SOFIA CANTON, DECEASED,REPRESENTED BY CO-ADMINISTRATORS OFHER ESTATE, MACARAIG CANTON, JR.,AND JUAN V. BOLO, DOMINGO L. ANTIGUA,ROGELIO UY, AND JUAN V. BOLO, PETITIONERS,VS CITY…

Canton versus City of Cebu

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by Sofia Canton, deceased, represented by the co-administrators of her estate, against the Metro Cebu Development Project and the City of Cebu. The action began as a complaint for forcible entry over a fenced parcel said to be in San Roque, Talisay, Cebu, which the respondents entered and cleared on the ground that the fence was an illegal construction without the necessary permit. The case matters to the reviewee not for the law of possession but for the law of appeal: it is the Supreme Court's clean statement that the right to appeal is a statutory privilege, and that the Court of Appeals may dismiss a petition outright when the petitioner fails to attach the pleadings and material portions of the record that Section 2 of Rule 42 requires.

Procedural History

The petitioners filed a complaint for forcible entry before the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu. In its decision dated 15 November 1998, the Municipal Trial Court ruled for the petitioners, ordering the respondents and all persons acting in their behalf to vacate the property and surrender possession, and to pay attorney's fees of 5,000 pesos plus the costs of suit. The Municipal Trial Court held that the only issue before it was prior physical possession, not the right of ownership or possession, and that while the removal of the fence for lack of a permit may have been legally proper, the respondents should first have secured the aid of the court before taking possession.

The Metro Cebu Development Project filed a notice of appeal with the Regional Trial Court. In its decision dated 2 June 2000, the Regional Trial Court reversed the Municipal Trial Court. It declared the disputed area to be foreshore land not covered by any foreshore lease agreement, and therefore part of the public domain belonging to the State regardless of whether it lies in Talisay or in Cebu City. It further held that the removal of the fence was not an act of forcible entry, and dismissed the complaint as well as the compulsory counterclaims for insufficiency of evidence.

The respondents received the Regional Trial Court's decision on 23 June 2000, while the petitioners claimed to have received their copy only on 7 January 2002. The petitioners filed their petition for review with the Court of Appeals on 16 January 2002. On 19 February 2002, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition outright for failure to attach copies of the complaint, the answer, the parties' position papers filed with the Municipal Trial Court, and the parties' appeal memoranda filed with the Regional Trial Court, in violation of Section 2 of Rule 42, pursuant to Section 3 of the same Rule. The petitioners moved for reconsideration on 1 March 2002 but again did not submit the complaint, the answer, or the appeal memoranda, calling the ruling overly harsh and a triumph of technicality over substance. The Court of Appeals denied the motion, explaining that the missing pleadings were indispensable to test the petition's allegations that the Regional Trial Court had injected an alien cause of action and that the respondents had made admissions in their answer. The petitioners then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Facts

Employees of the Metro Cebu Development Project identified the disputed area as part of the South Cebu Reclamation Project. On 24 June 1998, the project, with the assistance of the Squatters Prevention Encroachment Elimination Division of the Office of the City Mayor of Cebu City, removed the barbed wire fence from the disputed area on the ground that it was an illegal construction for lack of the necessary permit.

The petitioners responded with a complaint for forcible entry before the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu, alleging that the respondents' agents unlawfully entered their property and demolished their fence. They insisted that their property lies in San Roque, Talisay, Cebu, outside the reclamation project, and they presented tax declarations to prove ownership. The respondents answered that the petitioners had no right of ownership or possession over the area, which they described as foreshore land reclaimed and developed as part of the project.

The Municipal Trial Court ruled for the petitioners on the narrow ground of prior physical possession. The Regional Trial Court reversed, holding the area to be foreshore land of the public domain and the removal of the fence not an act of forcible entry. What followed was a procedural failure: when the petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, they omitted from their petition the very pleadings needed to test their allegations, and they persisted in that omission even on reconsideration.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition outright for failure to attach copies of the complaint, the answer, the parties' position papers filed with the Municipal Trial Court, and the parties' appeal memoranda filed with the Regional Trial Court, as required by Section 2 of Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals, in requiring those specific pleadings, imposed a requirement beyond what Section 2 of Rule 42 demands.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2 of Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Form and contents. - The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies, with the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the specific material dates showing that it was filed on time; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the specification of errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal; (d) be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, the requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition.

This is the provision the petitioners were held to have violated, and its paragraph (d) is the source of the duty to attach the pleadings and other material portions of the record supporting the petition's allegations.

Section 3 of the same Rule provides:

Effect of failure to comply with requirements. - The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.

This is the provision that authorized the Court of Appeals to dismiss the petition outright rather than merely note the deficiency.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition had no merit and that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed it. The Court noted that instead of admitting his fault, petitioners' counsel would rather blame the Court of Appeals and the seeming harshness of its reliance on technical rules of procedure. Non-compliance with any of the requirements of Section 2 is, by the express terms of Section 3, a sufficient ground for dismissal.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the argument that the Court of Appeals had invented a requirement. The Court pointed to paragraph (d) of Section 2, which requires the petition to be accompanied by the judgments of both lower courts and by the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition. The Court adopted its earlier ruling in Atillo versus Bombay as the guide for practitioners who insist on their own interpretation of the Rules:

[I]t is not disputed that it is petitioner who knows best what pleadings or material portions of the record of the case would support the allegations in the petition. Petitioner's discretion in choosing the documents to be attached to the petition is however not unbridled. The [Court of Appeals] has the duty to check the exercise of this discretion, to see to it that the submission of supporting documents is not merely perfunctory. The practical aspect of this duty is to enable the [Court of Appeals] to determine at the earliest possible time the existence of prima facie merit in the petition. Moreover, Section 3 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides that if petitioner fails to comply with the submission of "documents which should accompany the petition," it "shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof." In this case, the insufficiency of the supporting documents combined with the unjustified refusal of petitioner to even attempt to substantially comply with the attachment requirement justified the dismissal of her petition.

The Court balanced this with the settled principle that rules of procedure must be used to facilitate, not to frustrate, justice. But it immediately qualified that principle: the right to appeal is not a natural right but a statutory privilege, exercisable only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law, and a party who seeks to appeal must comply with the law's requirements or forfeit the privilege. Rules of procedure may be relaxed only to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure. Here, the petitioners' refusal even to attempt substantial compliance, repeated on reconsideration, foreclosed any relaxation.

Doctrine

First, the right to appeal is not a natural right but a statutory privilege, and it may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. A party who seeks to appeal must comply with the law's requirements; otherwise, he forfeits his privilege.

Second, under paragraph (d) of Section 2 of Rule 42, the petitioner must attach the judgments of both lower courts and the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition. The petitioner knows best which documents support his allegations, but that discretion is not unbridled; the Court of Appeals has the duty to check it so that the submission is not merely perfunctory, and so that the court can determine at the earliest possible time whether the petition has prima facie merit.

Third, under Section 3 of Rule 42, failure to comply with the requirements on the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition is a sufficient ground for dismissal, and the Court of Appeals may dismiss outright.

Fourth, rules of procedure may be relaxed only to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure. A litigant who persistently refuses to comply, even after being directed to do so, is not entitled to that relaxation.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for review; the respondents prevailed.

Remember This

Memorize the line: the right to appeal is a statutory privilege, not a natural right, and it is exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the law. Examiners use this case in remedial law and procedure to test the mandatory attachment requirement of Section 2 of Rule 42, the outright dismissal authorized by Section 3, and the narrow limits of liberal construction of the Rules.