HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON, PETITIONERS, VS. ELVIN CHAN AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENT.

There is no independent civil action to recover the
civil liability arising from the issuance of an unfunded check
prohibited and punished under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22).

Antecedents

On
July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) an information charging the
late Eduardo Simon (Simon) with a violation of BP 22, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 275381 entitled People v. Eduardo Simon.  The accusatory portion reads:

That
sometime in December 1996 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make
or draw and issue to Elvin Chan to apply on account or for value
Landbank Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 payable to cash in
the amount of P336,000.00 said accused  well knowing that at the time of
issue she/he/they did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment,
which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the
date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for Account
Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused
failed to pay said Elvin Chan the amount of the check or to make
arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days
after receiving said notice.

CONTRARY TO LAW. ^[1]

More
than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan
commenced in the MeTC in Pasay City a civil action for the collection of
the principal amount of P336,000.00, coupled with an application for a
writ of preliminary attachment (docketed as Civil Case No. 915-00).^[2]  He alleged in his complaint the following:

xxx
2.
Sometime in December 1996 defendant employing fraud, deceit, and
misrepresentation encashed a check dated December 26, 1996 in the amount
of P336,000.00 to the plaintiff assuring the latter that the check is
duly funded and that he had an existing account with the Land Bank of
the Philippines, xerox copy of the said check is hereto attached as
Annex “A”;

3. However, when said check was presented for payment
the same was dishonored on the ground that the account of the defendant
with the Land Bank of the Philippines has been closed contrary to his
representation that he has an existing account with the said bank and
that the said check was duly funded and will be honored when presented
for payment;

4.  Demands had been made to the defendant for him
to make good the payment of the value of the check, xerox copy of the
letter of demand is hereto attached as Annex “B”, but despite such
demand defendant refused and continues to refuse to comply with
plaintiff’s valid demand;

5.  Due to the unlawful failure of the
defendant to comply with the plaintiff’s valid demands, plaintiff has
been compelled to retain the services of counsel for which he agreed to
pay as reasonable attorney’s fees the amount of P50,000.00 plus
additional amount of P2,000.00 per appearance.

ALLEGATION IN SUPPORT OF PRAYER
FOR PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT

6. 
The defendant as previously alleged has been guilty of fraud in
contracting the obligation upon which this action is brought and that
there is no sufficient security for the claims sought in this action
which fraud consist in the misrepresentation by the defendant that he
has an existing account and sufficient funds to cover the check when in
fact his account was already closed at the time he issued a check;

7. 
That the plaintiff has a sufficient cause of action and this action is
one which falls under Section 1, sub-paragraph (d), Rule 57 of the
Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines and the amount due the
plaintiff is as much as the sum for which the plaintiff seeks the writ
of preliminary attachment;

8.  That the plaintiff is willing and
able to post a bond conditioned upon the payment of damages should it be
finally found out that the plaintiff is not entitled to the issuance of
a writ of preliminary attachment.^[3]

On
August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary
attachment, which was implemented on August 17, 2000 through the sheriff
attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon.^[4]

On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiff’s attachment bond for damages,^[5] pertinently averring:

xxx

On the ground of litis pendentia,
that is, as a consequence of the pendency of another action between the
instant parties for the same cause before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila, Branch X (10) entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo
Simon”, docketed thereat as Criminal Case No. 275381-CR, the instant
action is dismissable under Section 1, (e), Rule 16, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, xxx
xxx
While the instant case is
civil in nature and character as contradistinguished from the said
Criminal Case No. 915-00 in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
Branch X (10), the basis of the instant civil action is the herein
plaintiff’s criminal complaint against defendant arising from a charge
of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 as a consequence of the alleged
dishonor in plaintiff’s hands upon presentment for payment with drawee
bank a Land Bank Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 in the amount
of P336,000- drawn allegedly issued to plaintiff by defendant who is
the accused in said case, a photocopy of the Criminal information filed
by the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila on June 11, 1997 hereto
attached and made integral part hereof as Annex “1”.

