ROLANDO PAGDAYAWON, EDDIE SERNADILLA, FILEMON SERRANO, ALFREDO NARDO, JIMMY JACOB, RAMIL RAYOS, RODERICK LICAYAN, ROBERTO LARA, ROMEO NAVARETTE, ROLLY ABULENCIA, SANDY HINTO, CA…

Pagdayawon versus Secretary of Justice

The Case

This is a petition brought by thirty death row inmates against the Secretary of Justice and the Director of Prisons, asking the Supreme Court to stop their scheduled executions and to re-examine the laws that authorize the death penalty. The petitioners rest on two grounds: first, that Congress might soon repeal the death penalty laws, and second, that the Heinous Crimes Law and the Lethal Injection Law are unconstitutional. The case matters because it fixes the rule that the mere pendency of a bill in Congress is not a ground to stay a final death sentence, and because it affirms that the constitutionality of a law does not change with the changing composition of the Court.

Procedural History

The petitioners came directly to the Supreme Court on an original petition. They sought a temporary restraining order to enjoin the execution of their respective death sentences, and a re-examination of the Heinous Crimes Law and the Lethal Injection Law with the end in view of declaring them unconstitutional. There were no prior rulings by a trial court or by the Court of Appeals recited in the decision. The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, resolved the petition in the first instance.

Facts

Thirty death row inmates filed a petition before the Supreme Court. They asked the Court to enjoin the execution of their respective death sentences, citing the possibility that Congress might repeal the laws authorizing the imposition of the death penalty. They also asked the Court to re-examine the Heinous Crimes Law and the Lethal Injection Law and to declare them unconstitutional.

In support of their plea for a stay, the petitioners invoked the Court's earlier resolutions in the case of Echegaray versus Secretary of Justice, where the Court had issued a temporary restraining order moments before a scheduled execution. They pointed to newspaper reports indicating that a number of senators and congressmen favored the abolition of the death penalty.

The Court noted that in the Echegaray case, Congress was not in session and the Court was on its traditional recess when the urgent motion was filed. A special session was called, and time constraints, not the pendency of any bill, necessitated the restraining order. The Court also observed that three justices maintained that the Heinous Crimes Law is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, but they submitted to the majority view that the law is constitutional.

Issues

• Whether or not the pendency of a bill in Congress seeking to repeal the death penalty laws is a ground to stay the execution of a death sentence that has already become final.
• Whether or not the Heinous Crimes Law and the Lethal Injection Law should be re-examined and declared unconstitutional for failing to comply with the constitutional requirement of compelling reasons involving heinous crimes and for promoting arbitrariness for lack of objective standards.
• Whether or not the substantial change in the composition of the Court warrants a re-examination of the constitutionality of the death penalty laws.

Applicable Provisions

Section 19, paragraph 1 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

This is the constitutional yardstick against which the petitioners measured the Heinous Crimes Law, and which the Court held the law satisfies.

Article 79 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

When a convict has become insane after final judgment, the court shall order the execution of the sentence to be suspended.

The Court cited this provision as an example of a circumstance, other than the pendency of a bill, that may lawfully delay an execution.

Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

The death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one year after delivery.

The Court cited this provision, together with Article 79, to show that the law itself provides specific grounds for postponement, none of which is the mere pendency of a legislative bill.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court denied the application for a temporary restraining order. It held that the mere pendency of a bill in either or both houses of Congress should not per se warrant the issuance of a temporary restraining order to stay the execution of a death sentence that has become final. Being speculative, it is not and should not be considered as a ground for a stay. Newspaper reports of the supposed acquiescence of legislators are no assurance that they will eventually vote to repeal the law. The Court distinguished the Echegaray case, explaining that the restraining order there was issued under extreme time constraints, not because of the pendency of any bill.

On the second issue, the Court held that the constitutionality of the Heinous Crimes Law and the Lethal Injection Law had already been passed upon and sustained in earlier cases. The grounds raised by the petitioners were a rehash of arguments already ruled upon. The death penalty is not a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; the offenses satisfy the element of heinousness; the law provides procedural and substantial safeguards; and Congress is authorized to determine when the elements of heinousness and compelling reasons are present.

On the third issue, the Court held that the substantial change in its composition did not warrant a re-examination of the laws. The validity of a law cannot be made to depend on the individual opinions of the members who compose the Court. The Court, as an institution, had already determined what the law is, and that determination remains regardless of any change in composition. The Court added that any plea for reprieve or pardon ought to be addressed to the Office of the President.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, the pendency of a bill in Congress to repeal the death penalty laws is speculative and is not a ground to stay the execution of a death sentence that has already become final. Second, the constitutionality of a law cannot be made to depend on the individual opinions of the members of the Court; the Court as an institution determines what the law is, and that determination stands regardless of changes in its composition. Third, the death penalty is not a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment, and Congress is authorized under Section 19, paragraph 1 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution to determine when the elements of heinousness and compelling reasons are present. Fourth, the Supreme Court retains the power to control the enforcement of its decisions, including the issuance of a temporary restraining order to stay an execution, but that power is exercised only upon a proper ground, not upon speculation.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed, and the application for a temporary restraining order was denied.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the mere pendency of a bill in Congress is speculative and is not a ground to stay a final death sentence. Examiners like to use this case to test the rule that the constitutionality of a law does not change with the changing composition of the Supreme Court.