IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED MERCEDES CANO. FLORANTE C. TIMBOL, ADMINISTRATOR AND APPELLEE VS. JOSE C. CANO, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.

Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Hon. Arsenio
Santos, presiding, dated August 25, 1958, approving petitions of the
administrator Florante C. Timbol dated January 6 and 8, 1958. The order appealed
from authorizes the administrator to increase the area of a subdivision to be
formed out of the lands under administration from 30 hectares to 41.9233
hectares and approves the plan of such increased area.

The intestate Mercedes Cano died in August, 1945, leaving as her only heir
her son Florante C. Timbol then only 11 years old. On September 27, 1946, Jose
Cano, brother of the intestate, was appointed administrator. On April 13, 1951
Jose Cano filed a petition, thru his counsel Atty. Filemon Cajator, also an
uncle of the minor Florante C. Timbol, proposing that the agricultural lands of
the intestate be leased to the administrator Jose Cano for an annual rental of
P4,000, this rental to be used for the maintenance of the minor and the payment
of land taxes and dues the government. Judge itdilberto Barot, then presiding
the court, approved the motion in an order dated April 27, 1951, which
reads:

“WHEREFORE, the motion of the administrator and his lawyer dated April 13,
1951, is hereby granted under the conditions therein set forth and the further
condition that all previous obligations of the administration including the
previous deficits are assumed by said administrator, and that the arrangement
will continue only as long as, in the judgment of the Court, the same continues
to be advantageous to the heir, Florante C. Timbol.” (p. 27, Rec. on
Appeal).

On January 14, 1956 the court, upon motion of the administrator and the
conformity of the minor heir and his uncles, approved the reduction of the
annual rental of the agricultural lands of the intestate leased to the
administrator from P4,000 to P2,400 and the conversion of 30 hectares of the
agricultural lands into a subdivision.

On April 2, 1957, upon motion of the administrator, a project of partition
was approved, designating Florante C. Timbol the sole and exclusive heir of all
the properties of the intestate.

On June 6, 1957 Florante C. Timbol was appointed administrator in place of
Jose Cano and on January 6, 195S he presented a motion, which he modified in a
subsequent one of January 8, 1958, alleging among other things (a) that
the area destined for the projected subdivision be increased from 30 hectares to
41.9233 hectares and (b) that the plan submitted be approved. The motions
were approved but the approval was immediately thereafter set aside to give
opportunity to the former administrator and lessee Jose Cano to formulate his
objections to the motions. Cano’s objections are (1) that the enlargement of the
subdivision would reduce the land leased to him and would deprive his tenants of
their landholdings, and (b) that he is in possession under express
authority of the court, under k valid contract, and may not be deprived of his
leasehold summarily upon simple petition.

The court granted the motions of the administrator, overruling the objections
of Jose Cano, in the order now subject of appeal, which reads:

“The said contract of lease is on all fours illegal. Under article 1646 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines,—a new provision—,’the persons disqualified to
buy referred to in articles 1490 and 1491, are also disqualified to become
lessees of the things mentioned therein’, and under article 1491 (3) of the same
Code, executors and administrators cannot acquire by purchase the property of
the estate under administration.

“If, as already stated, Florante C. Timbol was only appointed administrator
on June 6, 1957 and the said contract of lease having been executed on July 9,
1956, the same falls within the prohibition provided by law. However, Jose C.
Cano avers that this court, in the instant proceeding’s, cannot pass upon the
legality of the aforesaid lease contract, but in its general jurisdiction. There
is no need for the court to declare such contract illegal and, therefore, null
and void as the law so expressly provides.

“Wherefore, in view of the foregoing considerations, the court hereby grants
Florante C. Timbol’s petitions dated January 6 and 8, 1958, approving the
amended plan for subdivision, attached thereto, and overrules Jose C Cano”s
motion for reconsideration dated May 9, same year.” (pp. 151-152, Record on
Appeal)

The above order is the subject of the present appeal.