It is our
understanding of the law and the rules, that, “when a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or
reserves his right to institute it separately xxx.

On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simon’s urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiff’s attachment bond for damages, stating:

1.
The sole ground upon which defendant seeks to dismiss plaintiff’s
complaint is the alleged pendency of another action between the same
parties for the same cause, contending among others that the pendency of
Criminal Case No. 275381-CR entitled “People of the Philippines vs.
Eduardo Simon” renders this case dismissable;

2.  The defendant
further contends that under Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Court, the filing of the criminal action, the civil action for recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action which the plaintiff does not
contest; however, it is the submission of the plaintiff that an implied
reservation of the right to file a civil action has already been made,
first, by the fact that the information for violation of B.P. 22 in
Criminal Case No. 2753841 does not at all make any allegation of damages
suffered by the plaintiff nor is there any claim for recovery of
damages; on top of this the plaintiff as private complainant in the
criminal case, during the presentation of the prosecution evidence was
not represented at all by a private prosecutor such that no evidence has
been adduced by the prosecution on the  criminal case to prove damages;
all of these we respectfully submit demonstrate an effective implied
reservation of the right of the plaintiff to file a separate civil
action for damages;

3.  The defendant relies on Section 3
sub-paragraph (a) Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which mandates
that after a criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot
be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal
action; however, the defendant overlooks and conveniently failed to
consider that under Section 2, Rule 111 which provides as follows:

In
the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party during the pendency of criminal case provided the right is
reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.

In as much as the case
is one that falls under Art. 33 of the Civil Code of the Philippines as
it is based on fraud, this action therefore may be prosecuted
independently of the criminal action;

4.  In fact we would even
venture to state that even without any reservation at all of the right
to file a separate civil action still the plaintiff is authorized to
file this instant case because the plaintiff seeks to enforce an
obligation which the defendant owes to the plaintiff by virtue of the
negotiable instruments law. The plaintiff in this case sued the
defendant to enforce his liability as drawer in favor of the plaintiff
as payee of the check. Assuming the allegation of the defendant of the
alleged circumstances relative to the issuance of the check, still when
he delivered the check payable to bearer to that certain Pedro Domingo,
as it was payable to cash, the same may be negotiated by delivery by who
ever was the bearer of the check and such negotiation was valid and
effective against the drawer;

5.  Indeed, assuming as true the
allegations of the defendant regarding the circumstances relative to the
issuance of the check it would be entirely impossible for the plaintiff
to have been aware that such check was intended only for a definite
person and was not negotiable considering that the said check was
payable to bearer and was not even crossed;

6.  We contend that
what cannot be prosecuted separate and apart from the criminal case
without a reservation is a civil action arising from the criminal
offense charged.  However, in this instant case since the liability of
the defendant are imposed and the rights of the plaintiff are created by
the negotiable instruments law, even without any reservation at all
this instant action may still be prosecuted;

7.  Having this
shown, the merits of plaintiff’s complaint the application for damages
against the bond is totally without any legal support and perforce
should be dismissed outright.^[6]

On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simon’s urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiff’s attachment bond for damages,^[7] dismissing the complaint of Chan because:

xxx
After
study of the arguments of the parties, the court resolves to GRANT the
Motion to Dismiss and the application to charge plaintiff’s bond for
damages.

For “litis pendentia” to be a ground for the
dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a)
identity of parties or at least such as to represent the same interest
in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity in the
two (2) cases should be such that the judgment, which may be rendered in
one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. xxx

A
close perusal of the herein complaint denominated as “Sum of Money” and
the criminal case for violation of BP Blg. 22 would readily show that
the parties are not only identical but also the cause of action being
asserted, which is the recovery of the value of Landbank Check No.
0007280 in the amount of P336,000.00. In both civil and criminal cases,
the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the reliefs being founded on
the same facts, are identical.

