IN RE: PETITION FOR CONTEMPT AGAINST FRANCISCO F. GONZALES IV. HERMOGENES CONCEPCION, JR., PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. FRANCISCO F. GONZALES IV, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT.

“In connection with Criminal Case No. 47152—Court of First Instance, Manila,
entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Secretary Jaime Hernandez”, the City
Fiscal, pursuant to Sec. 38 (b) of Rep. Act No. 409, as amended by Rep. Act No.
1201, issued a subpoena duces tecum to Francisco F. Gonzales IV, in his
capacity as Secretary of “Avegon, Inc.” to appear before him (City Fiscal), on
March 24, 1959, at 10:00 a. m., and to bring the following books and/or
documents of the Avegon, Inc.:

1. Minute bock containing all the resolutions of the Board of Directors since
   1953 up to the present;
2. All books of accounts of the Avegon, Inc. including subsidiary records and
   all supporting vouchers, receipts and documents from 1953 up to the present;
3. Audited financial statements, trial balances 6r supporting schedules for the
   said period.

The subpoena was duly served, despite of which Gonzales did not appear. For
such failure, the City Fiscal on March 24, 1959, filed a petition with the CFI
of Manila (Sp. Proc. No. 47870), praying that Gonzales, be required to appear
before said Court and show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.

On April 2, 1959, the CFI ordered Gonzales to show cause, in writing, within
five (5) days from receipt of copy of petition, why he should not be punished
for contempt of Court and set the hearing for April 11, 1959.

The answer of Gonzales, filed on April 10, 1959, gave five reasons why he
should not be guilty of contempt, to wit: (1) lack of authority of the City
Fiscal to issue the subpoena in question; (2) that same is unreasonable and
oppressive; (3) that it is void, because it is an attempt at a fishing
expedition, thus constituting unreasonable search and seizure; (4) that its only
purpose was to harass Avegon Inc.; and (5) the subpoena is defective. The City
Fiscal replied, after which the case was submitted on the pleadings.

On June 1, 1959, the lower court handed down a decision the dispositive
portion of which reads—

“Finding respondent Francisco F. Gonzales IV guilty of contempt as charged,
he is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00) to appear
before petitioner at such time or dates as the latter may designate and produce
the records called for in the said subpoena duces tecum, and to pay the
costs.”

Respondent Gonzales elevated the case to Us on a singular issue—”Whether or
not the City Fiscal has the power under the Charter of Manila or any other law
to issue a subpoena in a criminal case pending in court.”

Respondent-appellant maintains that the City Fiscal’s power to issue subpoena
is limited to cases pending preliminary investigation by him or his assistants;
that this limitation is defined in the charter of the city when it provided
that:—

“* * * * * * *

“The City Fiscal shall cause to be investigated all charges of crimes and
violations of ordinances and have the necessary informations or complaints
prepared or made against the persons accused. He or any of his assistants may
conduct such investigations by taking oral evidence of reputed witnesses, and
for this purpose may issue subpoena, summon witnesses, to appear and testify
under oath before him, and the attendance or evidence of any absent or
recalcitrant witness may be enforced by application to the municipal court or
the Court of First Instance. * * *.” (Sec. 38-B, Rep. Act. No. 409, as amended
by R.A. No. 1201).

The above provision is substantially the same as section 1687 of the Revised
Administrative Code, which also confines the authority of provincial Fiscals to
issue subpoena during the preliminary investigations of criminal complaints.

Thus defined, the power of the City Fiscal to issue subpoena extends only to
cases pending investigations before him or his assistants. After a criminal
charge has been investigated by him and the corresponding complaint or
information filed in court, the investigation ceases to be that of the Fiscal’s
Office, but of the Court, which then has the sole power to issue processes in
connection therewith. In the case under consideration, the information has been
filed. There is no indication whatsoever in the subpoena that a re-investigation
of the criminal case pending trial in court, was requested by the accused, in
which case the Fiscal’s Office might or could have re-opened the investigation
and justify the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum in question. If, as
surmised by the trial court, the purpose of the subpoena was for the Fiscal to
prepare for trial, the same could have been addressed to the court trying the
criminal case, so that said court would issue the necessary processes. As the
purpose of the subpoena duces tecum under consideration was not clearly
shown, it would seem reasonable to conclude that, as alleged by the appellant,
the City Fiscal was embarking in a fishing expedition for evidence. The grant of
the power to issue subpoena, under the facts obtaining in the case at bar, being
dubitable, We are inclined to rule against such grant. And considering that
contempt partakes of the nature of a criminal offense, doubt should be resolved
in favor of the respondent-appellant.

Moreover, the fact that appellant brought the stock and transfer book and
other records Of the corporation when the City Fiscal subpoenaed him, in the
course of the preliminary investigation, belies any intention on his part to act
contumely against the summons of the City Fiscal under consideration. No less
than Judge Arsenio Solidum himself, had denied to issue an order requiring
appellant to deposit certain specified corporate records with the court upon
petition of the Fiscal, after the information had already been filed in court,
on the ground that the City Fiscal, according to said Judge, has the power under
the law to cpmpel the production and surrender of the corporate records in court
to be used during the trial, by the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum by
the court itself at the opportune time and upon application of the parties.

Conformably with the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED, and another entered, exonerating the respondent-appellant from the
charges of contempt, without costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.
B. L., and Dizon, JJ., concur.