G.R. No. 15838. April 29, 1960
CAYETANO DANGUE, PETITIONER, VS. FRANKLIN BAKER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.
BARRERA, J.:
March 12, 1959 of respondent Workmen’s Compensation Commission, and its
resolution, en banc, of June 23, 1959.
In the morning of July 17, 1954, while petitioner Cayetano Dangue,
an employee of respondent Franklin Baker Company of the Philippines,
was cleaning his kaingin, his right eye was hit by the leaves
of a shrub known as “payang-payang”. Since his right eye was becoming
reddish in color, he consulted respondent company’s physician on July
19, 1954. Apparently finding nothing serious, he was allowed to work.
On the following day, July 20, 1954, while petitioner was in the course
of his work as sheller (shelling coconuts), his right eye was struck by
a flying speck of coconut shell. As a result, there developed an
unbearable pain and blurring of vision. On July 21, 1954, upon the
advice of respondent company’s physician, petitioner was given leave of
absence, which was extended from time to time, until November 10, 1954,
when he resumed work. During this time, he was thrice operated on his
injured eye and sustained a 16.4% loss of vision, thus causing his
temporary total disability and permanent partial disability. For the
entire period of his said leave of absence, from July 21 to November
10, 1954, petitioner was not paid any compensation by respondent
company.
On September 6, 1954, petitioner filed with the Department of Labor a complaint against respondent company praying, inter alia, for payment of compensation in accordance with the Workmen’s Compensation Act.[1]
On June 10, 1957, after due hearing, the Hearing Officer of
respondent Commission at San Pablo City rendered a decision (Annex A)
ordering respondent company to pay petitioner the amount of P460.77, as
compensation pursuant to Sections 14 and 17 of the aforecited Act.
On June 21, 1957, respondent company filed with respondent
Commission a petition for review of said decision of the Hearing
Officer. On March 12, 1959, respondent Commission rendered a decision
dismissing petitioner’s claim for compensation and absolving respondent
company from liability. From this decision, petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration, which motion, was denied by respondent Commission
in its resolution en banc of June 23, 1959 (Annex C).[2] Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner claims that respondent Commission erred in dismissing his claim for compensation.
We agree with petitioner. It is not disputed that petitioner, after
consulting the company physician about his eye, was allowed to report
for work. This fact indicates that the first injury, if at all,
received on July 17, 1954 was not serious. If it were so, respondent
company would have undoubtedly, and by all means, advised or even
prevented him from reporting for work, and petitioner himself would not
have been able to go about his task, considering the extreme
sensitiveness of the human eye. It appears, however, that after he met
the second accident while working for the company as a sheller,
petitioner was, on the following day, or on July 21, 1954, advised to
go on leave, which indicates that this second accident was serious, as
in fact it was, as he had to be operated on thereafter and his leave
continued until November 10, 1954. True it is, that petitioner’s right
eye was first injured while he was engaged in the performance of work
outside of his employment, but said injury became worse or was
aggravated by the accident which he met, while performing work in the
course of his employment in respondent company. Consequently, he is
entitled to compensation.
“Recovery will not be prevented because the
consequences of the injury received In the accident were aggravated by
the employee’s physical condition at the time the injury was received.”
(71 C.J. 606.)“But even assuming that appellant’s left eye
was already defective when he entered appellee’s employ, nevertheless
it is clear that the defect was somehow aggravated or accelerated by
his employment and ultimately necessitated an operation by reason of
the accident in question. Appellee is not therefore relieved of
responsibility under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, for acceleration
of a previously existing disease in an injury under Workmen’s
Compensation Laws (Brightman vs. Aetna Life Insurance
Company, 220 Mass. 17, 107 E.E. 527), and it is sufficient that the
injury and a pre-existing disease combined to produce disability in
order to make the injury compensable.” (71 C. J., 614; Izar vs. Kellog and Sons, 40 Off. Gaz., 167).“The
fact that the employee suffered from impaired vision prior to the
accident does not prevent the loss or further impairment of his vision
from constituting an injury such as the statute authorizes compensation
for.” (Hicatur vs. Hunter, 39 Pa. Super. 393.)“Where
a steel chip flew into an employee’s eye, accelerating the development
of a cataract and causing the loss of sight, he suffered an injury
within the statute.” (Kucinic vs. United Engineering and Foundry Co., 160 A. 344; 110 Pa. Super. 261.)“Where
a miner while at work was struck so hard a blow on the left eye by a
piece of coal that it accelerated the development of a cataract in that
eye, and made necessary an operation which resulted in the loss of the
vision of the eye, he suffered an injury within the statute.” (Sakunas vs. Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Co., 78 Pa. Super. 261.)“An
employee was struck in the eyes by a stream of analyne. His eyes were
injured and he was advised by the employer’s physician to wear dark
glasses. A month later while wearing’ these glasses, he fell downstairs
and permanently injured one eye. The second injury was held the natural
and proximate result of the first accident.” (VI Schneider’s
Compensation Text, 39-40, and cases therein cited.)“The
Workmen’s Compensation Act is a. social legislation designed to give
relief to the workman who has been the victim of an accident in the
pursuit of his employment and must he liberally construed to attain the
purpose for which it has been enacted.” (71 C.J. 341- 352; Ramos vs. Poblete 73 Phil., 241; Francisco vs. Consing, 63 Phi1)., 354.)[3]
Petitioner also contends that respondent Commission erred in
absolving respondent company from liability, in spite of its
non-controversion of petitioner’s claim and admission of his injury in
the performance of his regular work.
There is also merit in the contention. Examination of the records of
the case discloses that the Employer’s Report of Accident or Sickness,
signed by respondent company’s personnel manager, Mr. Gregorio
Imperial, contains the following: (1) as to controversion, said report
stated “No”, indicating that respondent company will not controvert
petitioner’s claim; (2) as to the question, “Was he (petitioner)
injured in regular occupation?”, the answer is “Yes”; and (3) as to the
description of the accident, said report stated: “while taking off the
shell from a coconut, a speck of coconut shell hit his (petitioner’s)
eye.” As a rule, when the employer does not controvert the claim of the
employee for compensation, he is also deemed to have waived his right
to interpose any defense, and he could not prove anything in relation
thereto. (Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, G.E. No. L-10533, prom. May 13, 1957.)
Wherefore, the appealed decision and resolution of respondent
Commission are set aside. Respondent Franklin Baker Co. is hereby
ordered to pay petitioner the amount of P460.77, as compensation in
accordance with Sections 14 and 17 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act,
and to pay the amount of P5.00 to respondent Commission, pursuant to
Section 55 of the same Act. With costs against respondent company. So
ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion, and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., on leave, took no part.
[1] Act No. 3428, as amended.
[2] With Associate Commissioner Nieves Baens del Rosario dissenting in a separate opinion.
[3] See II Francisco, Labor Laws (3rd Ed.) 137-145.