CONSOLACION GABETO, IN HER OWN RIGHT AND AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM OF HER THREE CHILDREN, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. AGATON ARANETA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

This action was instituted in the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo by Consolacion Gabeto, in her own right as
widow of Proceso Gayetano, and as guardian ad litem
of the three children, Conchita Gayetano, Rosita Gayetano, and Fermin
Gayetano, for the purpose of recovering damages incurred by the
plaintiff as a result of the death of the said Proceso Gayetano,
supposedly caused by the wrongful act of the defendant Agaton Araneta.
Upon hearing the evidence, his Honor, Judge L. M. Southworth, awarded
damages to the plaintiff in the amount of P3,000, from which judgment
the defendant appealed.

It appears in evidence that on August 4, 1918, Basilio llano and
Proceso Gayetano took a carromata near Plaza Gay, in the City of
Iloilo, with a view to going to a cockpit on Calle Ledesma in the same
City. When the driver of the carromata had turned his horse and started
in the direction indicated, the defendant, Agaton Araneta, stepped out
into the street, and laying his hands on the reins, stopped the horse,
at the same time protesting to the driver that he himself had called
this carromata first. The driver, one Julio Pagnaya, replied to the
effect that he had not heard or seen the call of Araneta, and that he
had taken up the two passengers then in the carromata as the first who
had offered employment. At or about the same time Pagnaya pulled on the
reins of the bridle to free the horse from the control of Agaton
Araneta, in order that the vehicle might pass on. Owing, however, to
the looseness of the bridle on the horse’s head or to the rottenness of
the material of which it was made, the bit came out of the horse’s
mouth; and it became necessary for the driver to get out, which he did,
in order to fix the bridle. The horse was then pulled over to near the
curb, by one or the other—it makes no difference which—and Pagnaya
tried to fix the bridle.

While he was thus engaged, the
horse, being free from the control of the bit, became disturbed and
moved forward, in doing which he pulled one of the wheels of the
carromata up on the sidewalk and pushed Julio Pagnaya over. After going
a few yards further the side of the carromata struck a police telephone
box which was fixed to a post on the sidewalk, upon which the box came
down with a crash and frightened the horse to such an extent that he
set out at full speed up the street.

Meanwhile one of the passengers, to wit, Basilio llano, had
alighted while the carromata was as yet alongside the sidewalk; but the
other, Proceso Gayetano, had unfortunately retained his seat, and after
the runaway horse had proceeded up the street to a point in front of
the Mission Hospital, the said Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig,
and in so doing received injuries from which he soon died.

As to the facts above stated the evidence cannot be said to be
materially in conflict; but there is decided conflict upon the point of
the exact relation of the defendant Agaton Araneta, to the runaway. The
evidence for the plaintiff on this point consists chiefly of the
testimony of Julio Pagnaya and of Basilio llano. They both say that
while yet in the middle of the street, the defendant jerked the bridle,
which caused the bit to come out of the horse’s mouth, and Julio says
that at that juncture the throatlatch of the bridle was broken. Be this
as it may, we are of the opinion that the mere fact that the defendant
interfered with the carromata by stopping the horse in the manner
stated would not make him liable for the death of Proceso Gayetano;
because it is admitted by Julio Pagnaya that he afterwards got out of
the carromata and went to the horse’s head to fix the bridle. The
evidence is furthermore convincing to the effect that, after Julio
Pagnaya alighted, the horse was conducted to the curb and that an
appreciable interval of time elapsed—same witnesses say several
minutes—before the horse started on his career up the street.

It is therefore evident that the stopping of the rig by Agaton
Araneta in the middle of the street was too remote from the accident
that presently ensued to be considered the legal or proximate cause
thereof. Moreover, by getting out and taking his post at the head of
the horse, the driver was the person primarily responsible for the
control of the animal, and the defendant cannot be charged with
liability for the accident resulting from the action of the horse
thereafter.

Julio Pagnaya testifies to one fact which, if it were fully
accredited, would possibly put a different complexion on the case; for
he says that when the horse was pulled over to the curb, the defendant,
by way of emphasizing his verbal denunciation of Pagnaya, gesticulated
with one of his arms and incidentally brought his hand down on the
horse’s nose. This, according to Pagnaya, is what made the horse run
away. There is no other witness who testifies to this; and it is
noteworthy that Basilio llano does not mention it. A decided
preponderance of the evidence in our opinion is against it.

The evidence indicates that the bridle was old, and the leather of
which it was made was probably so weak as to be easily broken. Julio
Pagnaya had a natural interest in refuting this fact, as well as in
exculpating himself in other respects; and we are of the opinion that
the several witnesses who testified for the defendant gave a more
credible account of the affair than the witnesses for the plaintiff.
According to the witnesses for the defendant, it was Julio who jerked
the rein, thereby causing the bit to come out of the horse’s mouth; and
they say that Julio, after alighting, led the horse over to the curb,
and proceeded to fix the bridle; and that in so doing the bridle was
slipped entirely off, when the horse, feeling himself free from
control, started to go away as previously stated.

Upon the whole we are constrained to hold that the defendant is not
legally responsible for the death of Proceso Gayetano; and though
reluctant to interfere with the findings of fact of a trial court when
there is a conflict of testimony, the evidence in this case so clearly
preponderates in favor of the defendant, that we have no recourse but
to reverse the judgment.

The judgment will therefore be reversed, and the defendant will be
absolved from the complaint; and it is so ordered, without express
finding as to costs of either instance. So ordered.

Johnson, Araullo, Avancena, and Villamor, JJ., concur.