🎧 Case Brief Lecture

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES LORENZO L. LAOHOO AND VISITACION LIM-LAOHOO; AND LUZ LOMUNTAD-MIEL, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. NO. 151973. July 23, 2009 July 23, 2009

← Read the full text of the decision

Listen, read along, or open presentation mode.

National Power Corporation versus Spouses Laohoo

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by the National Power Corporation, a government-owned and controlled corporation mandated to develop and transmit electric power nationwide, against the spouses Lorenzo and Visitacion Laohoo and the spouses Ernesto and Luz Miel. The petitioner sought to annul the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing its petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction for having been filed out of time. The case matters because it is a compact lesson on the jurisdictional character of the period to appeal, on the finality of judgments in expropriation proceedings, and on the binding effect of notice to counsel of record, including deputized counsel of the Office of the Solicitor General.

Procedural History

The National Power Corporation filed two complaints for expropriation before the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar, seeking to acquire easements of right-of-way over portions of the respondents' properties. The trial court fixed provisional values, allowed the petitioner to enter the properties upon deposit, and appointed commissioners to determine just compensation. The commissioners recommended a fair market value of not lower than 1,900 pesos per square meter. On September 15, 1997, the trial court issued orders fixing just compensation at 2,000 pesos per square meter. The petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied. Its notices of appeal were dismissed by the trial court for having been filed out of time, and its motion for reconsideration of that dismissal was likewise denied. The trial court then ordered the deposit of the balance of the just compensation, and when the petitioner failed to comply, it issued writs of execution and notices of garnishment. The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition for late filing. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Facts

The National Power Corporation decided to acquire an easement of right-of-way over the respondents' properties in Catbalogan, Samar for its proposed Leyte-Luzon high voltage direct current power transmission line project. On October 2, 1996, it filed two complaints for expropriation, covering 3,258 square meters of the Laohoo properties and 4,738 square meters of the Miel properties. The trial court fixed provisional values, later reduced upon motion, and the petitioner deposited the amounts with the Philippine National Bank. On February 28, 1997, the trial court allowed the petitioner to enter the subject properties.

The trial court appointed three commissioners to determine just compensation. The commissioners submitted an appraisal report recommending an amount not lower than 1,900 pesos per square meter. The respondents moved to increase the recommended values, and the trial court set the matter for further hearing. On September 15, 1997, the trial court issued orders fixing just compensation at 2,000 pesos per square meter, or a total of 6,616,000 pesos in one case and 9,476,000 pesos in the other. The petitioner received the orders on September 25, 1997, and filed a motion for reconsideration on October 2, 1997, which the trial court denied in an order dated October 14, 1997.

The petitioner filed its notices of appeal by registered mail on October 30, 1997. The trial court dismissed the appeal in an order dated December 10, 1997, finding that the petitioner's counsel, Attorney Neon Cinco, received the order denying the motion for reconsideration on October 15, 1997, such that the notice of appeal was filed six days beyond the reglementary period. The trial court later ordered the deposit of the balance of the just compensation, and when the petitioner failed to comply, it issued writs of execution and notices of garnishment. The petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition for having been filed beyond the sixty-day period under Rule 65.

Issues

  • Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that it was filed out of time.
  • Whether or not the dismissal of the petitioner's appeal by the trial court was proper, considering the timeliness of the notice of appeal, the failure to state material dates, and the late payment of docket fees.
  • Whether or not the petitioner is bound by the receipt of the trial court's order by its counsel of record, including deputized counsel of the Office of the Solicitor General.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.

This provision bears on the case because the trial court's order fixing just compensation was a final order that completely disposed of the controversy, and it should have been timely appealed.

Section 13 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

The trial court may, motu proprio or on motion, dismiss the appeal for non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.

This provision supports the dismissal of the appeal for the petitioner's failure to pay the docket and other lawful fees on time.

Section 2 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

The notice of appeal shall state the names of the parties to the appeal, the judgment or final order or part thereof appealed from, and the material dates showing the timeliness of the appeal.

This provision is relevant because the petitioner's notice of appeal failed to indicate the date when it received the order denying its motion for reconsideration.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the dismissal of the petition by the Court of Appeals was not based on mere technicality, but on the petitioner's failure to perfect its appeal on time with the trial court. The Court found that the petitioner's counsel received the order denying the motion for reconsideration on October 15, 1997, leaving only eight days, or until October 23, 1997, within which to appeal. The notice of appeal filed on October 30, 1997 was therefore late. The Court emphasized that the timeliness of an appeal is a jurisdictional caveat that not even the Supreme Court can trifle with.

On the second issue, the Court held that the trial court committed no error in dismissing the appeal. The failure to perfect an appeal within the period fixed by law renders the decision final, and a final and executory judgment becomes immutable and unalterable. The Court also noted that the notice of appeal failed to state the material dates showing the timeliness of the appeal, and that the petitioner did not pay the appellate court's docket and other lawful fees on time. The Court quoted its ruling in Fil-Estate Properties, Incorporated versus Homena-Valencia:

The payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of the appeal.

The Court further held that the petitioner could not take refuge in the fresh period rule, because that rule does not extend to actions that have already become final and executory.

On the third issue, the Court held that service of a copy of the order on Attorney Cinco is deemed service upon the petitioner. The Court ruled that service to one of several counsels is sufficient, and that the failure of counsel to file the necessary notice of appeal on time binds the client. The Court also held that the petitioner's contention that the Office of the Solicitor General was not furnished a copy of the order is without merit, because the acts of the authorized deputy bind the principal counsel, and service on the deputy is service on the Office of the Solicitor General.

Doctrine

The period to appeal is jurisdictional and mandatory. A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law. The payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of the appeal, and without such payment, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter. Service of a copy of the decision or order on one of several counsels of record is sufficient and binds the client, and the acts of an authorized deputy of the Office of the Solicitor General bind the principal counsel.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for certiorari.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the timeliness of an appeal is a jurisdictional caveat that not even the Supreme Court can trifle with, and that a final and executory judgment is immutable and unalterable. Examiners like to use this case to test the rules on the period to appeal, the payment of docket fees, and the binding effect of notice to counsel of record, including deputized counsel of the Office of the Solicitor General.