AGUSTIN RIVERA, SUBSTITUTED BY GREGORIO B. RIVERA, DOMINGA B. RIVERA, ORLANDO B. RIVERA, ROSARIO R. LOPEZ, CRISANTO B. RIVERA, EMILIANO B. RIVERA AND CONCHITA B. RIVERA, PETITIO…

Rivera versus David

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by Agustin Rivera, later substituted by his heirs, against Nemesio David and the other heirs of Consolacion Suarez David. Rivera claimed to be a tenant, and later an owner by way of disturbance compensation, of a portion of a five-hectare parcel of land in Mabalacat, Pampanga. He asked the agrarian adjudication bodies to keep him in peaceful possession and to recognize him as a qualified beneficiary of the agrarian reform program. The case matters for two reasons. First, it fixes the rule that the Department of Agrarian Reform keeps jurisdiction over a controversy that springs from a landlord-and-tenant relationship even after that relationship has ended. Second, it reminds us that jurisdiction is one thing and the merits are another: a tribunal may have power to hear a case and still dismiss it because the claimant proved nothing.

Procedural History

Rivera filed a complaint with an application for injunction before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board of Pampanga. The Provincial Board ruled in his favor, maintaining him in peaceful possession without prejudice to his claim as a qualified beneficiary. On appeal, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board affirmed, adding that the action to recover the property was barred by the statute of limitations under the Agricultural Land Reform Code. David then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, which reversed both agrarian decisions. The appellate court held that the Department of Agrarian Reform had no jurisdiction, because by Rivera's own admission the tenancy had ended in 1957, and it dismissed Rivera's complaint. The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration. Rivera came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari. Because he died during the pendency of the case, his heirs were substituted as petitioners.

Facts

The Davids owned in common five hectares of land covered by a transfer certificate of title in Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Agustin Rivera occupied one and eight-tenths hectares of that land. Through counsel, the Davids demanded that he vacate. Rivera refused and instead went to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, claiming that he was a duly instituted tenant. He supported this with a certification from the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office and the affidavits of two neighbors.

David denied that Rivera was ever the family's tenant. He alleged that Rivera had been squatting on the property since 1965 and had built, without consent, a hollow-blocks business and a piggery. David moved to dismiss on the ground that the land was not agricultural and that the case raised a question of ownership.

In his position paper, Rivera changed his story. He said he first occupied the land as a tenant, and then as owner beginning in 1957, when the land became his as disturbance compensation. He prayed to be declared a qualified beneficiary and to be awarded three hectares. David pointed out the inconsistency: disturbance compensation was introduced only by the Agricultural Land Reform Code in 1963, and in any event the area claimed exceeded what the law allowed. The Provincial Board and the Board of Adjudication ruled for Rivera on grounds of estoppel and prescription. The Court of Appeals reversed for lack of jurisdiction, and the case reached the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the Department of Agrarian Reform had jurisdiction over Rivera's complaint, given that the tenancy relationship had already ended before the complaint was filed.
• Whether or not Rivera was the owner of the land, and whether or not his substitute-petitioners were entitled to its peaceful possession.

Applicable Provisions

Section 21 of Republic Act No. 1199, the Agricultural Tenancy Act, as quoted in the decision, provides:

All cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the landlord or by a third party and/or the settlement and disposition of disputes arising from the relationship of landlord and tenant shall be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.

This is the jurisdictional anchor: it places disputes arising from the landlord-and-tenant relationship within the exclusive competence of the agrarian adjudicator.

Section 38 of Republic Act No. 3844, the Agricultural Land Reform Code, provides:

An action to enforce any cause of action under this Code shall be barred if not commenced within three years after such cause of action accrued.

The Board of Adjudication relied on this prescriptive period, a reliance the Supreme Court did not sustain.

Section 1, paragraph e of Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, invoked by Rivera, provides:

Those involving the sale, alienation, mortgage, foreclosure, pre-emption and redemption of agricultural lands under the coverage of the CARP or other agrarian laws.

Rivera used this to argue that jurisdiction survived the end of the tenancy, but the Court rested its ruling on the character of the controversy rather than on this enumeration.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled that the Department of Agrarian Reform had jurisdiction. It relied on its earlier decision in David versus Rivera, which involved the same parcel of land and had already settled the jurisdictional question between these parties. The Court held that the existence of a prior agricultural tenancy relationship characterizes the controversy as an agrarian dispute. Even if the tenurial arrangement has been severed, the action still involves an incident arising from the landlord-and-tenant relationship. Where the case involves the dispossession by a former landlord of a former tenant of land claimed to have been given as compensation for the renunciation of tenurial rights, there clearly exists an agrarian dispute. The Court quoted the rule that this jurisdiction does not require the continuance of the relationship of landlord and tenant at the time of the dispute, since the dispute often arises precisely from the previous termination of that relationship. By the conclusiveness of judgment from the earlier case, the parties were bound, and the Department of Agrarian Reform had jurisdiction.

On the second issue, the Court ruled that Rivera failed to prove ownership. His only evidence was an affidavit of Feliciano Manansala recounting a verbal agreement with the Davids' predecessor-in-interest. The affiant was never presented in court to identify his sworn statement, so the affidavit was hearsay and inadmissible. Against this, David presented the transfer certificate of title dated September 29, 1965, tax declarations from 1941 to 1963 in the names of the predecessors-in-interest, and tax declarations from 1965 to 1971 in the names of David and his co-heirs. These sufficiently showed that the Davids still owned the land. Since Rivera was not the owner, he and his heirs were not entitled to peaceful possession.

The Court summed up the result: the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the complaint, not because the Department of Agrarian Reform lacked jurisdiction, but because the complaint lacked merit.

Doctrine

First, an agrarian dispute exists where the controversy springs from a landlord-and-tenant relationship, and the jurisdiction of the agrarian adjudicator does not require that the relationship continue at the time the dispute arises. The dispute may arise precisely from the termination of that relationship, as where a former tenant claims the land was given to him as disturbance compensation.

Second, a prior final judgment on the question of jurisdiction between the same parties binds them under the rule of conclusiveness of judgment, so the jurisdictional issue cannot be relitigated in a later case involving the same land.

Third, jurisdiction over the subject matter does not guarantee success on the merits. A tribunal with jurisdiction may still dismiss a complaint that fails to establish its allegations by substantial evidence.

Fourth, an affidavit whose affiant is never presented to identify it is hearsay and inadmissible, and it cannot support a claim of ownership against a torrens title and a long series of tax declarations.

Disposition

The petition was denied. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decision and resolution dismissing Rivera's complaint, set aside the decisions of the Provincial Board and the Board of Adjudication together with the writs of execution, and declared Nemesio David and his fellow heirs owners of the contested land.

Remember This

Memorize this line: jurisdiction over an agrarian dispute survives the end of the tenancy, because the dispute itself may arise from that very termination. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between jurisdiction and the merits, and to test whether you know that a former tenant claiming disturbance compensation is still within the agrarian adjudicator's power even though he ultimately loses for failure of proof.