[With Resolution of November 29, 1961]

Saez versus Saez

The Case

This is the case of Adolfo Saez, convicted of killing Agripino Patrimonio inside the Saez family coconut plantation in Davao, who appealed his conviction and later sought a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The case matters for two reasons. First, it is a compact lesson on the qualifying circumstance of treachery, showing that an aggressor who first asks intruders to identify themselves before firing has not consciously adopted a mode of attack that insures the killing without risk to himself. Second, its resolution on reconsideration is a lesson on the grant of a new trial where a sworn statement kept in the files of the Constabulary, pointing to a person other than the appellant, could not have been discovered by the defense before or during trial.

Procedural History

Adolfo Saez, Juanito Purol, Roman Catian, Prudencio Esmalia, and Entrino Alejandro were charged with murder and with attempted murder before the Court of First Instance of Davao. All pleaded not guilty, but Juanito Purol was discharged from the information to be used as a state witness. After a joint trial, the trial court dismissed the attempted murder case against Entrino Alejandro, Prudencio Esmalia, and Roman Catian, and acquitted Adolfo Saez of attempted murder on reasonable doubt. In the murder case, it convicted Adolfo Saez as principal and Prudencio Esmalia and Roman Catian as accessories after the fact, and dismissed the murder charge against Entrino Alejandro for lack of evidence.

Adolfo Saez appealed his murder conviction to the Court of Appeals. That court concluded that the appealed decision should be affirmed, but finding that the penalty should have been imposed in its medium period, that is, reclusion perpetua, it certified the case to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court rendered its decision on March 29, 1961, modifying the penalty but affirming the conviction in other respects. Adolfo Saez then filed a motion for reconsideration and for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The Supreme Court resolved that motion on November 29, 1961, setting aside its decision and remanding the record for new trial.

Facts

At about eight o'clock in the evening of March 9, 1955, Adolfo Saez, armed with a rifle, was patrolling the family coconut plantation at Darung, Santa Cruz, Davao, together with Prudencio Esmalia, Entrino Alejandro, and Juanito Purol. They saw two men inside the plantation. Saez asked them who they were, and upon receiving no answer, he fired several shots. One of the two men, Agripino Patrimonio, was killed; the other, Benito Guisansana, escaped unharmed. A post-mortem examination showed that Patrimonio died of external and internal hemorrhage caused by several gunshot wounds.

Before midnight of the same day, Prudencio Esmalia and Roman Catian, following Saez's instruction to dispose of the body, placed it in the rear compartment of the Saez family car and drove to Hagonoy, where they dumped the corpse in a dry well inside the Christiansen plantation. Returning to Darung the following morning, the car ran out of gas, and Catian bought gasoline with money given by Saez's brother, Maximo Saez. A few days later, Catian and Esmalia were investigated by the Constabulary and the local police, and they revealed where the body was concealed.

At trial, the prosecution relied on the testimony of Juanito Purol and Benito Guisansana, who both testified that they saw Saez fire the shots that killed Patrimonio, and on the extrajudicial confessions of Catian, Alejandro, and Esmalia, which corroborated that testimony. Saez raised alibi and sought to shift the blame to Roman Catian. The trial court found the attempt to implicate Catian a device framed by the defense to save Saez, and rejected the alibi because the supporting witnesses were the appellant's wife, his housemaid, and neighbors depending on the Saez family for their livelihood.

Issues

• Whether or not the prosecution evidence was sufficient to establish the guilt of Adolfo Saez beyond reasonable doubt despite the inconsistencies between the testimonies of Juanito Purol and Benito Guisansana.
• Whether or not the defense of alibi of Adolfo Saez should be sustained.
• Whether or not the crime committed was murder, qualified by treachery, or only simple homicide.
• Whether or not the motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence should be granted.

Applicable Provisions

Article 429 of the Revised Penal Code, as cited by the Court, provides the penalty for homicide:

Article 429. Homicide. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 404, shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.

The Court applied this provision because it held that the killing was not attended by treachery, and therefore the crime was simple homicide, not murder.

The Indeterminate Sentence Law, as applied by the Court, provides:

Applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant Saez should have been, as he is hereby, sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from six years and one day of prision correccional to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal.

This fixed the minimum and maximum of the penalty after the Court found nighttime compensated by obfuscation, so that reclusion temporal was imposed in its medium degree.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the inconsistencies pointed out by the appellant referred only to details and were not of a substantial nature. Far from destroying their credibility, the inconsistencies led the Court to believe that Purol and Guisansana testified to the truth and were not coached or rehearsed. Their testimonies coincided on the important fact that they saw the appellant fire the shots that killed Patrimonio. Even if the extrajudicial confessions were disregarded entirely, the remaining prosecution evidence was sufficiently strong to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

On the second issue, the Court held that alibi must be established by strong, positive, and unbiased testimony, the same being easily fabricated. The witnesses for the defense were the appellant's wife, his housemaid, and neighbors depending on the Saez family for their livelihood. Their testimony could not overcome the positive identification of the appellant, which was amply corroborated by circumstantial evidence: the rifle belonged to the appellant, the killing took place around the Saez plantation, the plantation had been victimized by coconut thefts, and the Saez family car in which the body was transported bore human bloodstains.

On the third issue, the Court held that the crime was only simple homicide, not murder. The fact that the appellant asked Patrimonio and Guisansana to identify themselves before firing showed that there was no treachery. The Court quoted its ruling in People versus Tumaob:

the qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot logically be appreciated against the accused because the latter did not make any preparation to kill the deceased so as to insure the commission of the crime making it at the same time impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate.

The Court added that the suddenness of the attack did not constitute alevosia, because there was no evidence that the aggressor consciously adopted a mode of attack intended to facilitate the commission of the crime without risk to himself. Giving the victims the opportunity to identify themselves before firing the fatal shots negated that requirement and showed that he gave them an opportunity to defend themselves. Nighttime attended the killing, but it was compensated by the mitigating circumstance of obfuscation, so the penalty of reclusion temporal under Article 429 was imposed in its medium degree, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law fixed the penalty at six years and one day of prision correccional to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal.

On the fourth issue, in its resolution of November 29, 1961, the Court granted the new trial. It noted that an extrajudicial confession of Roman Catian had been taken into account by the trial court in convicting the appellant; that the sworn statement relied upon in the motion might render valueless the sworn statement upon which the trial court partly relied, and might even affect the credibility of some prosecution witnesses because it pointed to a person other than the appellant as the one who gave the order to shoot any intruder; and that before and during the trial the defense had no reasonable opportunity to discover the existence of that sworn statement. In the interest of justice, the motion for new trial was granted.

Doctrine

Treachery cannot be appreciated where the aggressor gave the persons attacked an opportunity to identify themselves and to defend themselves before firing, because the essence of treachery is the conscious adoption of a mode of attack that insures the killing without risk to the aggressor. The suddenness of an attack, without more, does not constitute alevosia. Alibi, to be believed, must rest on strong, positive, and unbiased testimony, and cannot prevail over positive identification corroborated by circumstantial evidence. A new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be granted where the evidence could not have been discovered by the defense before or during trial and might affect the credibility of the witnesses or the sworn statement on which the conviction partly rested.

Disposition

The Court modified the appealed decision by imposing the indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision correccional to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, and affirmed it in other respects; later, on reconsideration, it set aside its decision and remanded the record to the lower court for new trial.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that treachery requires the conscious adoption of a mode of attack that insures the killing without risk to the aggressor, so an accused who first asks the intruders to identify themselves before firing is guilty only of homicide. Examiners like to use this case to test the elements of treachery and the requisites for granting a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.