EMIGDIO SORIANO AND BEATRIZ DE VERA, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. THE HEIRS OF DOMINGO MAGALI, NAMELY: LUISA MAGALI, LUTGARDA MAGALI, DEMETRIA MAGALI, MODESTA CALIMLIM, LAMBER…

This case was originally appealed to the Court of Appeals, but certified to this Court as one involving purely
legal issues. The complaint is for recovery of a piece of
land. The Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Judge
Jesus P. Morfe presiding, gave judgment for the defendants, appellees, herein, on the following findings:

“The parties to the instant case submitted no testimonial evidence
but merely documentary proofs of some of their respective allegations.

“It
appears from the evidence of the plaintiffs that the disputed
Northeastern portion, consisting of 25,000 square meters, forms part of
a bigger parcel of land consisting all in all of 317,600 square meters
which, as early as July 18, 1933, was owned by and registered in the
names of the spouses Domingo Magali and Modesta Calimlim (Original
Certificate of Title No. 51878, Exhibit
“I”). On July 28, 1939, said spouses sold the aforesaid Northeastern
portion of said parcel of land to the spouses Tomas Cerezo and Segunda
Soriano for P500.00, but said deed of sale (Exh. A) was never
registered and annotated on said O.C.T. No. 51878. Said spouses Tomas
Cerezo and Segunda Soriano in turn sold the same Northeastern portion
to Maximino Mamormo for P950.00 on January 7, 1941 (Exh. B). This deed
of sale was also not registered and annotated on said 6.C.T, No. 51878.
On April 5, 1946 Francisca Reyes, as surviving spouse of said Maximino
Mamorno sold her one-half pro-indiviso share in said Northeastern
portion to the spouses Emigdio Soriano and Beatriz de Vera for
P1,000.00, and on the same day she, as guardian of her minor children,
sold the remaining one-half pro-indiviso of said Northeastern portion
to the same spouses Emigdio Soriano and Beatriz de Vera (Exhibit C and
D). These two deeds of sale were on April 9, 1946 registered under the
provisions of Act No. 3344 and were, consequently, also not registered
and annotated on O.C.T. No. 51878. Under these circumstances,
plaintiffs Emigdio Soriano and Beatriz de Vera filed the present action
for reivindicacion of said Northeastern portion, the defendants Modesta
Calimlim and Lamberto Magali being now in possession of said
Northeastern portion and claim ownership thereof.

“Defendants’ evidence (Exh. 3) on the other hand shows that in
January, 1944 Maximino Mamorno in turn sold said Northeastern
portion back to Modesta Calimlim for P5,000.00, but, instead of
executing a formal deed of sale, merely delivered to said Modesta
Calimlim the muniments of title over said land, among which were
the original of the deed of sale of July 28, 1939 by the spouses
Domingo Magali and Modesta Calimlim in favor of the spouses
Tomas Cerezo and Segunda Soriano (Exh. 1), and the original
of the deed of sale of January 7, 1951 by the spouses Tomas Cerezo
and Segunda Soriano in favor of said Maximino Mamormo (Exh.
2). By virtue of said verbal sale Modesta Calimlim has been, as
found by this Court in its decision of June 26, 1956 in Civil Case

No. 9618 between the same Emigdio Soriano and Modesta Calhnlim
(Exh. 6), in possession of said Northeastern portion continuously
since January, 1944 to the present time, paying the real estate tax
thereon under Tax Declaration No. 47040 (Exhs. 4 and 4A to
4—O, inclusive). Consequently, defendant Modesta Calimlim, one
of the registered owners of said parcel of land covered by O.C.T.
No. 51878, and her co-defendants Manuel, Consorcia, Luis, and
Tomas, all surnamed Magali, surviving children of the other registered owner, Domingo Magali, are now the lawful owners of
said parcel of land, including the aforesaid Northeastern part
thereof.

“The defendants Luisa, Demetria and Lutgarda, all surnamed
Magali, on their part, presented no evidence in their behalf.”

Three errors are assigned in this appeal, namely: (1) The lower
court erred in not holding that the deeds of sale (Exhibits A & B,
plaintiffs) are valid and binding, even though not registered and
annotated at the back of original certificate of title No. 57878; (2)
The lower court erred in not holding that there was in fact no verbal
sale of the property in question (northeastern portion) made by
Maximino Mamorno in favor of defendant Modesta Calimlim; (3) The lower
court erred in not holding that the deeds of sale (Exhibits C & D,
plaintiffs) executed by Francisca Reyes in favor of the
plaintiffs-appellants were valid and binding and conveyed the ownership
of the property in question (northeastern portion) to said appellants.

