VIRGINIA CLAREZA, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS, FELIPE J. ZAMORA, PLAINTIFF-INTERVENOR-APPELLANT, VS. BENJAMIN A. ROSALES AND AMADO A. DIMAYUGA, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing a
“complaint in intervention and/or amended complaint” filed by Felipe J. Zamora
in Civil Case No. 34997 of said court, entitled “Virginia Clareza, et al.,
plaintiffs, versus Benjamin A. Rosales, et al., defendants.”

In said civil case, Virginia Clareza and her children claim damages for the
death of Juan Luno (Virginia’s husband and the father of her children), caused
by the reckless negligence of the defendant Rosales in colliding with the
taxicab driven by the deceased. On February 10, 1958, the defendants filed their
answer, claiming that the incident was due to the negligence of the deceased
himself, and praying for the dismissal of the complaint. By way of counterclaim
they asked for payment of damages to them. On February 12, 1958, plaintiffs
filed their answer to the counterclaim.

On January 21, 1959, Felipe J. Zamora filed an urgent motion for leave to
intervene and/or be substituted for the plaintiffs attaching thereto his
complaint in intervention and/or amended complaint. In his motion, he avers that
he is the owner of the Golden Taxicab that the deceased Juan Luno was driving at
the time of the collision; that he has paid P4,000.00 to the heirs of the
deceased as compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and is therefore
subrogated to their rights against the defendants. In his complaint, the
intervenor prays for actual, compensatory, exemplary and moral damages,
including the P4,000.00 which he paid to the heirs.

The lower court admitted the complaint in intervention and required the
defendants to answer it and on January 29, 1959, the defendants filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint as well as the complaint in intervention. In support of
their motion, defendants allege that inasmuch as plaintiffs have already
recovered compensation from the intervenor, they have no more cause of action
against the defendants, and, consequently, there is also no basis for the
intervention.

Acting upon said motion to dismiss and for the reasons stated therein, the
lower court on February 7, 1959 dismissed both the complaint and the complaint
in intervention. A motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal having
been denied, Intervenor Zamora has prosecuted this appeal to this Court.

In this appeal, the right of intervenor Zamora to be subrogated to the rights
of the plaintiffs against the defendants is not disputed. The only question
refers to the correctness of the dismissal of the complaint in intervention.

Fundamentally, intervention is never an independent action, but is ancillary
and supplemental to an existing litigation. (91 A.L.R., p. 592; Garcia
vs. David, et al., 67 Phil., 279). The above principle was reiterated by
us in the case of Reliance Commercial Enterprises, Inc. vs. Board of Tax
Appeals, etc. L-6697, November 18, 1955, although in said case we sustained the
resolution of the Board of Tax Appeals dismissing the complaint in intervention
.also because the intervenor had not intervened before the Commissioner of
Customs. It only did so in an appellate court.

Strictly speaking, as the right of the original plaintiffs to sue the
defendants has ceased to exist by virtue of the payment of compensation to them
by the intervenor, in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 6, Act 3812, as
amended by Republic Act No. 772, the said action of original plaintiffs may no
longer be allowed to continue. The right of an intervenor should merely be in
aid of the right of the original party, like the plaintiffs in this case. As
this right of the plaintiffs has ceased to exist, there is nothing to aid or
fight for. So the right of intervention has ceased to exist.

However, the coming in of the intervenor may be allowed under the provisions
of Section 20 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

“In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or
against the original party, unless the court upon motion directs the person to
whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with
the original party.”

Under the provisions of Section 6 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as
amended, the employer who paid the compensation to an employee “shall succeed
the injured employee to the right of recovery from such person what he paid.” We
hold that the intervenor, the employer, may well be substituted as party
plaintiff. In the case at bar he actually prayed the court to allow him to do
so. Thereafter, he presented the amendments to the original complaint, required
by the new circumstances surrounding the substituted party’s rights. Such a
procedure subserves the policy of the Rules avoiding multiplicity of suits. The
right of the intervenor herein being the same right of the original party
injured by the negligence of the defendant, which right has been transferred to
the intervenor, the latter should be allowed to be substituted for the original
plaintiff.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby set aside, the intervenor Felipe
J. Zamora is substituted for the original plaintiffs Virginia Clareza and her
children, and the complaint filed by the intervenor admitted. Let this case be
returned to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance herewith. With
costs against the defendants-appellees.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista
Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, De Leon, and
Natividad, JJ., concur.