PRUDENCIO M. REYES, JR., PETITIONER, VS. SIMPLICIO C. BELISARIO AND EMMANUEL S. MALICDEM, RESPONDENTS.

Reyes versus Belisario

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by Prudencio Reyes, Jr., the Administrator of the Local Water Utilities Administration, against Simplicio Belisario and Emmanuel Malicdem, two Deputy Administrators of the same agency who had filed an administrative complaint for oppression and harassment against him before the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman exonerated Reyes and dismissed the complaint. The question that reaches the Supreme Court is procedural at its core but doctrinal in its reach: may a complainant appeal an Ombudsman decision that absolves the respondent of the administrative charge, given that the Ombudsman Rules declare such a decision final and unappealable? The case matters because it maps the boundary between the statutory bar on appeal and the constitutional power of the courts to correct grave abuse of discretion, and because it fixes the relationship between the Civil Service Commission and the Ombudsman when the same set of facts is examined by both.

Procedural History

The administrative complaint for oppression and harassment was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman, which resolved it in a decision dated July 19, 2000, exonerating the petitioner and his co-defendants and dismissing the case. The respondents moved for reconsideration, attaching a copy of the Civil Service Commission en banc resolution that had declared the reassignments invalid. The Ombudsman denied reconsideration, holding that the Commission resolution was not yet final because the petitioner had filed a motion for reconsideration, and that under Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules its own decision had become final and unappealable. The respondents then went to the Court of Appeals by petition for review, invoking grave abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals reversed the Ombudsman in its decision of November 27, 2001, and denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration in its resolution of August 1, 2002. The petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari, arguing that the appellate court should never have entertained the appeal.

Facts

On March 3, 2000, the respondents, together with two other officers of the Local Water Utilities Administration, filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Thirteen days later, the petitioner issued an office order reassigning the respondents to the Office of the Administrator as a supposed core group of an agency task force, with officers-in-charge designated for the offices they vacated. The next day, a Friday, the officer-in-charge for Administration directed the security agency to bar the respondents from using the rooms and facilities they had occupied. On the following Monday, another office order directed them to vacate their offices and remove their personal belongings. On March 30, 2000, a further order directed them to desist from performing the functions of their previous positions and relieved them of their designations as directors of water districts; entry was effected into their rooms with the help of police officers, their locks were replaced, and their cabinet drawers were sealed with tape.

The Civil Service Commission, through a legal opinion issued on April 3, 2000, ruled that the reassignments were not in order, were tainted with bad faith, and constituted constructive dismissal, noting that the reassignment came barely days after the criminal complaint was filed and resulted in a diminution of the respondents' rank. On April 13, 2000, the respondents filed the administrative complaint for oppression and harassment before the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman, in its decision of July 19, 2000, acknowledged that the Civil Service Commission has primary jurisdiction over the validity of reassignments, yet refused to give weight to the Commission's opinion on the ground that it was not a final and categorical ruling, applied the presumption of regularity, found no evidence of force or intimidation, and exonerated the petitioner.

Meanwhile, the Civil Service Commission en banc affirmed its earlier opinion by resolution dated July 26, 2000, declared the reassignments invalid and constitutive of constructive dismissal, and ordered the respondents' reinstatement. The petitioner sought reconsideration, which the Commission denied on October 17, 2000. The Ombudsman had earlier denied the respondents' motion for reconsideration precisely because the Commission resolution was not yet final. The respondents then challenged the Ombudsman's rulings before the Court of Appeals.

Issues

• Whether or not a complainant in an administrative case before the Office of the Ombudsman may appeal a decision exonerating the respondent, despite the rule that such a decision is final and unappealable.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in taking cognizance of the respondents' petition for review and in reversing the Ombudsman's decision.
• Whether or not the Ombudsman's exoneration of the petitioner was attended by grave abuse of discretion, and if so, whether it could attain finality.

Applicable Provisions

Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman provides:

SECTION 7. Finality of decision. -- Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari shall have been filed by him (referring to the respondent) as prescribed in Section 27 of RA 6770.

This is the rule the petitioner invokes as an absolute bar to the respondents' appeal, and which the Court must reconcile with the constitutional power of certiorari.

Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act, provides:

SECTION 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. -- (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory. x x x Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month's salary shall be final and unappealable.

This is the statutory source of the finality rule, and its silence on exoneration is the gap the Court fills.

Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, as invoked by the Court, provides:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

This is the overriding authority that keeps the courthouse door open even when the statute closes it, through the petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that by statute and regulation a decision of the Ombudsman absolving the respondent of the administrative charge is final and unappealable. Exoneration is not mentioned in Section 27, but its inclusion is implicit: if a sentence of censure, reprimand, or one-month suspension is final and unappealable, so must exoneration be. The clear import of Section 7, Rule III is to deny the complainant the right to appeal where the Ombudsman has exonerated the respondent. Only the respondent is granted the right to appeal, and only when he is found liable and the penalty is higher than public censure, reprimand, one-month suspension, or a fine equivalent to one month's salary.

On the second issue, the Court held that the absence of a statutory right of appeal does not leave the complainant without a remedy. Over and above the statutes is the constitutional power of the courts to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government, implemented through the petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The respondents filed a petition for review under Rule 43 rather than a Rule 65 petition, but the Court, exercising liberality in applying the Rules, treated the recourse as having the effect of a Rule 65 petition and considered it properly filed.

On the third issue, the Court fully supported the finding of grave abuse of discretion. The Ombudsman correctly acknowledged that the Civil Service Commission has primary jurisdiction over the validity of reassignments, yet refused to apply that premise, dismissed the Commission's opinion as not final, and on that flimsy ground applied the presumption of regularity and exonerated the petitioner. The Court held that the validity of the reassignments had to be determined first as a prior question, and that any finding on harassment or oppression rendered without a definitive ruling on that validity would be premature and without factual and legal bases. A decision attended by grave abuse of discretion is null and void, and a void decision cannot become final and may be impugned at any time; it cannot trigger the application of Section 7, Rule III.

Doctrine

An Ombudsman decision exonerating the respondent in an administrative case is final and unappealable under Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules and Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act, and the complainant has no right of appeal. The complainant is not, however, without remedy: the constitutional power of the courts to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction remains available through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and a petition for review that raises grave abuse of discretion may be treated as having the effect of such a petition. A decision rendered with grave abuse of discretion is void, never becomes final, and cannot invoke the shield of finality. Where the validity of personnel reassignments is the prior question, the Ombudsman must await or respect the ruling of the Civil Service Commission, the agency with primary jurisdiction, before deciding a charge of harassment and oppression.

Disposition

The petition was denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the Ombudsman was affirmed; the respondents prevailed.

Remember This

Memorize the line: exoneration by the Ombudsman is final and unappealable, but grave abuse of discretion voids the decision and keeps it forever open to certiorari. Examiners use this case on the finality of Ombudsman decisions, on the Rule 43 petition treated as a Rule 65 petition, and on the boundary between the Civil Service Commission's primary jurisdiction and the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority.