THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. LIBERATO GAGUI, ET AL., DEFENDANTS. EUSEBIO V. NAVARRO, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT.

Navarro versus Gagui

The Case

This is the case of Navarro versus Gagui, decided by the Supreme Court in June 1961. Atty. Eusebio V. Navarro, counsel of record for one of the accused in a criminal case pending before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, was summarily fined by the trial court for failing to appear when the case was called for trial. He appealed the three orders imposing and enforcing that fine. The case matters because it draws the dividing line between a direct contempt, which a court may punish summarily, and an indirect contempt, which may be punished only after a written charge and a hearing. Every bar candidate must know on which side of that line an absent lawyer falls.

Procedural History

Criminal Case Number 2193 was pending before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. On November 8, 1957, when the case was called for trial, Atty. Navarro did not appear, and the trial court issued an order fining him 100 pesos for delaying the criminal case, announcing in advance that it would not reconsider the order. On November 16, 1957, the court amended that order to provide that if the fine was not paid, Atty. Navarro would suffer subsidiary imprisonment not exceeding five days. On December 2, 1957, the court issued a further order warning him that if he failed to pay the fine on or before December 14, 1957, the court would order his arrest and confinement. From these three orders, Atty. Navarro interposed the present appeal to the Supreme Court.

Facts

The trial of Criminal Case Number 2193 had been set for November 8, 1957. The record showed that the setting was made in open court and after consultation with Atty. Navarro, and the court had even ordered the detail of a Tagalog interpreter for that date. On the day of trial, the fiscal and counsel for one of the accused appeared, but Atty. Navarro, counsel for the other accused, Liberato Gagui, did not. Instead, he filed an urgent motion for postponement, alleging that he could not attend because he was engaged in a civil case before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur.

The trial court found the reasons unsatisfactory. It noted that Atty. Navarro was fully aware that the criminal case had been pending for a considerable length of time and should have given it priority. The court then imposed upon him a fine of 100 pesos for delaying the criminal case, and reset the trial to January 7, 1958.

The court later amended its order to add subsidiary imprisonment of not more than five days in case of nonpayment, and still later warned Atty. Navarro that failure to pay by December 14, 1957 would result in his arrest and confinement. It is undisputed that no written charge for contempt was ever filed against him, and he was never given an opportunity to be heard by himself or counsel.

Issues

• Whether or not the failure of Atty. Navarro to appear for trial when the case in which he was counsel of record was called constitutes direct contempt summarily punishable under section 1 of Rule 64.
• Whether or not, if any contempt was committed, it is indirect contempt punishable only after a written charge and hearing under section 3 of Rule 64.
• Whether or not the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction in summarily declaring Atty. Navarro guilty of contempt and imposing the fine.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Rule 64, on direct contempt, provides:

Section 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt or obstruct the proceedings before the court or the administration of justice, either before or during the session of the court or before or after a session thereof, may be punished summarily for such misbehavior as for a direct contempt of court.

This is the provision the trial court relied upon, and the Court holds it does not apply because the lawyer's absence was not misbehavior in the presence of or so near the court.

Section 3 of Rule 64, on indirect contempt, provides:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt: (a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions; (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge; (c) Any abuse or unlawful use of, or interference with, the process of a court; (d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; (e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority; (f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served; (g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.

Paragraph (b) is the clause the Court invokes, since the lawyer's failure to appear is closer to disobedience of a lawful order of the court than to misbehavior in its presence.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court holds that the contempt attributed to Atty. Navarro is not a direct contempt and cannot be summarily punished under section 1 of Rule 64, because it is not misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. The Court quotes with approval its earlier ruling in Rivera versus Arellano:

failure or refusal of an accused or of his attorney to appear for trial comes closer to the definition of indirect contempt in paragraph (b) of section 3 (Rule 64) than to a misbehavior in the presence of or near the court contemplated in section 1.

On the second issue, the Court holds that if any contempt occurred, it would be an indirect contempt, punishable only after a written charge and hearing under section 3 of Rule 64, paragraph (b) of which speaks of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court.

On the third issue, the Court notes that no charge in writing for contempt was filed against the appellant, nor was he given an opportunity to be heard by himself or counsel. It therefore finds that the lower court acted in excess, if not in grave abuse, of its jurisdiction in proceeding against and declaring him guilty of contempt. Having reached this conclusion, the Court deems it unnecessary to pass upon the other questions raised.

Doctrine

First, direct contempt requires misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice, and only such misbehavior may be punished summarily under section 1 of Rule 64.

Second, the unexcused absence of counsel from court when a case in which he is counsel of record is called for trial is not a contempt committed in the presence of the court. If it is contempt at all, it is indirect contempt under section 3 of Rule 64, closer to disobedience of a lawful order of the court.

Third, indirect contempt may be punished only after a written charge has been filed and an opportunity to be heard given to the respondent. A summary fine imposed without these safeguards is an act in excess of jurisdiction and must be set aside.

Disposition

The Supreme Court set aside the orders complained of, without costs, and Atty. Navarro was relieved of the fine.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing: a lawyer's failure to appear for trial is not direct contempt but, at most, indirect contempt, punishable only after a written charge and hearing. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between direct and indirect contempt under Rule 64 and the jurisdictional requirement of a written charge before punishing for indirect contempt.