In the first assignment of error appellant claims that the consideration of
the motions of the administrator cf July 6 and 8, 1958, without due notice to
him, who is a lessee is a violation of the Rules of Court. This objection lost
its force when the court, motu propio, set aside its first order of
approval and furnished copy of the motions to appellant and gave him all the
opportunity to present his objections thereto.

In the second and third assignments of error appellant argues that the court
below, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to deprive the appellant of his
rights under the lease, because these rights may be annulled or modified only by
a court of general jurisdiction. The above arguments are without merit. In
probate proceedings the court orders the probate of,the will of the decedent
(Rule 80, Sec. 5); grants letters, of administration of the party best entitled
thereto or to any qualified applicant (Id., Sec. 6); supervises and
controls all acts of administration; hears and approves claims against the
estate of the deceased (Rule 87, Sec. 13); orders payment of lawful debts (Rule
89, Sec. 11); authorizes sale, mortgage or any encumbrance of real estate (Rule
90, Sec. 2); directs the delivery of the estate to those entitled thereto (Rule
91, Sec. 1). It has been held that the court acts as a trustee, and as such
trustee, should jealously guard the estate and see “that it is wisely and
economically administered, not dissipated. (Tambunting vs. San Jose, 97
Phil., 491.)

Even the contract of lease under which the appellant holds the agricultural
lands of the intestate and which he now 3eeks to protect, was obtained with the
court’s approval. If the probate court has the right to approve the lease, so
may it order its revocation, or the reduction of the subject of the lease. The
act of giving the property to a lessee is an act of administration, also subject
to the approval of the court. Of course, if the court abuses its discretion in
the approval of the contracts or acts of the administrator, its orders may be
subject to appeal and may be reversed on appeal; but not because the court may
make an error may it be said that it lacks jurisdiction to control acts of
administration of the administrator.

In the fourth assignment of error, appellant argues that the effect of the
reduction of the area under lease would be to deprive the tenants of appellant
of their landholdings. In the first place the tenants know or ought to know that
the lands leased are lands under administration, .subject to be sold, divided or
finally delivered to the heir, according to the progress of the administration
of the lands of the intestate. The order appealed from does not have the effect
of immediately depriving them of their landholdings; the order does not state
so, it only states that the lands leased shall be reduced and subdivided. If
they refuse to leave their landholdings, the administrator will certainly
proceed as the law provides. But in the meanwhile, the lessee cannot allege the
rights of his tenants as an excuse for refusing the reduction ordered by the
court.

In the fifth assignment of error, appellant claims that his rights as lessee
would be prejudiced because the land leased would be reduced without a
corresponding reduction in the rentals. This would be a matter to be litigated
between the administrator and himsellf before the probate court. But the fact of
the prejudice alone cannot bar the reduction of the land leased, because such
reduction is necessary to raise funds with which to pay and liquidate the debts
of the estate under administration.

The sixth assignment of error merits no attention on our part; it is
appellant himself, who as administrator since 1945, has delayed the settlement
of the estate.

In the seventh assignment of error, appellant argues that since the project
of partition had already been approved and had become final, the lower court has
lost jurisdiction to appoint a new administrator or to authorize the enlargement
of the land to be converted into a subdivision. This assignment of error needs
but a passing mention. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate
delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. In the case at bar the
debts had not yet been paid, and the estate had not yet been delivered to the
heir as such heir.

We have taken pains to answer all the arguments adduced by the appellant on
this appeal. But all said arguments are squarely laid to naught by the
declaration of the court that the lease of the agricultural lands of the estate
to the appellant Cano, who was the administrator at the time the lease was
granted, is null and void not only because it is immoral but also because the
lease by the administrator to himself is prohibited.by Jaw. (See Arts. 1646 and
1491, Civil Code of the Philippines). And in view of the declaration of the
courtbelow that the lease is null and void, which declaration we hereby affirm,
it would seem proper for the administrator under the direction of the court, to
take steps to get back the lands leased from the appellant herein, or so much
thereof as is needed in the course of administration.

The court’s order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.