the judgment became final, and in May 1962 absolute title was transferred to the Republic.

When the Mactan International Airport began operations, President Corazon Aquino ordered the Lahug Airport closed in a Memorandum dated 29 November 1989. The lot was virtually abandoned. In March 1990 Gopuco wrote the Bureau of Air Transportation asking for the return of his lot and offering to return the money he had received. The letter was ignored. Congress then created the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, and in May 1992 ownership of the lot was transferred to it.

In August 1992 Gopuco sued for recovery of ownership, claiming that the purpose of the expropriation had ceased and title had reverted to him. He also claimed that the government had promised, in a compromise settlement, to resell the lots to their owners if the airport were abandoned. He presented no proof of this, and later admitted that no compromise agreement was entered into as to his lot.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Gopuco has the right to reclaim ownership of the expropriated lot based on the import of the 1961 decision in the expropriation case.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in deleting the award of litigation expenses and costs in favor of the petitioners.

Applicable Provisions

Section 9, Article Three of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

This is the only direct constitutional qualification on eminent domain, and it protects the owner at the moment of taking, not after a final judgment of expropriation.

Article 1454 of the Civil Code, which the Court discusses in connection with its earlier Moreno ruling, provides:

If an absolute conveyance of property is made in order to secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor toward the grantee, a trust by virtue of law is established. If the fulfillment of the obligation is offered by the grantor when it becomes due, he may demand the reconveyance of the property to him.

The Court notes that the Moreno ruling invoked a constructive trust akin to this implied trust, but distinguishes it because Gopuco proved no right of repurchase.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court granted the petition and held that Gopuco has no right to reclaim the lot. The answer, the Court said, depends on the character of the title acquired by the expropriator. Quoting its own ruling in Fery versus Municipality of Cabanatuan:

If, for example, land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so expropriated.

But the Court also quoted the contrasting rule from the same case:

When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.

The Court found that the 1961 judgment granted title in fee simple to the Republic, with no condition of reversion. It relied on its earlier ruling involving Virginia Chiongbian, arising from the same expropriation, where it held that the judgment was clear and unequivocal and imposed no condition of return or repurchase. Gopuco, like Chiongbian, did not appeal that judgment, and he was not a party to any compromise agreement with other landowners, so he cannot invoke those agreements. The Court also rejected the argument that expropriation carries an implied contract that the land will be used only for the original public purpose. Eminent domain is an inherent power of sovereignty, and expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense; the condemnor merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession, while the owner asserts a right to compensation.

On the second issue, the Court held that the deletion of litigation expenses and costs was proper, because the petitioners presented no proof that the case was clearly unfounded or filed for harassment, or that Gopuco acted in gross and evident bad faith. It is not sound public policy to penalize a litigant who sues in good faith.

Doctrine

When private land is expropriated for a particular public use and that use is later abandoned, whether the land returns to the former owner depends on the character of the title acquired by the expropriator. If the judgment of expropriation is conditioned on continued public use, abandonment entitles the former owner to reacquire the property. If the judgment grants a fee simple title, unconditionally, the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator, and non-use or abandonment does not defeat that title or work a reversion. There is no implied contract in expropriation that the property will be used only for the purpose for which it was taken; the only direct constitutional safeguard is that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. A person who is not a party to a compromise agreement cannot invoke its terms. And costs and litigation expenses cannot be imposed on a litigant who sues in good faith.

Disposition

The petition was granted; the Court of Appeals decision and resolution were reversed and set aside, and the trial court decision dismissing Gopuco's complaint was reinstated, with the award of exemplary damages, litigation expenses, and costs deleted.

Remember This

Memorize the line: abandonment of the public use does not ipso facto return expropriated land to the former owner where the judgment of expropriation granted title in fee simple and unconditionally. Examiners use this case to test the Fery doctrine on reversion, the distinction between conditional and fee simple titles in eminent domain, and the rule that non-parties to a compromise agreement cannot claim its benefits.