PHILIPPINE AMERICAN DRUG CO., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND ALBERTO CUADRA, RESPONDENTS.

Certiorari, by way of appeal, to reverse the order of the Court of Industrial
Relations directing petitioner Philippine American Drug Co. to pay to respondent
Alberto Cuadra the difference between what he would have received as
petitioner’s Legaspi branch manager and what he had actually earned while
employed in another company, from December 1, 1957 to June 30, 1958.

In March 1957 in CIR Case No. 692-V (3), said Industrial Court found that
Philippine American Drug Co., was justified in laying off some 40 employees,
including Cuadra, then a sales supervisor, because it had suffered
business losses. However, the court ordered petitioner to give the employees so
separated first priority should it thereafter employ additional personnel.

It happened that on December 1, 1957, petitioner appointed Federico Garcia,
Jr., vice Angel Fidelino as Legaspi branch manager.

So, invoking his priority right to employment, Cuadra asked the court to
require petitioner to dismiss Garcia, and to appoint him instead as Legaspi
branch manager. In opposition, petitioner alleged that Cuadra did not have the
requisite qualifications and that Garcia, who was fully qualified, was not an
additional employee, but a replacement of Fidelino who had been dismissed.
Later, as affirmative defense, it averred that as of June 30, 1958, all its
provincial branch managers, Garcia among them, would be laid off.

Deeming Cuadra more qualified than Garcia, and considering his preferential
right, the Court of Industrial Relations on September 15, 1958, declared that
petitioner should have employed him instead of taking an outsider, (Garcia). It
therefore required petitioner to pay to Cuadra the difference between the
equivalent of what Garcia received during his incumbency and Cuadra’s actual
earnings during the same period. The motion for reconsideration having been
denied by resolution en banc, the present petition for certiorari, was
filed, petitioner claiming that the Industrial Court acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.

The issue is: Does a dismissed employee’s preferential right to reemployment
include appointment to a position higher than that which he had lost?

The position of Legaspi branch manager was higher than that of sales
supervisor.^[1]

Unquestionably, petitioner had suffered a business recession which rendered
unjustified Cuadra’s reinstatement on March 1957—a remedy to which he would
ordinarily have been entitled. So he was merely given a priority right to
be employed should petitioner subsequently employ additional personnel. A
preferential right to employment is a lesser privilege than reinstatement; it is
reinstatement contingent upon availability of work.

It is a settled rule that the Industrial Court cannot order reinstatement of
a dismissed employee to a position which he had not previously
occupied.^[2] All that is required is that
the dismissed employee be restored to his former position or to substantially
equivalent employment. If reinstatement, as defined, does not cover appointment
to a higher position (otherwise it would be a misnomer), then the preferential
right to employment, a lesser right, certainly cannot include appointment to a
position higher than that formerly occupied by the laidoff employee.

So, in ordering that Cuadra be paid the equivalent to Garcia’s salary (minus
what Cuadra earned in another company), the court virtually ordered his
appointment as petitioner’s Legaspi branch manager—an act which it had no power
to do. Indeed, even if Cuadra were still working as petitioner’s sales
supervisor at the time of Fidelino’s dismissal, he could have hoped to be
promoted, but he could not have compelled petitioner to promote him to
Legaspi branch manager.

WHEREFORE, the appealed order is reversed, and herein petitioner is absolved
from all liability to Cuadra. So ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.

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^[1] While there is no admission that the
office of branch manager is higher than that of sales supervisor, there is no
claim that they are equal. Respondent court avers that it had not impliedly
ruled that a Manila sales supervisor is of the same category as a provincial
branch manager (page 4, respondent court’s answer), somehow, leaving the
impression that they are not exactly of the same class. On the other hand,
Cuadra claims “that the position of sales supervisor is almost equivalent
to the position of branch manager (page 2, respondent Cuadra’s answer). “Almost”
means nearly; in large part; well-nigh; little short of (Webster’s International
Dictionary, 2nd ed., unabridged). So sales supervisor is not quite equal to a
provincial branch manager even with reference to petitioner’s organizational
set-up. Note that Guadra, when he was Davao general manager, received P650 a
month, but only P600 a month when was sales supervisor. (Cuadra was formerly
Davao general manager, but he res’gned on January 20, 1951, because he was being
demoted to salesman. Petitioner reemployed him as sales supervisor on
July 9, 1951).

^[2] San Miguel Brewery, Inc. vs.
Santos, G.R. No. L-12682. The Court (citing 36 Words & Phrases, Perm. ed.,
730) defined reinstatement as reforestation to a state from which one has been
removed or separated,and consequently declared that one who had been dismissed
from the position of temporary guard may be reinstated to the same, but not to
the position of permanent guard (which, though not stated, appears to be of
higher category, considering the tenure).