The first assignment of error misses the point made by
the court a quo in its decision. It did not say that the
deeds of sale marked Exhibits A and B were not valid
and binding, but rather that they became functus oficio and divested the vendees of their rights thereunder upon
surrender of the documents to Modesta Calimlim when
the land was “resold” to her verbally in 1944. Indeed
those two sales are the basis of the respective claims of
the parties, both of whom derive their conflicting titles
from the second vendee—appellees by virtue of the verbal
sale aforesaid, made by Maximino Mamorno in 1944, and

appellants by virtue of the two deeds executed by Francisca
Reyes, Mamorno’s surviving spouse, on April 5, 1946.

The decisive questions, as raised in the second and third
assignments of error, are, first, whether or not there was
in fact a sale in favor of appellees, and second, if there
was, whether or not it is superior to the sales in favor of
appellants.

The first question seems at first blush to be one of fact,
which would place this appeal within the jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals. But in reality the question refers
to the correctness of the ruling of the court a quo in
admitting and giving probative value to the documentary evidence
presented by appellees. The pivotal document is their Exhibit 3, which
is a sworn written statement of Ildefonso Mamorno, dated June 10, 1946,
affirming his personal knowledge that his son Maximino had sold the
disputed land to Modesta Calimlim for P5,000.00 in January 1944; that
no written instrument of sale was executed but that all the papers
(muniments of title) concerning the land were delivered by his son to
the said vendee; that his son actually received the purchase price; and
that possession of the land was thereupon delivered to the vendee.
Exhibit 3 is one of the documents submitted before the Deputy Clerk of
Court, who had been commissioned to receive them upon motion of both
parties, and no objection to the admission of any one of them appears
in the record.

True, Exhibit 3 could have been objected to because
the affiant did not testify and hence could not be cross-examined by the adverse party as to its contents. But
no such objection having been interposed, the right of
cross-examination was waived; and having thus been
admitted in evidence, the document is entitled to some
probative value as to the fact of the verbal sale. Since
this fact is categorically stated in Exhibit 3, it is not a
mere inference from, but rather antecedent to and herefore justified the consideration of, the corroborative
circumstantial evidence presented by appellee, to wit:
(1) actual possession of the land by appellee since 1944;
(2) possession by them of the originals, of the first two
deeds of sale (Exhibits 1 and 2); (3) tax declaration in
the name of appellees; (4) receipts of tax payments made
by them; and by contrast, (5) possession by appellants
of only a carbon copy and a true copy of Exhibits 1 and
2 (Exhs. A and B), respectively, as well as their failure
either to declare the land in their names or to pay the
taxes thereon.

As basis of the declaration by the court a quo that
since 1944 appellees had been in actual possession of the
land, reliance is placed on its finding to that effect in the
decision in the previous case of forcible entry between
the same parties (Case No. 9618, Exh. 6), which was
decided in favor of appellees, who were the defendants
in that case, appellants invoke section 7 of Rule 72, which
states as follows:

“SEC. 7. Judgment conclusive only on possession, not conclusive
in certain actions.—The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession
only and in no wise bind the title or effect the ownership of the
land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between
the same parties respecting title to the land or building, nor
shall be held conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon different cause of action.”

While it is true that the judgment in an action for
forcible entry is not conclusive of the facts therein found
in a case between the same parties upon a different cause
of action, the rule does not say that such facts shall have
no probative value whatsoever. In the absence of any
evidence to the contrary—as in the case at bar there is
none—the previous judgment on the question of material
possession carries a persuasive effect. The logic of the
situation is that if Modesta Calimlim purchased the land,
albeit verbally, in 1944, the corroborative circumstances
pointed out above would not have existed. The originals
of the two deeds of sale (Exhibits I and 2), would not
have been in the hands of the appellees, nor would they
have declared the land in their names nor paid the taxes
thereon.

This case, therefore, should be resolved in the light of the law
governing double sale of the same property Article 1473 of the Old
Civil Code, now Article 1544, provides that if immovable property is
sold to different vendees the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the registry of
property; and should there be no inscription the ownership shall
pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession.
Appellees obtained possession of the land in good faith in 1944;
appellants never did so. The registration by appellants of the sale in
their favor was made under Act 3344, which refers to properties not
registered under the Land Registration Act, and hence was not effective
for purposes of Article 1544 of the Civil Code. Registration of
Instruments, in order to affect and bind the land, must be done in the
proper registry (Secs. 50 and 51, Act 496).

The Statute of Frauds, invoked by appellants with reference to the verbal sale to Modesta Calimlim, has no
application in this case, because the statute applies only
in an executory sale of real property, not in one which
has been consummated by the delivery of the property to
the vendee.

There being no error in the judgment appealed from,
the same is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.