AURELIA T. DE PINEDA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. FELINO V. VELOIRA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Pineda versus Veloira

The Case

This is the case of Pineda versus Veloira, decided by the Supreme Court in June 1961. Aurelia Pineda sued Felino Veloira for forcible entry and illegal detainer over a parcel of land in Quezon City. The case matters not for the land itself but for a single procedural question: when does the period to file an answer begin to run again after a motion to dismiss is denied? Specifically, is an oral notice given in open court enough, or must the party actually receive a copy of the order of denial? The answer decides whether Veloira was properly declared in default.

Procedural History

The action began in the Municipal Court of Quezon City and was appealed by the defendant to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, sitting in Quezon City. In the court below, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss instead of an answer. The motion was denied, and the parties were notified of the denial in open court. The defendant later filed his answer, but on the same day the court declared him in default, holding that the time to plead had already expired because the running of the period resumed upon the oral notice in open court. The defendant moved to set aside the order of default; the motion was denied, and reconsideration was likewise denied. The defendant then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Facts

On or about May 12, 1957, according to the complaint, the defendant, by means of force, stealth and strategy, unlawfully entered and took possession of a parcel of land belonging to the plaintiff in Barrio Tatalon, Quezon City, and refused to vacate despite repeated demands.

The defendant received notice from the clerk of court that the case had been docketed on appeal on March 25, 1958. Two days later, on March 27, 1958, he filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action, claiming that ownership and title were involved and that the action was premature because that question was pending in another court. The motion was heard and denied on May 17, 1958, and the parties were notified of the denial in open court. However, a copy of the order of denial was sent to the defendant by registered mail only on June 25, 1958, and he received it on June 27, 1958.

Three days later, on June 30, 1958, the defendant filed his answer with a counterclaim for moral and actual damages. On that same day, upon the plaintiff's motion, the court declared him in default, reasoning that the period to answer resumed on May 17, 1958, when the parties were notified in open court. The defendant received a copy of the order of default on July 11, 1958, and on July 14, 1958, he moved to set aside the default, insisting that his period to answer began to run only on June 27, 1958, when he actually received the order of denial.

Issues

• Whether or not the running of the period within which to file the defendant's answer resumed on May 17, 1958, when he was verbally notified in open court of the denial of his motion to dismiss, or on June 27, 1958, when he actually received a copy of the order of denial.
• Whether or not the answer filed on June 30, 1958, was filed within the reglementary period, such that the order of default should be lifted.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3 of Rule 27 of the Rules of Court, on the modes of service, provides:

Service shall be made personally or by mail.

This provision is decisive because the Court holds that oral notice in open court is neither personal nor service by mail, and therefore does not constitute valid service of the order of denial.

Section 7 of Rule 40, on the answer in appealed cases, provides:

Within fifteen days after the receipt of the notice that the cause has been docketed in the Court of First Instance, the defendant shall file his answer.

This fixes the period that the defendant's motion to dismiss interrupted, and which resumed only upon valid service of the denial.

Section 4 of Rule 8, on interruption of the period to plead, provides:

A motion to dismiss interrupts the period within which to file the answer.

This explains why the defendant, having filed his motion two days after notice, still had thirteen days from the denial within which to file his answer.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled that the period to answer resumed only on June 27, 1958, when the defendant actually received a copy of the order of denial. The Court held that notice given orally in open court as to the denial of a motion is not sufficient and does not constitute service under Rule 27. The provisions of that Rule prescribing the modes of service are, in the Court's words, "mandatorily intended to provide a uniform procedure affecting a matter of public interest which may not be changed by the parties." To be effective, service of the denial of a motion must be made either personally or by mail.

On the second issue, the Court ruled that the answer was timely. The defendant received notice that the cause had been docketed on March 25, 1958, and filed his motion to dismiss two days later, on March 27, 1958. Since the motion interrupted the time to plead, he had thirteen days from the denial of his motion within which to file his answer. Having been served with the order of denial only on June 27, 1958, he still had until July 10, 1958, to file his pleading. His answer, submitted on June 30, 1958, was therefore filed within the prescribed reglementary period, and his motion to lift the order of default should have been granted.

Doctrine

Oral notice in open court of the denial of a motion is not valid service and does not restart the period to plead. Service of such an order must be made personally or by mail, as the Rules mandatorily require. A motion to dismiss interrupts the period to file an answer, and that period resumes only upon valid service of the order denying the motion. Consequently, an answer filed within the remaining period counted from actual receipt of the order of denial is timely, and a default entered before that period expires must be set aside.

Disposition

The Supreme Court set aside the order appealed from and remanded the case to the court below for further proceedings, without costs. The defendant prevailed.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that oral notice in open court of a denial is not service; only personal service or service by mail restarts the period to plead. Examiners use this case to test default, motions to dismiss, and the mandatory modes of service under the Rules of Court.