ANACLETO SANTIAGO, PETITIONER, VS. PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORP. AND COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

Santiago versus Pilar Development Corp

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, brought by Anacleto Santiago against Pilar Development Corporation and the Court of Appeals. Santiago had sued the corporation for forcible entry, claiming that he had been in prior physical possession of a parcel of land in Dasmariñas, Cavite since 1967 and that the corporation ejected him by force, intimidation, strategy and stealth in February 1996. The case matters because it teaches the boundary of the one great rule of forcible entry: that the only issue is prior physical possession. Here the Court explains when evidence of title may be looked at, and how far any pronouncement on ownership in such an action can reach.

Procedural History

Santiago filed his complaint for forcible entry with the Municipal Trial Court of Dasmariñas, Cavite. On April 28, 1997, that court decided in his favor, ordering the corporation to vacate the property, to restore possession to him, to pay him 100,000 pesos monthly from the time of the forcible entry until possession is restored, and to pay 100,000 pesos in attorney's fees plus the costs of suit.

The corporation appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20, which on March 6, 1998 affirmed the Municipal Trial Court. The Regional Trial Court rejected the corporation's argument that its possession must be reckoned from the issuance of the Transfer Certificate of Title in its name in January 1974, citing the rule that the only issue in forcible entry is physical or material possession, and that the proper remedy was accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

On April 4, 1998, the corporation filed a Motion for Reconsideration and or for New Trial, attaching affidavits of new witnesses and documents. On May 8, 1998, the Regional Trial Court granted the motion and dismissed Santiago's complaint, holding that his possession rested solely on his self-serving statement and those of his caretakers, and that the corporation's possession must be based on the title of its predecessor-in-interest, Antenor S. Virata, issued on March 12, 1958. Santiago's Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

Santiago then filed a petition for review under Rule 42 with the Court of Appeals. On February 13, 2002, the Fourteenth Division affirmed the Regional Trial Court but deleted the award of attorney's fees in favor of the corporation. Santiago's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on May 16, 2002, hence this petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Facts

Santiago alleged that he had been in prior physical possession of a parcel of land within Dasmariñas, Cavite since 1967, that the corporation unlawfully ejected him by means of force, intimidation, strategy and stealth around February 1996, that he demanded that the corporation vacate but it refused and threatened him with physical harm, and that it remained in illegal possession, depriving him of income of 100,000 pesos monthly.

The corporation denied the allegations. It claimed that it acquired its properties in good faith and for value from the registered owner, that it entered possession through peaceful and lawful means in the concept of an owner, without force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth against anyone in prior physical possession, that Santiago was never in prior physical possession, and that it had been in continuous and uninterrupted physical possession since its acquisition before February 1996.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals relied on the joint affidavit of Santiago's own witnesses, who stated that they had been his caretakers since November 1993, or after he acquired the land from the former owner, but that they had been residing on the land even before his acquisition. The appellate court found that the Transfer Certificates of Title of both parties covered the same property, but that the corporation's title antedated Santiago's by almost twenty years. Weighing all the evidence, it held that Santiago failed to prove prior physical possession as against the corporation.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the issue of prior possession by comparing the dates of the titles of the opposing parties.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling for the corporation despite the testimony of Santiago's witnesses that he occupied the land personally and through his predecessor since 1967.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in considering affidavits presented by the corporation only on appeal to the Regional Trial Court instead of in the Municipal Trial Court.

Applicable Provisions

Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 7. Judgment how executed. The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no case bind the defendant or a person not a party to the action. The judgment shall not be conclusive as regards the issue of ownership.

This provision fixes the limit of the case: whatever the court says about possession, and even about ownership, cannot bind the parties on the question of title.

Section 33, paragraph 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as cited in the decision, provides:

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. x x x

The decision invokes this provision together with Section 7, Rule 70 for the rule that the judgment in a forcible entry case is effective with respect to possession only.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Court of Appeals did not err. It is true that what is determinative in actions for forcible entry is the issue of prior possession. However, where the question of prior possession materially hinges on who the real owner of the disputed portion is, the trial court may resolve the issue of ownership and make a declaration as to who among the contending parties is the real owner. Nonetheless, any pronouncement affecting ownership of the disputed portion is merely provisional, and does not bar nor prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land. Here, the appellate court turned to evidence of title only because it found Santiago's testimonial evidence riddled with inconsistencies and lacking probative value, and because the corporation's title antedated his by almost twenty years.

On the second issue, the Court held that the appellate court's finding was supported by the record. Santiago's own witnesses admitted residing on the land even before his acquisition, and his claim of possession since 1967 rested on self-serving statements. The Court found no reversible error in the conclusion that he failed to prove prior physical possession as against the corporation.

On the third issue, the Court sustained the appellate court. The corporation maintained that the documentary evidence it supposedly submitted belatedly was actually attached to the position paper it submitted to the Municipal Trial Court. In any event, the Court found that the appellate court did not commit reversible error under the circumstances.

Doctrine

First, in forcible entry the determinative issue is prior physical possession, or possession de facto, not ownership.

Second, by way of exception, where the question of prior possession materially hinges on who the real owner of the disputed portion is, the trial court may resolve the issue of ownership and declare who among the contending parties is the real owner.

Third, any pronouncement on ownership in a forcible entry case is merely provisional. It does not bar nor prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land, because the judgment is effective with respect to possession only and is not conclusive as regards ownership.

Fourth, evidence of title may be considered where it is the best available proof of prior possession, especially where the opposing party's testimonial evidence is inconsistent and lacks probative value.

Disposition

The petition was denied, and the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals were affirmed, with no costs; the corporation prevailed.

Remember This

Memorize the line: prior possession is the issue in forcible entry, but where prior possession hinges on ownership the court may provisionally rule on ownership, and that ruling never binds in a later title case. Examiners use this case to test the exception to the possession-only rule and the provisional character of an ownership pronouncement under Section 7, Rule 70.