Plaintiff’s claim that there is an
effective implied waiver of his right to pursue this civil case owing
to the fact that there was no allegation of damages in BP Blg. 22 case
and that there was no private prosecutor during the presentation of
prosecution evidence is unmeritorious. It is basic that when a complaint
or criminal Information is filed, even without any allegation of
damages and the intention to prove and claim them, the offended party
has the right to prove and claim for them, unless a waiver or
reservation is made or unless in the meantime, the offended party has
instituted a separate civil action. xxx The over-all import of the said
provision conveys that the waiver which includes indemnity under the
Revised Penal Code, and damages arising under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of
the Civil Code must be both clear and express. And this must be
logically so as the primordial objective of the Rule is to prevent the
offended party from recovering damages twice for the same act or
omission of the accused.

Indeed, the evidence discloses that the
plaintiff did not waive or made a reservation as to his right to pursue
the civil branch of the criminal case for violation of BP Blg. 22
against the defendant herein. To the considered view of this court, the
filing of the instant complaint for sum of money is indeed legally
barred. The right to institute a separate civil action shall be made
before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under
circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to
make such reservation. xxx

Even assuming the correctness of the
plaintiff’s submission that the herein case for sum of money is one
based on fraud and hence falling under Article 33 of the Civil Code,
still prior reservation is required by the Rules, to wit:

“In
the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party during the pendency of criminal case provided the right is
reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.”

xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court resolves to:

1. Dismiss the instant complaint on the ground of “litis pendentia“;
2. Dissolve/Lift the Writ of Attachment issued by this court on August 14, 2000;
3. Charge
   the plaintiff’s bond the amount of P336,000.00 in favor of the
   defendant for the damages sustained by the latter by virtue of the
   implementation of the writ of attachment;

4. Direct the
   Branch Sheriff of this Court to RESTORE with utmost dispatch to the
   defendant’s physical possession the vehicle seized from him on August
   16, 2000; and

5. Direct the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of P5,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees.

SO ORDERED.

Chan’s motion for reconsideration was denied on December 20, 2000,^[8] viz:

Considering
that the plaintiff’s arguments appear to be a mere repetition of his
previous submissions, and which submissions this court have already
passed upon; and taking into account the inapplicability of the ratio decidendi in
the Tactaquin vs. Palileo case which the plaintiff cited as clearly in
that case, the plaintiff therein expressly made a reservation to file a
separate civil action, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack
of merit.

SO ORDERED.

On July 31, 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasay City upheld the dismissal of Chan’s complaint, disposing:^[9]

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

On September 26, 2001, Chan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for review,^[10] challenging the propriety of the dismissal of his complaint on the ground of litis pendentia.

In his comment, ^[11]
Simon countered that Chan was guilty of bad faith and malice in
prosecuting his alleged civil claim twice in a manner that caused him
(Simon) utter embarrassment and emotional sufferings; and that the
dismissal of the civil case because of the valid ground of litis pendentia based on Section 1 (e), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was warranted.

On June 25, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,^[12]  overturning the RTC, viz:

xxx
As
a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The
first is the social injury produced by the criminal act which is sought
to be repaired through the imposition of the corresponding penalty, and
the second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the crime
which injury is sought to be compensated through indemnity which is also
civil in nature. Thus, “every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable.”

The offended party may prove the civil
liability of an accused arising from the commission of the offense in
the criminal case since the civil action is either deemed instituted
with the criminal action or is separately instituted.

Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective on December 1, 2000, provides that:

(a)
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institute the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Rule 111, Section 2 further states:

After
the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action
arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
entered in the criminal action.

However, with
respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or
omission, the rule has been changed.

In DMPI Employees Credit
Association vs. Velez, the Supreme Court pronounced that only the civil
liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action. Speaking through Justice Pardo, the
Supreme Court held:

“There is no more need for a
reservation of the right to file the independent civil action under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The
reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for
the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged.
This does not include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33,
34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same
act or omission which may be prosecuted separately without a
reservation”.

Rule 111, Section 3 reads:

Sec. 3. When
civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action.

