CORNELIO LAMPESA and DARIO COPSIYAT, Petitioners, vs. DR. JUAN DE VERA, JR., FELIX RAMOS and MODESTO TOLLAS, Respondents.

Lampesa versus De Vera

The Case

This is an action for damages arising from a quasi-delict, brought by Dr. Juan De Vera, Jr. against Cornelio Lampesa as owner of a truck, Dario Copsiyat as its driver, and Felix Ramos and Modesto Tollas as the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney in which the doctor was riding. The doctor lost his left middle finger when the truck slid back into the jeepney. The case matters because it gathers in one decision the whole architecture of vicarious liability: the definition of quasi-delict, the presumption of an employer's negligence in selection and supervision, the proof needed to rebut it, and the damages that follow.

Procedural History

The Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, Branch 57, found driver Copsiyat negligent and held that his negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. It also found that owner Lampesa failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of his driver, and ordered the two of them jointly and solidarily to pay moral damages, actual damages, and attorney's fees, plus costs. The counterclaims and cross-claims were dismissed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in full. The petitioners then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review, assigning as errors the finding of negligence against their driver, the award of moral damages and attorney's fees, and the appreciation of the evidence by the courts below.

Facts

On the twenty-eighth of December, 1988, Dr. De Vera boarded a passenger jeepney bound for Baguio City, driven by Modesto Tollas. At the Km. 4 marker of the national highway, the jeepney came to a complete stop to let a truck driven by Dario Copsiyat cross its path and park in a private lot on the right side of the road.

As Tollas began to move the jeepney slowly forward, the truck, which had just left the pavement, suddenly slid back toward the jeepney until its rear left portion struck the right side of the jeepney. The doctor, seated in front and holding the handle on the right side, found his left middle finger cut off. He was rushed to the hospital, and the medical certificate described a ray amputation of the left middle finger.

The defense told a different story: that the jeepney sideswiped the truck while the truck's rear was still on the pavement. Lampesa offered five thousand pesos as a gesture of humanitarian support, but the doctor demanded one million pesos, later reduced to seventy-five thousand, and no settlement was reached.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming that the petitioners are liable for the injury sustained by Dr. De Vera, Jr.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in awarding moral damages and attorney's fees.

Applicable Provisions

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

This is the source of the driver's own liability for his negligent act.

Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

This makes the owner answerable for his driver, subject to the defense of diligence.

The same article closes with the employer's escape clause:

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

This is the burden Lampesa had to discharge and failed to discharge.

Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides:

Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries.

This is the basis for the moral damages awarded to the injured passenger.

Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides:

In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except: (2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest.

This supports the award of attorney's fees, since the doctor was forced to sue.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition lacks merit. Negligence is a question of fact, and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in a petition for review is limited to errors of law. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found Copsiyat negligent in maneuvering the truck and found his negligence to be the proximate cause of the injury, and the Court is not bound to weigh the evidence all over again where those findings coincide.

On the liability of the owner, the Court laid down the rule that once negligence on the part of the employee is established, a presumption instantly arises that the employer was negligent in the selection or supervision of that employee. To rebut it, the employer must present adequate and convincing proof of the care and diligence he exercised. Lampesa offered only bare allegations. Even granting that Copsiyat showed a professional driver's license when he applied, the owner should not have been satisfied with mere possession of the license; he was duty bound to examine the driver's qualifications, experience, and record of service, and to show due supervision afterward. Having failed, he cannot avoid solidary liability.

On the second issue, the Court held that the award of moral damages and attorney's fees can no longer be questioned, because the petitioners did not raise it before the Court of Appeals, and issues not raised below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. In any event, the award is justified under Article 2219 for a quasi-delict causing physical injuries, and attorney's fees are proper under Article 2208 because the doctor was compelled to litigate when the petitioners ignored his demand for amicable settlement.

Doctrine

First, whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done, and this is a quasi-delict when there is no pre-existing contract between the parties. Second, employers are liable for the damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Third, once the employee's negligence is established, a presumption instantly arises that the employer was negligent in selection or supervision, and the employer must rebut it with adequate and convincing proof of the diligence of a good father of a family. Fourth, mere possession of a professional driver's license is not enough; the employer must examine the driver's qualifications, experience, and record of service, and must show due supervision after hiring. Fifth, negligence is a question of fact, and findings of the trial court affirmed by the Court of Appeals are binding on the Supreme Court. Sixth, moral damages are recoverable in quasi-delicts causing physical injuries, and attorney's fees may be awarded when the defendant's act or omission compelled the plaintiff to litigate.

Disposition

The petition was denied for lack of merit, the decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed, and costs were taxed against the petitioners.

Remember This

Memorize the line that once the employee's negligence is shown, the employer is presumed negligent in selection and supervision, and only adequate and convincing proof of a good father's diligence will set him free. Examiners use this case for the employer's burden under Article 2180 and for the rule that a driver's license alone does not discharge it.