FLASH TAXICAB CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. ALBERTO CRUZ and PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner Flash Taxicab Co., Inc. (Company for short) was the
holder of a certificate of public convenience for the operation of 20
taxicabs by virtue of a decision of the Public Service Commission
(Commission hereafter) dated February 4, 1947. On May 13, 1957 the
above certificate was sold at a public auction pursuant to a writ of
execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila in’ Civil
Case No. 29752 entitled “Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. Flash Taxieab
Co., Inc., et al.” At this auction sale, respondent Philippine Bank of
Commerce (to be referred to as the Bank hereafter) won the bid and was
awarded all the rights, title and interest in the same certificate of
public convenience. On Juiie 8, 1957, the lower court issued an order
confirming the sale. Five days later, or, on June 13, 1957, the Bank
sold -the certificate previously mentioned to the other respondent
herein, Alberto A. Cruz. The very next day, June 14, 1957, respondents
Bank and Cruz jointly petitioned” the Commission for the approval of
the June 18 sale between them. :

Acting on the joint petition of the herein respondents, and, without
notice to the Company, the Commission issued an order dated June 15, 1957 withdrawing the authority of the Company to operate the 20
taxieabs. As a ground therefor. Hie Commission cited the auction sale
of the certificate to the herein respondent Bank.

Thereafter, on June 18, 1957, it issued another Order granting
respondent Cruz provisional authority to operate the above service.

Meanwhile, on June 18, 1957, the Company filed in the Court of First
Instance a petition for the annulment of the Order confirming the
.public sale, and, in the Commission, a motion for reconsideration of
the Commission’s Order of June 15, 1957. When, therefore, on October
17, 1957, the Court of First Instance set aside the sheriff sale and
revoked its Order conforming it, the Company filed with the Commission
an urgent ex pwrte motion for the resolution of its basic urgent motion
for reconsideration dated June 18, 1957. Acting on this last pleading,
the Commission, on April 21, 1958, ruled that the provisional right
granted to Alberto A.” Cruz to operate the taxi service had no more
basis in law. Consequently, it ordered the revocation of the same.
Within the prescribed period, Cruz moved for a, reconsideration of this
last Order. For its part, the Company filed with the Commission a
petition for the reinstatement of the withdrawn certificate.

In resolving the last two pleadings filed, the Commission
promulgated two inconsistent and diametrically opposed Orders, namely:

a) an Order dated February 27, 1959, denying the motion for reconsideration filed by Alberto A. Cruz, and

b) an Order dated March 3, 1959, allowing Alberto A. Cruz to continue operating the taxi service.

Petitioner Company now raises in issue the validity of the
Commission’s Order dated March 3, 1959 as well as  the  Order of June
IS, 1957 which set in motion the events which led to the filing of this
case.

Reviewing the records of this case, this Court believes that as
between the parties herein Alberto Cruz has a clearer right to the
operation of the contested taxi service and must thus be awarded the
same.

The underlying reason invoked by the Public Service Commission in
justification of its order dated March 3, 1959, allowing Alberto A.
Cruz to continue operating the taxi service is clearly set forth in the
text of the same order, as hereunder quoted:

“* * * The order of the Commission of April 21, 1958
revoked the provisional authority in favor of Alberto A. Cruz on the
ground that the Court of First Instance has set aside the Sheriff’s
sale of the certificate of Flash Taxi Co. in favor of the Philippine
Bank of Commerce and therefore there was no. basis for the provisional
authority, but our records show that long  before April 21, 1958′ and
up to the present time the Flash Taxi Co. has not registered any car
for operation as a taxicab, that is, that it lias not been able to operate any taxicab even after the provisional authority granted to
Alberto A. Cruz was withdrawn, so that it has not and does not render
the service required under the certificate.”

The aforequoted explanation is in the nature of a finding of fact
which under prevailing legislations and jurisprudence, this Court is
not at liberty to disturb, unless it is not clearly and sufficiently
supported by the evidence. (Rule 43, Sec. 2, Rules of Court; Espiritu
to. San Miguel Brewery, 53 Phil. 615; Halili vs. Ice and Cold Storage,
etc., G.R. No. L-336 and 343, January 25, 1947.)

The Company further contends that it has been denied due process of
law when the Order of June 15, 1958, withdrawing its authority to
operate under the certificate was issued without prior notice to it. We
note from the record, however, that the Company has filed, with the
Public Service Commission a motion for reconsideration of the same
order of June 15, 1957 and that the Company was duly heard by the
Commission on the said motion for reconsideration. That being the case,
then the doctrine We enunciated in the case of Borja vs. Flores, 62
Phil. 106, finds full relevance and application. In that case, We ruled
that although the Commission entered its order without notice or
hearing, a requisite provided for by the Public Service Act before
suspension, revocation or cancellation of any certificate of public
convenience, the defeet, if any, was cured by the hearing held on the
petitioner’s motion to reconsider the order. The force and logic of
that rule becomes more impressive when, as in the instant case, the
motion for reconsideration had raised in issue all the merits and
defenses of the movant which he would have raised in the original.
hearing had there been any As a matter of fact, petitioner Company’s
motion for reconsideration was granted by the Commission.

The operation of the taxi service was, however, nonetheless denied
to the Gompany because of the Commission’s finding that the Company had
not registered its units.

In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that the Commission had
substantially observed the requirements of due process in its
promulgation of the Order dated June 15, 1957. Consequently, the same,
as well as the Order dated March 3, 1958 are hereby affirmed. The
petition for review is hereby dismissed, with costs against the
petitioner.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, J., concurs in the result.