The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure pertaining to independent civil actions which became effective
on December 1, 2000 are applicable to this case.

Procedural laws
may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of
procedure. xxx

Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-124, an independent
civil action for damages on account of the fraud committed against
respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may proceed
independently even if there was no reservation as to its filing.”

It
must be pointed that the abovecited case is similar with the instant
suit. The complaint was also brought on allegation of fraud under
Article 33 of the Civil Code and committed by the respondent in the
issuance of the check which later bounced. It was filed before the trial
court, despite the pendency of the criminal case for violation of BP 22
against the respondent. While it may be true that the changes in the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil
action became effective on December 1, 2000, the same may be given
retroactive application and may be made to apply to the case at bench,
since procedural rules may be given retroactive application. There are
no vested rights in the rules of procedure.

In view of the ruling on the first assigned error, it is therefore an error to adjudge damages in favor of the petitioner.

WHEREFORE,
the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 13, 2001
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108 affirming
the dismissal of the complaint filed by petitioner is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for
further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

On March 14, 2003, the CA denied Simon’s motion for reconsideration.^[13]

Hence,
this appeal, in which the petitioners submit that the CA erroneously
premised its decision on the assessment that the civil case was an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code; that the CA’s reliance on the ruling in DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative Inc. v. Velez^[14] stretched the meaning and intent of the ruling, and was contrary to Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; that this case was a simple collection suit for a sum of money, precluding the application of Section 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.^[15]

In his comment,^[16] Chan counters that the petition for review
should be denied because the petitioners used the wrong mode of appeal;
that his cause of action, being based on fraud, was an independent
civil action; and that the appearance of a private prosecutor in the
criminal case did not preclude the filing of his separate civil action.

Issue

The
lone issue is whether or not Chan’s civil action to recover the amount
of the unfunded check (Civil Case No. 915-00) was an independent civil
action.

Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

A

Applicable Law and Jurisprudence on the
Propriety of filing a separate civil action based on BP 22
The Supreme Court has settled the issue of whether or not a violation of BP 22 can give rise to civil liability in Banal v. Judge Tadeo, Jr.,^[17] holding:

xxx
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:

Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Regardless,
therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification
of the offended party may be had on account of the damage, loss or
injury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of
another.  The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an
integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of a
crime (Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44, citing Bagtas v. Director
of Prisons, 84 Phil 692).  Every crime gives rise to a penal or
criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party, and also to
civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and
indemnification for the losses (United States v. Bernardo, 19 Phil
265).

xxx
Civil liability to the offended party
cannot thus be denied.  The payee of the check is entitled to receive
the payment of money for which the worthless check was issued.   Having
been caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense.

Surely, it
could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 to leave the offended private party defrauded and empty-handed
by excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving her only the
remedy, which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to
file a separate civil suit. To do so may leave the offended party unable
to recover even the face value of the check due her, thereby unjustly
enriching the errant drawer at the expense of the payee.  The protection
which the law seeks to provide would, therefore, be brought to naught.

xxx

However,
there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing
check issued in contravention of BP 22. This is clear from Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court, effective December 1, 2000, which relevantly provides:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – (a)
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The
reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall
be made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under
circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to
make such reservation.

When the offended party seeks to enforce
civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate,
or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the
complaint or information, the filing fees therefor shall constitute a
first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.

Where the
amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended
party upon the filing thereof in court.

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.

No
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the
accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have
been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.
(1a)

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.^[18]

Upon
filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended
party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check
involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed.
Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated,
moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall
pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the
amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently
awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action
has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it
may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the
court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial
of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of the Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

Section 3. When civil action may proceed independently.
– In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by
the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal
action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act
or omission charged in the criminal action.

