MINERVA UMPOC, ATTY. ILDEBRANDO VIERNESTO AND ETHEL MANALOTO, PETITIONERS, VS. MILDRED MERCADO AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE DR. JESUSA BARRIOS, RESPONDENT.
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Umpoc versus Mercado
The Case
This is a petition for review of an ejectment suit. The respondent, Mildred Mercado, sits as administratrix of the estate of the late Dr. Jesusa Barrios. She sued three occupants of the decedent's four-unit apartment in Sampaloc, Manila: Minerva Umpoc, Atty. Ildebrando Viernesto, and Ethel Manaloto. The action is one for unlawful detainer. The case matters because it gathers in one place the working rules of summary ejectment: what makes out a cause of action, what confers jurisdiction on the first-level court, and who holds the better right of possession when an unregistered deed of sale is pitted against a torrens title still in the decedent's name.
Procedural History
The respondent filed three separate complaints for unlawful detainer before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 5. The three cases were consolidated. On 19 December 2000, the Metropolitan Trial Court ruled for the respondent. It ordered the petitioners to vacate and to restore peaceful possession, to pay monthly compensation for use and occupancy, and to pay attorney's fees and costs. The petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7. On 24 October 2001, the Regional Trial Court affirmed the decision in its entirety and granted the respondent's prayer for immediate execution. The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. The petitioners then went up to the Court of Appeals. On 3 December 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court. Its resolution of 19 May 2003 denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The petitioners then filed the present petition for review before the Supreme Court.
Facts
Dr. Jesusa Barrios died a spinster on 23 March 1999. On 13 July 1999, the respondent filed a petition for letters of administration over the estate. She was appointed administratrix on 22 December 1999. One Pedro Viernesto, father of the petitioner Atty. Ildebrando Viernesto, opposed the petition. He claimed to be a devisee, a legatee, and an executor under a holographic will dated 25 May 1975. The Regional Trial Court later admitted the will to probate but declined to recall the respondent's appointment, since other after-acquired properties were not covered by the will.
Among the properties still registered in the decedent's name was a lot at Don Quijote Street, Sampaloc, Manila, covered by a transfer certificate of title, where a four-unit apartment stands. The petitioners occupied the units. Acting under her letters of administration, the respondent sent individual demand letters in January and February 2000, asking the petitioners to vacate and to pay rentals. Atty. Viernesto replied in a letter dated 10 February 2000. He asserted that the premises had long been conveyed in fee simple by a deed of sale dated 30 March 1987, and he warned the respondent to stop harassing the occupants.
On 30 March 2000, the respondent filed the three complaints for unlawful detainer. A day earlier, she had filed a separate action for annulment of the deed of sale with damages. The petitioners raised common defenses: the first-level court had no jurisdiction, the respondent had no capacity to sue, and there was no cause of action. On 11 October 2001, while the case was pending on appeal, the Registry of Deeds cancelled the decedent's title and issued a new one in the names of the alleged buyers under the 1987 deed of sale. The petitioners raised this as a supervening event, but the courts below were not persuaded.
Issues
- Whether or not the complaints state a cause of action for unlawful detainer.
- Whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court had jurisdiction over the ejectment cases.
- Whether or not the respondent has the better right of physical possession over the subject property.
Applicable Provisions
Section 1 of Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines the action and fixes the one-year period:
A person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.
This is the provision the petitioners invoked to argue that, absent a contract of lease, there is no cause of action and no jurisdiction. The Court reads it through the allegations of the complaint.
The Rules also supply the administrator's power to sue, which the Metropolitan Trial Court cited on the question of capacity:
An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased, and may prosecute or defend an action as a representative of the real party in interest.
This answers the petitioners' claim that the administratrix had no capacity to bring the ejectment suits.
Ruling
On the first and second issues, resolved jointly, the Court held that the complaints sufficiently allege unlawful detainer and that the Metropolitan Trial Court had jurisdiction. The nature of an action and the court's jurisdiction are determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. In unlawful detainer, the defendant's possession was originally lawful but ceased to be so upon the expiration of the right to possess. The phrase unlawful withholding implies possession that was legal in the beginning, having no other source than a contract, express or implied, and which later expired. Following the earlier ruling in Barba versus Court of Appeals, a simple allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession is sufficient. Although the respondent did not use the exact phrase, her complaints alleged her appointment as administratrix, the decedent's registered title, the demand letters, and the petitioners' continued refusal to vacate. Those allegations make out unlawful withholding and conferred initiatory jurisdiction, the case having been filed within the one-year period.
On the third issue, the Court declined to reassess the factual findings. A petition for review under Rule 45 raises only questions of law, and the Court is not a trier of facts. The Metropolitan Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, and the Court of Appeals all found that the petitioners' possession was by mere tolerance. The Court quoted with approval the rule that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance, without any contract, is bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy. One whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the property the moment he is required to leave. On the deed of sale, the Court held that between a title registered in the decedent's name and an unregistered deed of sale with its attendant circumstances, the former takes precedence. The deed had remained unregistered during the decedent's lifetime; the alleged buyers never took possession of their designated units; no realty taxes were shown to have been paid; and the deed surfaced only when the petitioners were being ejected. The issuance of a new certificate of title in the buyers' names does not import conclusive evidence of ownership.
Doctrine
First, the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of the court are determined by the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought, not by the defenses raised. Second, a complaint for unlawful detainer need not use the phrase unlawfully withholding; allegations of prior lawful possession, demand to vacate, and continued refusal state a cause of action and confer jurisdiction on the first-level court, provided the action is brought within one year. Third, possession by mere tolerance creates an implied promise to vacate upon demand, and refusal converts the occupant into a deforciant against whom summary ejectment lies. Fourth, an unregistered deed of sale does not defeat a torrens title still in the registered owner's name for purposes of the better right of possession in an ejectment suit. Fifth, the administrator may prosecute actions for the preservation of the estate, including ejectment.
Disposition
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, so the respondent administratrix prevailed and the petitioners were ordered to vacate and restore possession.
Remember This
Memorize the line that possession by mere tolerance carries an implied promise to vacate upon demand, and refusal makes the occupant a deforciant subject to summary ejectment. Examiners use this case to test jurisdiction over ejectment based on the allegations of the complaint, and the priority of a registered title over an unregistered deed of sale on the question of possession.