LEODEGARIO BAYANI, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

Bayani versus People of the Philippines

The Case

This is Leodegario Bayani against the People of the Philippines, a petition for review on certiorari brought to undo a conviction for violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the Bouncing Checks Law. Bayani was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City and affirmed in full by the Court of Appeals. The case matters for the bar because it gathers in one decision the working rules every examiner tests: the elements of the offense, the presumption that a check was issued for valuable consideration, the difference between admissibility and weight of hearsay evidence, and the effect of a failure to object to hearsay testimony.

Procedural History

Bayani was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 55, with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. After trial, the trial court rendered its decision on November 20, 1995, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, sentencing him to one year of imprisonment and a fine of 5,000 pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and ordering him to pay the complainant, Dolores Evangelista, the value of the check in the amount of 10,000 pesos, plus 5,000 pesos in attorney's fees and double the costs of suit.

Bayani appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, in its decision dated January 30, 2002, affirmed the judgment of conviction in full, with costs. He then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assigning as errors the reliance on hearsay evidence, the failure to establish the consideration for the check, the conviction on the weakness of the defense evidence rather than the strength of the prosecution's evidence, and the conviction based solely on presumptions.

Facts

The Philippine Savings Bank, Candelaria Branch, issued to Bayani a booklet of checks in December 1991, and Check Number 054924 was one of those included in that booklet. On August 20, 1992, that check, dated August 26, 1992 and payable to cash in the amount of 10,000 pesos, was given to Dolores Evangelista in exchange for cash. The check was postdated, and it was drawn against the account of Bayani, whose name appears in bold print at the upper portion of the check.

When the check was deposited, the drawee bank dishonored it for insufficiency of funds. Evangelista then pursued payment: there was a confrontation at the office of a lawyer, and another confrontation at the Candelaria municipal building before a barangay captain, where Bayani and a certain Alicia Rubia pointed to each other for the settlement of the amount. At the time, Bayani's checking account had a remaining deposit of only 2,414 pesos and 96 centavos, and the account was closed on September 1, 1992.

At trial, Evangelista testified that Rubia had told her that Bayani requested that the check be exchanged for cash because he needed money badly. Bayani denied issuing the check and claimed that the signature on it was merely similar to his, though with differences, and he never categorically denied that the signature was his, nor did he claim that it was a forgery.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to acquit the accused despite the conviction resting on hearsay evidence.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in convicting the accused despite the consideration for the issuance of the check not being duly established.
• Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in convicting the accused based on the weakness of his evidence rather than on the strength of the prosecution's evidence.
• Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in convicting the accused solely on the basis of presumptions.

Applicable Provisions

Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, on the hearsay rule, provides:

Section 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.

This is the rule against which Evangelista's testimony was measured, since she testified to a request made by Bayani to Rubia, a matter she did not personally perceive.

Section 24 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, on the presumption of consideration, provides:

Section 24. Presumption of consideration. Every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration; and every person whose signature appears thereon to have become a party thereto for value.

This presumption supplied the first element of the offense once the prosecution showed the issuance of the check.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that Evangelista's testimony was indeed hearsay, because she had no personal knowledge of the fact that Bayani requested Rubia to have the check exchanged for cash. But Bayani was barred from questioning its admission: under the Rules, objection to a question must be made as soon as the ground becomes reasonably apparent, and since no objection was timely made, he effectively waived any objection to admissibility. Still, the Court stressed that admissibility is not weight. The testimony was admissible as an independently relevant statement, offered merely to establish that the statement was made, not its truth, and it was relevant to the issues of Bayani's authorship of the check and his culpability. In any event, the conviction did not rest solely on that testimony: the check came from the booklet issued to Bayani, it was drawn on his account, and he never categorically denied that the signature was his.

On the second issue, the Court held that the making, drawing, and issuance of a check for account or for value is presumed, and that it devolved upon Bayani to present convincing evidence to overthrow the presumption. The check was in fact issued and exchanged for cash, which was the valuable consideration. More fundamentally, the Court ruled that what the law punishes is the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued.

On the third and fourth issues, the Court held that the prosecution sufficiently proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and that proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean absolute certainty but only moral certainty, that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, were entitled to great weight and respect.

Doctrine

First, the elements of the offense under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 are: the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of the check in full upon presentment; and the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.

Second, upon issuance of a check and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration, consistent with Section 24 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. The burden is on the accused to overthrow that presumption with convincing evidence.

Third, the law punishes the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance; it does not distinguish whether the check was issued in payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee one.

Fourth, hearsay evidence not objected to is admitted, but it remains without probative value unless it falls within an exception to the hearsay rule, such as an independently relevant statement offered only to establish that the statement was made.

Disposition

The petition was denied, and the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals stood.

Remember This

Memorize the line that the law punishes the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued. Examiners use this case to test the elements of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the presumption of consideration under the Negotiable Instruments Law, and the distinction between admissibility and weight of hearsay evidence.