The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court,
even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced Civil Case No. 915-00 on
August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It is axiomatic that the
retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of
a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally
objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a general rule, no vested
right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws.^[19] Any
new rules may validly be made to apply to cases pending at the time of
their promulgation, considering that no party to an action has a vested
right in the rules of procedure,^[20]
except that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply
if they permit or require a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than
what is required at the time of the commission of the offenses, because
such retroactivity would be unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the Constitution.^[21]

Moreover,
the application of the rule would not be precluded by the violation of
any assumed vested right, because the new rule was adopted from Supreme
Court Circular 57-97 that took effect on November 1, 1997.

Supreme Court Circular 57-97 states:

Any
provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the
following rules and guidelines shall henceforth be observed in the
filing and prosecution of all criminal cases under Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 which penalizes the making or drawing and issuance of a check without
funds or credit:

1. The criminal action for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the
corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action
separately shall be allowed or recognized.^[22]

2.
Upon the filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the
offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based upon the amount
of the check involved which shall be considered as the actual damages
claimed, in accordance with the schedule of fees in Section 7 (a) and
Section 8 (a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as last amended by
Administrative Circular No. 11-94 effective August 1, 1994. Where the
offended party further seeks to enforce against the accused civil
liability by way of liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, he shall pay the corresponding filing fees therefor based on
the amounts thereof as alleged either in the complaint or information.
If not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by
the court, the amount of such fees shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment.

3. Where the civil action has heretofore been filed
separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court
trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both
actions shall proceed in accordance with the pertinent procedure
outlined in Section 2 (a) of Rule 111 governing the proceedings in the
actions as thus consolidated.

4. This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and shall take effect on November 1, 1997.

The reasons for issuing Circular 57-97 were amply explained in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corporation,^[23] thus:

xxx
We
agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that upon filing of the
criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22, the civil action for the
recovery of the amount of the checks was also impliedly instituted under
Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under
the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22
shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. The
reservation to file a separate civil action is no longer needed. The
Rules provide:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. —

(a) x x x

(b)
The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file
such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of
the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall
pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved,
which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the
complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay
additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the
amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently
awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action
has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it
may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the
court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial
of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

The
foregoing rule was adopted from Circular No. 57-97 of this Court. It
specifically states that the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22
shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. It also
requires the complainant to pay in full the filing fees based on the
amount of the check involved. Generally, no filing fees are required for
criminal cases, but because of the inclusion of the civil action in
complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the payment of
docket fees upon the filing of the complaint. This rule was enacted
to help declog court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as
creditors actually use the courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no
filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee
uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit
gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even
informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case
is expected to significantly lower the number of cases filed before the
courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It is also expected
to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting two
separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only a single
suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed that the policy
laid down by the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of the civil
action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a separate civil
action, which means that one can no longer file a separate civil case
after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when
separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead
of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation
of the civil and criminal cases. We have previously observed that a
separate civil action for the purpose of recovering the amount of the
dishonored checks would only prove to be costly, burdensome and
time-consuming for both parties and would further delay the final
disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided.
Where petitioners’ rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings
before the trial court, resort to a separate action to recover civil
liability is clearly unwarranted. In view of this special rule governing
actions for violation of B.P. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code cited by
the trial court will not apply to the case at bar.^[24]

The CA’s reliance on DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez^[25] to give due course to the civil action of Chan independently and separately of  Criminal Case No. 275381 was unwarranted. DMPI Employees, which involved a prosecution for estafa, is
not on all fours with this case, which is a prosecution for a violation
of BP 22. Although the Court has ruled that the issuance of a bouncing
check may result in two separate and distinct crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22,^[26]
the procedures for the recovery of the civil liabilities arising from
these two distinct crimes are different and non-interchangeable. In
prosecutions of estafa, the offended party may opt to reserve his
right to file a separate civil action, or may institute an independent
action based on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code,^[27] as DMPI Employees has allowed. In
prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the Court has adopted a
policy to prohibit the reservation or institution of a separate civil
action to claim the civil liability arising from the issuance of the
bouncing check upon the reasons delineated in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation, supra.

