SUSAN GO AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONERS, VS. FERNANDO L. DIMAGIBA, RESPONDENT.

Dimagiba versus Go

The Case

This is a petition for review filed by Susan Go, joined by the People of the Philippines, against Fernando L. Dimagiba. The action challenges two orders of a Regional Trial Court in Baguio City which granted Dimagiba's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, released him from confinement, and required him to pay a fine of 100,000 pesos in lieu of imprisonment. The case matters because it fixes the character of the Court's administrative circulars on the Bouncing Checks Law: they are not penal laws, they do not operate retroactively, and they cannot be used to reopen a judgment of conviction that has already become final and executory.

Procedural History

Dimagiba was prosecuted for thirteen counts of violation of the Bouncing Checks Law before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Baguio City. After a joint trial, that court rendered a joint judgment of conviction, imposing three months of imprisonment for each count, an indemnity of 1,295,000 pesos with legal interest, attorney's fees of 15,000 pesos, and costs. Dimagiba appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, which denied the appeal and sustained the conviction. No further appeal was taken, and the Regional Trial Court issued a certificate of finality.

When the Municipal Trial Court ordered his arrest and issued a writ of execution, Dimagiba moved for reconsideration and for partial quashal of the writ, asking that the penalty be reduced to a fine alone. Both motions were denied. He was arrested and imprisoned. He then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the Regional Trial Court, which granted the writ, ordered his immediate release, and required a fine of 100,000 pesos in lieu of imprisonment. Go's motion for reconsideration was denied, and she came directly to the Supreme Court on pure questions of law.

Facts

Fernando Dimagiba issued thirteen checks to Susan Go. When presented to the drawee bank on their due dates, all were dishonored for the reason account closed. He was charged with thirteen counts of violating the Bouncing Checks Law, and after a joint trial he was convicted and sentenced to three months of imprisonment on each count, plus civil liability.

His appeal was denied and the judgment became final. When the trial court moved to execute, he asked that the penalty be reduced to a fine alone, invoking the Court's administrative circular on the Bouncing Checks Law. The trial court denied him, and he was arrested and jailed.

He then turned to habeas corpus before a different branch of the Regional Trial Court, which granted the writ, released him, and imposed a fine of 100,000 pesos in lieu of imprisonment, reasoning that the circular should be applied retroactively in his favor.

Issues

• Whether or not the writ of habeas corpus was validly granted, the Regional Trial Court having modified a final and executory judgment of conviction.
• Whether or not Dimagiba was entitled to the rule of preference in the imposition of penalties under the administrative circular on the Bouncing Checks Law.
• Whether or not the administrative circular operates retroactively and may be applied to a judgment that has already become final.
• Whether or not the modification of the final judgment was warranted under the exceptional circumstances recognized in jurisprudence.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of the Bouncing Checks Law provides:

Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

This is the penal provision the circular merely refines, and it shows that imprisonment remains an alternative penalty that the legislature, not the Court, may remove.

Administrative Circular 13-2001, clarifying the earlier circular, provides:

Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions of BP 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge.

This fixes the circular as a guideline addressed to the sentencing judge, not as a law conferring rights on convicts.

The same circular further provides:

The Judges concerned, may in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice, or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice.

This confirms that the choice of penalty rests on a factual review that a final judgment forecloses.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the writ of habeas corpus was improperly granted. The writ tests the circumstances of detention, but it may not be availed of when the person is in custody under a valid judgment, save in exceptional cases such as deprivation of a constitutional right, lack of jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or an excessive penalty. Dimagiba's resort to the writ was a procedural infirmity and an attempt to reopen a final case, amounting to forum shopping; the proper remedy was an appeal of the order denying his motions.

On the second issue, the Court held that the circular establishes only a rule of preference, and the determination of whether a fine alone is warranted rests solely on the trial judge who rendered the decision. The circular did not delete imprisonment, for the competence to amend the law belongs to the legislature.

On the third issue, the Court held that the circular is not a penal law and therefore has no retroactive effect. It applies only to pending or future litigations, and it cannot modify final judgments. The Court quoted its earlier ruling that the circular merely lays down a rule of preference and does not confer any new right in favor of the accused, much less those convicted by final judgment.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that the modification was not warranted. The exceptional case in which a final judgment was modified rested on a supervening event established by evidence, which was absent here. Settlement of civil liability after conviction does not erase criminal liability, for what the law punishes is the issuance of worthless checks, an offense against public order.

Doctrine

The administrative circular on the Bouncing Checks Law is not a penal law; it merely establishes a rule of preference in the imposition of penalties, and it applies only to pending or future litigations, never retroactively to final judgments. The writ of habeas corpus may not be used to reopen a final judgment of conviction or to correct a lawful penalty; the remedy is appeal. The competence to determine the proper penalty belongs to the court rendering the decision, and another court may not encroach upon it in the guise of granting the writ.

Disposition

The petition was granted, the assailed orders were nullified, Dimagiba's petition for habeas corpus was denied, and the case was remanded to the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Baguio City for his re-arrest and the completion of his sentence.

Remember This

The single line to memorize: the circular on bouncing checks is a rule of preference, not a penal law, so it never reaches a final judgment. Examiners use this case to test retroactivity, the limits of habeas corpus after conviction, and forum shopping.