To
repeat, Chan’s separate civil action to recover the amount of the check
involved in the prosecution for the violation of BP 22 could not be
independently maintained under both Supreme Court Circular 57-97 and the
aforequoted provisions of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, notwithstanding the allegations of fraud and deceit.

B

Aptness of the dismissal of the civil action
on the ground of litis pendentia
Did
the pendency of the civil action in the MeTC in Manila (as the civil
aspect in Criminal Case No. 275381) bar the filing of Civil Case No.
915-00 in the MeTC in Pasay City on the ground of litis pendentia?

For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary, namely: (a) there must be identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) there must be identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and, (c)
the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may
be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in respect of the other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of the existence of the third becomes nil.^[28]

A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal Case No. 275381 ineluctably shows that all the elements of litis pendentia
are attendant. First of all, the parties in the civil action involved
in Criminal Case No. 275381 and in Civil Case No. 915-00, that is, Chan
and Simon, are the same. Secondly, the information in Criminal Case No.
275381 and the complaint in Civil Case No. 915-00 both alleged that
Simon had issued Landbank Check No. 0007280 worth P336,000.00 payable to
“cash,” thereby indicating that the rights asserted and the reliefs
prayed for, as well as the facts upon which the reliefs sought were
founded, were identical in all respects. And, thirdly, any judgment
rendered in one case would necessarily bar the other by res judicata; otherwise, Chan would be recovering twice upon the same claim.

It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay City properly dismissed Civil Case No. 915-00 on the ground of litis pendentia through its decision dated October 23, 2000; and that the RTC in Pasay City did not err in affirming the MeTC.

Wherefore, we grant the petition for review on certiorari,
and, accordingly, we reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by
the Court of Appeals on June 25, 2002. We reinstate the decision
rendered on October 23, 2000 by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45,
in Pasay City.

Costs of suit to be paid by the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Brion, (acting Chairperson),^**  Abad,^*** Villarama, Jr., and Sereno, JJ., concur.

---

^*  Misspelled as Elven in the caption of the petition and in the rollo.

^** Acting Chairperson in lieu of Justice Conchita Carpio Morales who is on leave per Special Order No. 925 dated January 24, 2011.

^*** Additional member per Special Order No. 926 dated January 24, 2011.

^[1] Rollo, p. 31.

^[2] Id., pp. 35-37.

^[3] Id., pp. 35-36.

^[4] Id., p. 24.

^[5] Id., pp. 38-46.

^[6] Id., pp. 47-49.

^[7] Id., pp. 50-54.

^[8] Id., p. 56.

^[9] Id., pp. 76-79.

^[10] Id., pp. 80-88.

^[11] Id., pp. 89-97.

^[12] Id.,
pp. 23-27; penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona
(retired), and concurred in by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico
(retired) and Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña.

^[13] Id., pp. 29-30.

^[14] G.R. No. 129282, November 29, 2001, 371 SCRA 72.

^[15] See note 19, p.16.

^[16] Rollo, pp. 105-109.

^[17] G.R. No. L-78911, December 11, 1987, 156 SCRA 325.

^[18] Bold emphasis supplied.

^[19] Cheng v.Sy, G.R. No. 174238, July 7, 2009, 592 SCRA 155, 164-165.

^[20] Aldeguer v. Hoskyn, 2 Phil. 502; Ayala de Roxas v. Case, 8 Phil. 197.

^[21] Sec. 22, Art. III, 1987 Constitution; Cooley’s Principle of Constitutional Law, p. 313.

^[22] Bold emphasis supplied.

^[23] G.R. No. 163597, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 454, 459-461.

^[24] Bold emphasis supplied.

^[25] Supra, note 14.

^[26] E.g., Rodriguez v. Ponferrada, G.R. Nos.155531-34, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 338, 343.

^[27]
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a
civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.

^[28] Taningco v. Taningco, G.R. No. 153481, August 10, 2007, 529 SCRA 735.